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Abstract 
This dissertation examines private gun ownership and its sociocultural and political 
implications in modern China from 1860 to 1949, a period characterized by foreign invasion, 
constant military conflicts, and political decentralization. During this period, foreign guns, along 
with their Chinese imitations, flooded society. In response to the social disorder, many Chinese 
civilians turned to this new class of weaponry for self-defense. While historians have understood 
the gun in China in terms of military modernization, this dissertation sets the privately-owned 
gun in its social and political context, and studies why Chinese civilians chose to arm themselves 
with guns and how governments of different periods responded to their armed civilians. 
 This study argues that growing social violence and the state’s inability to respond to it 
led Chinese men and women seek to obtain their own weapons. This demand was fueled by the 
gun’s powerful symbolism in public culture and social life, and by beliefs that guns were a 
source of social status and self-empowerment. Civilian ownership of guns contributed to 
persistent social violence, and also transformed power structures in local society and accelerated 
local militarization, impacting the balance between state and society. Both late Qing and 
Republican governments’ regulation and control over armed civilians was a dynamic and 
contingent process, hovering between two practices: the state’s resolute maintenance of its 
monopoly on the uses of guns, and its reliance on armed civilians in local defense. This study 
argues that the state’s dilemma over whether to control private guns or rely on them prevented 
the formation of an effective and consistent gun policy. In contrast, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) adopted a different policy towards private gun ownership, by making the 
mobilization of an armed populace part of its massline policy. The CCP’s private gun policy 
played an important role in strengthening the CCP’s presence and authority in wartime China. 
  
 
Drawing from a variety of sources such as government documents, legal cases, social 
survey reports, and popular writings, this study chronicles both the state efforts to deal with 
armed civilians and the reactions from the bottom. This dissertation engages with and 
complements wider research on modern Chinese history in examining violence, social life, and 
the dynamic state-society relationship.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China witnessed an unprecedented 
level of social and political transformation. The Qing dynasty began to dramatically decline as 
the once powerful Chinese empire was laden with overwhelming suffering from within and 
without. The collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) and the formation of the Republic (1912-
1949) did not bring socio-political stability to China. Instead, the nation was wracked by almost 
constant warfare, political fragmentation, and unprecedented waves of banditry. Shen Congwen 
(沈從文 1902-1988), one of the most influential writers of the Republican era, wrote a short 
essay entitled “Old and New (新與舊 Xin yu Jiu),” in which he attributed the escalation of social 
violence to the proliferation of weapons, which made their way from the hands of soldiers to 
those of civilians. One theme that Shen expressed in the essay is that the ready availability of 
guns gave those predisposed to aggression the means to seize local power. The public perception 
of the 1911 Revolution was in reality its social byproduct: the rise of armed civilians and 
resultant constant social violence.1 
 Shen’s description indicates the existence of a new social phenomenon in modern China 
that deserves our scholarly attention. Non-military individuals or groups chose to arm themselves 
with guns in the late nineteenth century, when the central government was impotent to maintain 
its monopoly on violence. Private gun ownership became surprisingly common during the 
Republican period, as constant warfare and political decentralization accelerated local 
militarization. In both periods, Western guns manufactured by companies such as Colt, 
                                                          
1 Shen Congwen, “Xin yu Jiu,” (新與舊, Old and new), in Shen Congwen, Xin yu Jiu (Shanghai: 
Liangyou tushu yinshua gongsi, 1936), 135.  
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Remington, Winchester, and Mauser, together with their Chinese imitations, flooded local 
society. Japanese guns, too found their ways into China and were diffused in society.2 Observing 
the variety of guns held in private hands led German missionary F. Strauss to conclude that 
China was a “splendid gun museum.”3  
Ownership of these guns had a profound and heretofore unnoticed impact on Chinese 
society and ultimately, I argue, national politics. In a time of tumultuous upheaval, ambitious 
individuals or groups, like the ones in Shen’s essay, armed themselves with guns to dominate 
local society, which helped transform traditional power structures and challenge the state’s 
monopoly on violence. Recognizing the danger of private gun ownership both to society and to 
their own power, the late Qing government, the Nationalist Government (KMT), and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) made efforts to measure, and in some cases, regulate private gun 
ownership. As my dissertation shows, the decisions that each political entity made about how to 
deal with armed civilians had profound effects on the national political arena during the late 
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. The late Qing government officially 
loosened harsh restrictions on gun ownership, and saw the armed civilians as important power 
holders to defend the localities, if they were properly regulated. The Nationalist Government 
followed the late Qing practice, and adopted a regulatory approach, seeking to allow guns to 
remain in the hands of those it judged to be the “good people (良民 liangmin).” The KMT’s 
                                                          
2 As early as the late nineteenth century, Chinese revolutionaries sought to obtain weapons from 
Japan, which experienced a successful program of military modernization. The firearm 
smuggling reached a peak when Japan occupied Manchuria and established a puppet state in the 
early 1930s, where had become a base for gun smuggling. See Leang-Li T’ang, ed. The Puppet 
State of “Manchukuo” (Shanghai: China United Press, 1935), 122-24. 
3 F. Strauss, “In Perils of Robbers,” in We Are Escaped, ed. F. Strauss (London: China Inland 
Mission, 1932), 30. 
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effort to maintain control over violence and to utilize the armed populace to help the state defend 
localities led to an inconsistent gun policies. The Communists approached civilian gun 
ownership differently in the 1930s and 1940s, coopting armed civilians into their ongoing 
revolutionary project. 
The study of private gun ownership in Republican China thus provides a new prism 
through which to examine state-society relations in modern China. Using a wide range of fresh 
sources, this dissertation project sheds new light on China’s social power structures and state-
building efforts. Despite the pervasiveness of fragmented violence brought about by unregulated 
gun ownership, scholarly investigation of this subject has been rare. To date, almost all studies of 
arms in China have related to China’s military modernization.4 European and American 
historians have studied the history of international arms transfers, and examined China’s position 
in the global arms network from the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the real influence of 
                                                          
4 China historians have explored several issues on China’s military transformation, ranging from 
the reception of foreign technology, changes in the organization of the Chinese military, and the 
ideas of Chinese military officials. Some important works include: John K. Fairbank, ed. The 
Cambridge History of China, vols.10 and 11 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978-
1980); Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 
1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957); Wang Ermin 王爾敏, Qingshi junshi shi 
lunji 清史軍事史論集 (Essays on military affairs in the Late Qing) (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 
1980).  Thomas L. Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance 
Industry, 1860-1895 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); David Pong, Shen Pao-chen and China’s 
Modernization in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John 
L. Rawlinson, China’s Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967). For the historiography of Chinese military modernization, see Richard 
S. Horowitz, “Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-
1911,” in A Military History of China, eds., David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 153-74.  
 
  
4 
 
foreign weapons on the society of recipient countries are still complex and ill understood.5 As a 
consequence, much is known about the various Chinese governments’ arduous efforts to acquire 
Western military technology, but little work has been done on other aspects of the firearm’s 
history in Chinese society.  
My research shows that as more private individuals acquired guns, many Chinese 
localities saw the emergence of military-based elite powers that challenged state authority. Philip 
Kuhn and Edward McCord’s classic studies remain the most important works in the process of 
militarization. These works demonstrate that local militarization kept the Nationalists from a 
successful program of state-building.6 Using that research as a baseline, my work follows the 
story into the 1930s and 1940s, when militarized elites, local bullies, and others contended for 
dominance over local society. The new forms of firearms, whether imported from the West or 
manufactured in China based on Western designs, were the essential tools in this struggle for 
dominance, and for that reason I place the gun at the center of my research.  
To fathom the social, cultural, and political implications of private gun ownership in 
modern China, the questions at the core of my research are twofold: Why did Chinese people in 
the modern period embrace private gun ownership? How did the state deal with an armed 
populace in its state-building efforts? This dissertation posits that private gun ownership was not 
only a social and cultural phenomenon, but also an important component of Chinese political 
                                                          
5 For the history of the arms trade, see Donald J. Stoker Jr. and Jonathan A. Grant, eds., Girding 
for Battle: The Arms Trade in a Global Perspective, 1815-1940 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 
2003); Jonathan A. Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of 
Imperialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
6 Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social 
Structure, 1769-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Edward A. McCord, The 
Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993).  
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culture during the late Qing and Republican period. This dissertation argues that Chinese 
civilians’ demand for guns was fueled by the gun’s provocative symbolism in social life, 
including violence, social status, and self-empowerment. Both late Qing and Republican 
governments’ regulation and control over the armed civilians appeared as a dynamic process, 
hovering between two practices: the resolute maintenance of a monopoly on violence, and the 
reliance on armed civilians in their efforts to defend localities. Both central and local 
governments during this period adopted a “control/reliance” approach, which will be explained 
in the following chapters. A series of programs, including gun registration, licensing, inspection, 
and smuggling prevention were designed and implemented to maintain social order and stability. 
In the meantime, the easy access to arms gave rise to a highly-militarized society. Local elites 
who were able to “translate access to guns and military skills into local power,” in many cases, 
served as agents for state penetration into society.”7 Thus, the political dilemma prevented the 
formation of an effective and consistent gun policy in modern China.  
In the Cambridge History of China, Mary Rankin, John K. Fairbank and Albert 
Feuerwerker argue that “efforts to find a simple progression or a single key to the dynamics of 
all this change in Republican China founder in the face of the size and geographical diversity of 
the country, differences of local social organization, and unevenness of development in different 
spheres.”8 According to this view, it is impossible to find a single model to explain the historical 
trajectory of modern China, which has been undergoing dynamic transformation and possesses 
substantial cultural diversity. My research on private gun ownership focuses on just one topic 
                                                          
7 Edward A. McCord, Military Force and Elite Power in the Formation of Modern China (New 
York: Routledge, 2014), 102. 
8 Mary B. Rankin, John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, “Introduction: Perspectives on 
Modern China’s History,” in Cambridge History of China, ed. John K. Fairbank, vol. 13 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 6.  
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from which vantage point we can understand many aspects of China from the late nineteenth 
century to 1949. The introduction of foreign guns, whether through cross-border commerce or 
contraband smuggling underscores China’s involvement with the broader world. Chinese 
civilians’ penchant for the lethal weapon in modern period reveals developments there were not 
so different than occurred elsewhere in the world, where private gun ownership changed the 
state-society relationship. It also reveals how Chinese people embraced violence as one part of 
their social life. The state’s regulation efforts and the effectiveness of gun policies allow us to 
capture the dynamic relations between state and society. From the late 1930s, the armed 
populace, in the eyes of Chinese Communists, served as an important social force that could be 
utilized to fulfill their revolutionary agenda. Thus, the gun manifested its multifaceted and fluid 
nature in China. This dissertation complements our existing knowledge of weapons, violence, 
state power, and societal change in modern China. 
As the first comprehensive study to examine the phenomenon of private gun ownership 
in modern China, this project uses a variety of primary documents to identify an important but 
overlooked dynamic in the emergence of the modern Chinese state. This study will engage with 
existing scholarship in social, cultural, and political history. 
Scope 
 
This dissertation focuses on the period from the late Qing’s Self-Strengthening 
Movement in 1860 when foreign guns began pouring into China, to the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949. My research takes 1949 as the terminus ad quem because 
with the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party successfully 
used a campaign to suppress “counterrevolutionaries” to disarm civilians. After 1949, the 
Communist government claimed a monopoly on violence through the banning of private 
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possession of all firearms. It was from 1860 to 1949 that the general prevalence of privately-
owned guns loomed large in social life and political activities throughout China. This period was 
characterized by foreign invasion, constant military conflicts, and political decentralization. 
Under such circumstances, people chose to arm themselves when a weak government was 
impotent to maintain social order and public security. Another reason to focus on this period is 
that, for the first time in history, Chinese state (both the late Qing and the Republican 
governments) was not able to defend the monopoly on the distribution of advanced firearms, and 
even allowed ordinary people to own guns. The state’s shifting stances towards an armed 
populace allow me to scrutinize the process and obstacles of the state building efforts.  
Terms 
 
The term “private gun” does not do justice to the variety of guns that circulated in Chinese 
society. During the first half of the twentieth century, China was flooded with different types of 
guns, including traditional bird guns, foreign guns of various brands, and their Chinese copies. A 
few terms became common in this era, including “bird guns 鳥槍,” “foreign guns 洋槍,” 
“civilian guns 民槍,” and “self-defense gun自衛槍支.” This variety makes definitions 
necessary. The muzzle-loading matchlock gun transferred from Japan in the sixteenth century 
had already been localized in the Ming and Qing dynasties. The Chinese called the matchlock 
“bird (鳥 niao) gun,” later known as the “native (土 tu) gun.” When trading restrictions were 
lifted in 1842, foreign goods started to flood Chinese society. Chinese people called these 
Western imported goods “洋貨 yanghuo”, indicated their “modern” and “superior” status, while 
symbolizing native made as “pure local goods.” Western weapons poured into China in 1860 
when China started to learn modern military technology. The western gun was given the prefix 
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“foreign” (yang), which served to denote its superiority over the traditional Chinese bird gun. 
However, as Sherman Cochran in his book on consuming Chinese medicine during the early 
twentieth century suggests, Chinese consumers’ distinction between “Chinese” and “Western” 
was very broad and inexplicit. According to Cochran, “[Chinese customers’] notions of what was 
‘Chinese’ included both old medicine and new ‘old’ medicine; and their notions of what was 
‘Western’ included Chinese-made ‘new medicine’ as well as Western-made products.”9 As this 
dissertation will show, the imitations of foreign guns constituted an important part of civilian 
weapons. In this sense, if Chinese people began defining the term “foreign” broadly and 
inclusively, it is no exaggeration to say that such an obscure notion can also be applied to 
Chinese-made “foreign guns.” 
Another important term is “private gun ownership,” which in my case refers to individuals 
or groups who were not soldiers. In addition to ordinary civilians, spontaneous collective defense 
forces organized by local elites are also at the core of my inquiry. These individuals and groups 
pursued powerful weapons for a variety of reasons, including self-defense, showing their 
elevated social status, or purely committing violence. My objects of study are those individuals 
and groups without “a revolutionary agenda at transforming the basic structure of the state.”10 
Nevertheless, this does not mean these individual or groups were insulated from national politics. 
                                                          
9 Sherman Cochran, Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 161. For the Chinese consumer culture, see Frank 
Dikötter, Exotic Commodities: Modern Objects and Everyday Life in China (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007).   
10 In this sense, my research resembles the work on worker militias by Elizabeth Perry. However, 
her approach focuses on how worker militias built their citizenship and connected themselves 
with national politics in urban area. I take another angle by exploring the role of gun in the 
formation of individual and collective power. See Elizabeth Perry, Patrolling the Revolution: 
Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2006).  
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Rather, they were closely connected with the state, especially when their holding of power 
constituted a potential threat to the state authority in the eyes of the government officials or 
political actors, who drew these armed individuals or groups into the political landscape, as the 
state sought to either regulate or mobilize them. 
The Proliferation of Private Gun Ownership: A Nationwide Overview 
 
The total number of guns owned by non-military individuals cannot be calculated with 
any precision. This is partly owing to the reality that a vigorous national program of gun 
registration was absent during late Qing and Republican periods. Though successive 
governments designated private weapons regulation policies including gun licensing and 
registration, these procedures were never effectively implemented. The difficulty in accurately 
estimating the amount of private guns also lies in the sheer diversity of Chinese people who 
owned guns. Gun ownership was more prevalent among violence-prone people, such as urban 
criminals and rural bandits, whose roving lifestyle also hindered their visibility. In the modern 
period, affluent urban dwellers and rural residents obtained guns for self-defense purposes. But a 
majority of them too left few historical traces.  
As Edward McCord has shown, the formation of military power in Republican China was 
an uneven process, which depended on “the particular circumstances, or opportunities, in 
different areas.”11 In a similar vein, gun ownership was unevenly distributed in Republican 
China. In the province of Guangdong, for example, gun ownership was especially common, 
owing to the penetration of foreign guns from nearby Hong Kong and Macau. In some northern 
provinces, like Henan, where bandit raids were common, many local residents bore arms for self-
                                                          
11 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 11.   
  
10 
 
defense. As my research shows, bandits and outlaws were primary armed groups who armed 
themselves with modern guns. Civilians’ action of pursuing guns partly stemmed from the social 
insecurity caused by frequent banditry and crime. When the regions suffered from deteriorating 
social disorder, people were more likely to acquire powerful weapons to defend themselves and 
their communities. Based on a number of social survey report, historian Phil Billingsley 
estimated the general distribution of banditry in modern China, which might be applicable to the 
distribution of privately-owned guns, as offense and defense were intertwined.12    
 
                                                          
12 Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 28. 
  
11 
 
 
Figure 1: The distribution of bandits in Republican China. SOURCE: This map was adapted from 
Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China, 32; Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 
1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University, 1976). 
While difficult to estimate with any precision, based on social survey reports and criminal 
cases, it is possible to figure out major regions that possessed large number of guns. Modern 
Shanghai, for example, was one major point of entrance for foreign guns, which were held by 
gangsters, members of the urban middle-class, bandits, and others. Before the Chinese 
Communist Party’s takeover in 1949, the Shanghai Municipal Police Department issued more 
than eight thousand gun licenses to the city’s civilians, who legally owned a weapon for self-
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defense.13 Violent and ruthless acts committed by Shanghai gangsters who armed themselves 
largely with rapid-firing weapons like the semiautomatic Mauser, almost reached their peak. A 
crime statistic by the North China Herald, Shanghai’s most influential foreign newspaper of the 
time, stated that the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) arrested more than 300 gangsters on 
charges of armed robbery and murder from 1919 to 1923.14 
Private gun ownership was likely more prevalent in Guangdong province than in other 
Chinese provinces. After 1949, over 500,000 private guns were confiscated in Guangdong. 
People in the province had a long tradition of using firearms even before the modern gun was 
introduced in the late nineteenth century. Bird guns were commonly found in temple sacrifices, 
lineage feudings, and epidemic banditry. In the decades after the First Opium War (1838-1842), 
large amounts of firearms poured into Guangdong, mainly owing to its geographical proximity to 
Macau and Hong Kong, two Western colonies that provided access to foreign guns. One 1924 
newspaper report estimated that non-military individuals or groups in the province owned as 
many as four million guns.15  
Neighboring Guangxi province offered another focus for the prevalence of guns. Ethnic 
conflicts and frequent banditry spurred people’s obsession with powerful weapons. As one local 
                                                          
13 Shanghaishi Gonganju Gongan Shizhi Bianzuanweiyuanhui 上海市公安局公安史志編纂委
員會, Shanghai Gonganzhi 上海公安志 (Shanghai Police Gazetteer) (Shanghai: Shanghai 
shehui kexue chubanshe, 1997), 312; Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA) Q131-22-164, 165, 
168, 169, 170, 171. 
14 North China Herald, June 16, 1923. Gangsters’ activities were addressed in Brian G. Martin’s 
The Shanghai Green Gang, Politics and Organized Crimes, 1919-1937 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996). 
 
15 He Minhun 何民魂, “Zisha di Sunwen自殺底孫文” (To kill Sun Yat-sen), Huazi ribao 華子
日報, October 24, 1924. 
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Communist cadre recalled, wealthy families made efforts to buy powerful foreign weapons in the 
1920s, whereas the poor could only afford inferior guns or collectively buy firearms. Not willing 
to join the military, local peasants obtained guns to defend themselves against potential attacks 
from bandits or their rival ethnic groups.16 A newspaper article appeared in the Nanjing Minguo 
ribao in 1936 noted that “it was quite common for peasants to arm themselves with guns for self-
protection when grazing livestock and farming.”17 Given Guangxi’s proximity to Guangdong, 
Hong Kong, and French Indochina, guns of different types easily entered the province through 
the hands of smugglers and other intermediaries. 
The number of privately owned guns in Henan province soared in the decades after the 
1911 Revolution when the province suffered from constant warfare as Henan’s central 
geographical position “made it the site of pitched battles.”18 As Phil Billingsley’s research on 
Henan asserts, warlordism helped create a condition that contributed to “the consequent increase 
in banditry.”19 A conservative estimate in 1924 by sociologist He Xiya 何西亞 put the number of 
                                                          
16 For the distribution of firearms in Guangxi, see Xiaorong Han, Red God: Wei Baqun and his 
Peasant Revolution in Southern China, 1894-1932 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2014), 27-8.  
17 “Guangxi minqiang shengduo廣西民槍勝多” (The prevalence of privately-held guns in 
Guangxi), Nanning minguo ribao 南寧民國日報, July 24, 1936. 
18 Micah S. Muscolino, The Ecology of War in China, Henan Province, the Yellow River, and 
Beyond, 1938-1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 17. For the strategic importance 
of Henan, see Roger V. Des Forges, Cultural Centrality and Political Changei in Chinese 
History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Xin Zhang, Social Transformation in 
Modern China: The State and Local Elites in Henan, 1900-1937 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 25-8; Odoric Y.K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in 
Henan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 17. 
19 Henan Sheng Zhengfu Michuchu 河南省政府秘書處, Wuniandai Henan Zhengzhi 
Zongbaogao 五年來河南政治總報告 (Reports on the political situation of Henan in the past few 
years), N.P., 1936, 37.   
 
  
14 
 
bandits at more than 51,100 belonging to at least 6,000 gangs. From the 1920s on, rural 
militarization in Henan accelerated in response to weak central government, banditry, and 
military conflicts. Local elites and peasants sought guns for either self-defense or organizing 
militia forces. After the Nationalist government re-established its central authority in Henan in 
1933, the provincial government then ordered privately-owned guns registered. According to 
government statistics, 232,400 guns or rifles were registered and engraved.20 The prevalence of 
the privately-owned guns in Henan was partially a result of banditry. For instance, to defend 
against rapacious bandits, local elites in northern Henan forced the peasants to make 
contributions to purchase firearms.21 However, at the same time, a social survey conducted by 
sociologist Wang Yike王怡柯 found the real number of private guns was several times higher.22 
Wang’s survey was echoed by local Communist cadres, who were active in the Province to 
mobilize the masses. It was reflected in the Communist document that almost all the middle 
peasants in Western Henan owned at least one gun.23 
All of Manchuria, including today’s Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces, was 
another region that was known for the proliferation of guns in local society. The region 
transformed into a “bandit world” after the fall of the Qing dynasty as it underwent economic 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Wang Yike 王怡柯, Nongcun Ziwei Yanjiu 農村自衛研究 (Research on the Self-defense in 
Rural Society) (Kaifeng: Kaifeng jianhua yinshuju, 1932), 104.  
22 Xingzhengyuan Nongcun Fuxing Weiyuanhui 行政院農村復興委員會, Henan sheng 
nongcun diaocha 河南省農村調查 (Investigation of rural Henan province) (Shanghai: Shangwu 
chubanshe, 1934), 90.  
23 Henan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 河南省文史資料編纂委員會, Jiuzong zai 
Henan 九縱在河南 (The ninth regiment in Henan) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 
1986), 54.   
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and social dislocation. “Most peasant families had a gun, both to protect themselves from 
predators and to allow them to ‘go bandit’ themselves should the need arise.”24 It was quite 
common in Manchuria that wealthy landlords obtained guns to organize collective self-defense 
forces. The Shengjing Shibao reported in 1912 that one local gentryman of the suburb of Mukden 
owned 140 Russian guns, 72 Japanese guns, 13 Mauser rifles, and many other foreign weapons.25 
After Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and later established Manchukuo, the puppet state 
immediately registered civilians guns which were then confiscated. Jin Shiming 金名仕, a high 
ranking official in the puppet state, confessed after the Japanese surrender that he was ordered to 
confiscate approximately 290,000 guns from civilians in Jilin province in 1934.26 
The Issues and Historiography 
 
The Social and Cultural Life of Private Gun Ownership 
A full understanding of the relationship between private gun ownership and state politics 
is not possible without explaining who carried guns and how. In considering the circulation of 
private firearms and their social meaning to Chinese civilians, this project first sets the private 
gun in its specific social and cultural context. This project suggests that “the gun issue” did not 
come to the front line of China’s stormy history until the late nineteenth century. In the same 
essay cited above, Shen Congwen noted that most local militias continued to use swords, spears, 
                                                          
24 Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China, 28.  
25 “Xiangfang junhuo zhi zhongzu鄉防軍火之充足” (Weapons are sufficient among militia 
forces), Shengjing shibao, March 20, 1912.  
26 Hou Ming 侯明 ed. Wei Manzhouguo de Tongzhi yu Neimu: Weiman Guangyuan Gongshu偽
滿洲國的統治與內幕: 偽滿官員供述 (The confessions of former officials in the puppet 
Manchukuo) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), 182. 
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and traditional Chinese bird guns (niaoqiang) through the 1900s.27 Shen’s observation matched 
that of T.R. Jernigan’s 1908 travel account, which claimed firearms with gunpowder were 
seldom used in China’s interior regions, even though China invented the firearm in the early 
thirteenth century.28  
 Private weapons were available from a variety of sources in the Republican period, and 
those sources changed over time. Starting in the early 20th century, China was inexorably drawn 
into a whirlwind of global economic, technological, and political changes, accelerating the 
diffusion of personal weapons nationwide. Faced with slumping domestic markets for military 
arms, many Western arms producers turned to China, with its vast population and mounting civil 
insecurity, as a potential new market. Sales representatives from Remington, Colt, Winchester, 
and many other companies came to China in large numbers to dispose of their surplus arms 
following the end of the American Civil War, World War I, and Russian Revolution. Many 
accounts of the time show that Chinese civilians came to prefer these foreign-made guns for their 
greater accuracy, penetration, and operability. The invention of the self-loading semi-automatic 
gun in 1902 made the foreign gun even easier for non-military people to operate. For example, 
the Colt's Manufacturing Company’s business records show that by the late 1940s, its Colt 
M1903, a self-loading gun designed by John Moses Browning, sold astoundingly well in 
China.29  
                                                          
27 Shen, Xin yu jiu, 123.  
28 Thomas R. Jernigan, Shooting in China (Shanghai: Methodist Publishing House, 1908), 205-
10.  
29 Colt Collection, Connecticut State Library. 
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The inclination towards foreign guns was inextricably intertwined with trends in 
consumption. As China historians Sherman Cochran and Frank Dikötter remind us, “foreign” 
always denoted “modern” and “superior” and signaled elevated social status. China’s huge 
domestic market and its escalating demand spurred the emergence of gun merchants, who served 
as intermediaries between arms manufacturers and Chinese customers. Henry Brewer, a sales 
representative for the Winchester Arms Company, stayed in China from the 1890s to the 1920s. 
His diary, housed at the Yale University Archives, shows that many foreign trading companies in 
the treaty ports, like Canton and Shanghai, not only functioned as importers by providing 
Chinese officials the weapons they needed to fight rebels or defend themselves, but also played 
pivotal roles in circulating foreign guns among civilians.30 As bi-cultural intermediaries, these 
comprador-merchants, who were familiar with the China market, greatly facilitated the actual 
gun transactions. Fully utilizing their expertize in foreign firearms and adept at marketing 
through modern advertizing in newspapers and periodicals, these middlemen became sole 
licensed agents for urban dwellers to obtain this fashionable new product.  
While legal trading companies offered civilians the latest guns at exorbitant prices, a 
huge number of surplus or outmoded weapons from arms-producing states or armed conflict 
prone regions flowed into China through illicit arms trafficking. Meanwhile, with the 
introduction of foreign guns, early twentieth-century Chinese local society saw dramatic changes 
in the technology of manufacturing guns. Once these foreign guns arrived in China, local 
craftsmen learned to pirate their advanced design, and manufactured innumerable poor and 
inexpensive copies. For example, Nanyang, a city of southwestern Henan Province, had 
hundreds of small workshops operated by local gentry that imitated guns of foreign design and 
                                                          
30 William Henry Brewer Papers, Yale University Archives. 
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distributed them to local people. Lastly, the intermittent civil warfare during the Republican 
period facilitated the civilians’ easy access to weapons. Some local newspaper accounts show 
that, after doing battle, soldiers simply abandoned their weapons on the battlefield, which were 
then picked up by local people. These scattered firearms, known to local people as “leftover 
guns,” were gathered together in many cases to support the formation of militia forces. The 
firearm suppliers, foreign gun smugglers, Chinese criminal organizations, and corrupt officials 
saw the profitability of gun sales. A vast gun distribution network formed gradually, resulting in 
the prevalence of guns not only in China’s coastal areas but also in the interior. 
Gun Ownership and Power Structure in Local Society 
Chinese acquired small arms for a variety of reasons, including self-protection against 
armed bandits, elevating social status, and seizing local power. To analyze Chinese civilians’ 
motives for owning guns, this study draws inspiration from anthropologist Arjun Appadurai’s 
assertion that “commodities, like persons, have social lives,” and “their meanings are inscribed in 
their forms, their uses, their trajectories.” As he writes, “it is only through the analysis of these 
trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions and calculations that enliven things.”31 
Thus, the social significance of guns varies in both actual times and social spaces, as Chinese 
people of different classes might assign their weapons different symbolic values.  
Influenced by Confucian values, Chinese traditional culture regarded lethal weapons as 
implements of evil design. In the 1930s, the eminent historian Lei Haizong labeled Chinese 
                                                          
31 Arjun Appadurai, “Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value,” in The Social Life of 
Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 3. 
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culture a “demilitarized” culture (無兵文化 wu bing wenhua), in which the military side of 
society was devalued, therefore sapping Chinese civilians’ ability to fight. Chinese civilians had 
very limited access to life-taking weapons, except during periods of rebellions.32  However, the 
view of weaponry had changed in the republican period when the social turmoil created by 
predatory warlordism, foreign invasion, and the proliferation of armed banditry forced Chinese 
civilians to arm themselves for self-defense. Offenders with lethal intentions often resorted to 
guns when committing violent crimes. The social insecurity that resulted from frequent gun 
violence led to an arms race of sorts, incentivizing other Chinese to purchase ever more powerful 
guns, or replace their traditional Chinese weapons with potent foreign guns. Moreover, in the 
context of social insecurity, state officials and intellectuals had already been pondering how to 
mobilize civilians against potential enemies in local society. Sun Yat-sen, first president of the 
Republic of China, and his fellow reformers emphasized people’s right of self-defense, which 
would help the government fight against rebels and bandits. As a political tool to expel rebels 
and maintain order, the idea of self-defense suggested that the right to use violence was 
sanctioned if necessary.  
This sanctioned violence led to a startlingly high level of private gun ownership, which 
brought about tremendous and unexpected social consequences. In rural areas, the process of 
what Prasenjit Duara calls “state involution” in the late Qing and throughout the Republican era 
gave rise to regional predatory powers, which were freed from central constraints and controls.33 
                                                          
32 Lei Haizong 雷海宗, Zhongguo Wenhua yu Zhongguo de Bing 中國文化與中國的兵 
(Chinese culture and the Chinese military) (Changsha: Shangwu chubanshe, 1940), 51.   
33 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1988). 
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Over the course of political fragmentation and in response to the increasingly widespread armed 
banditry, this period witnessed pervasive local militarization as a form of collective self-defense. 
This process has been carefully examined by Philip Kuhn.34 Nevertheless, relatively few studies 
have been done on how ambitious individuals and their followers wielded guns and transformed 
local power structures. This new phenomenon was manifest in early 20th century Guangdong, 
which shows that militarized mobilization in rural society generated new forms of social power 
and domination, in which the use of guns played an increasingly decisive role. During the 
warlord era (1916-1928), some ambitious individuals in Canton, who were eager to improve 
their military prominence in local society, sought to acquire guns to establish their own 
Merchants’ Corps. Consequently, local elites in many regions, who had managed local affairs in 
the Qing dynasty, either obtained powerful guns to retain their dominance, or gave way to the 
newly emerging martial elite. 
Private Guns, National Politics: Regulating Gun Ownership in Wartime China 
Widespread and largely unregulated private gun ownership also exerted appreciable 
effects in the national political arena. Max Weber defined the modern state as a “compulsory 
organization with a territorial basis” which “successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force in the enactment of its order.” 35 Nevertheless, civilian 
possession of guns not only endangered public security, but also helped subvert central and local 
government authority over local areas, affecting the power relationship between the state and 
                                                          
34 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China. 
35 Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), 54, 56. 
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commoners. In a state of what Joel Migdal called “strong societies and weak states,” the 
Nationalist government had to face the failure of its bureaucratic penetration into local society.36  
In the city of Canton, for example, the government was wary of civilian gun ownership, 
which it took to be a challenge to its authority. In the early 1910s, amidst tremendous social 
instability, merchants in Canton created the Merchant Volunteers Corps for self-defense. In 
August 1924, when Sun Yet-sen, then president of the Guangdong Revolutionary government 
noticed in August 1924 that the merchants had purchased a large number of guns from Europe, 
he ordered the guns confiscated. After the merchants’ carried out a two-month protest and strike, 
Sun ordered his army to suppress the Corps, leading to the death of thousands of people. After 
the incident, the KMT government enacted various mechanisms to restrict private gun 
ownership.     
Various mechanisms then had been enacted or proposed by governments to regulate the 
foreign gun’s circulation. The Qing Code and many criminal cases of the late Qing confirm that 
carrying of firearms by civilians was prohibited and that the penalty for violation was severe. In 
the Republican period, the Nationalist government, on the one hand, allowed those people it 
defined as “good civilians,” or liangmin to own guns to guarantee their rights of self-defense. 
The Nationalists also worked to reduce firearm smuggling and implemented a national policy of 
gun licensing to ensure the compliance of gun owners. On the other hand, the Nationalists 
merged control of gun ownership with the baojia system, an administrative mechanism for local 
control and surveillance. However, the number of guns in private hands increased rather than 
decreased. These gun regulation efforts failed when regional power blocs undercut the central 
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power. In wartime, the government even ceased scrutinizing unregistered gun ownership for fear 
that restrictive control might provoke illegal gun owners to insurrection, as demonstrated in the 
1938 incident described below. 
In March 1938, Chen Cheng (陳誠1897-1965), a senior general in the Nationalist 
Chinese military, wrote to Chiang Kai-shek, expressing his deep concern over the popular 
movements in southwestern Shandong province. The confiscation of civilian-owned guns in 
Shandong, Chen argued, did more to provoke peasants’ anti-government outrage than any 
socioeconomic cause. Chen attributed the peasant unrest to the policy of confiscating guns 
adopted by Han Fuju, the military governor of Shandong, who had been executed two months 
previously for disobeying central government orders. Starting in the early1930s, Han took the 
advice of Liang Shuming, a leading figure of the rural reconstruction movement, to collect 
private guns, which were then distributed to militia for collective self-defense. However, local 
residents were skeptical about the policy, fearing that they would lose their means of self-
defense. To avoid escalating tension, Chiang quickly ordered Shandong authorities to return the 
guns and required them not to register any private weapons.37 
 In contrast, the lax gun regulations offered the CCP an opportunity to increase its 
military strength when it established revolutionary base areas in Shandong. The CCP internal 
documents show that its successful mobilization of armed civilians played an important role in 
enlarging its influence in North China. The CCP took another position and emphasized the 
strategic significance of armed civilians in sustaining its revolutionary enterprize. As the 1938 
                                                          
37 Chen Cheng, Chen Cheng Xiansheng Shuxinji: yu Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng Wanglai 
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incident in Shandong suggests, the CCP quickly exploited the potential military power of civilian 
gun holders. Another case in Henan province indicates that the number of peasants owning guns 
even determined where the CCP would choose to locate their revolutionary bases. In 1941, Wei 
Gongzhi (危拱之 1905-1973), a local communist cadre in Henan province, observed that 
“almost each county in West and South Henan had more than 10,000 guns in the hands of 
civilians.”38 The general prevalence of private guns, resulting partially from lax government 
regulations, offered the CCP an opportunity to increase its military strength when the CCP 
established its revolutionary base areas in this region. The CCP’s gun ownership policy fit into 
its general ideology of mass line policies. In seeking to mobilize these armed civilians, the CCP 
prevented them from registering their guns with the local Nationalist government. Local 
Communist cadres either organized the armed civilians into guerrilla units or confiscated private 
guns for their military use. As chapter five will present, Communist cadres in northern China 
adopted the theory of class struggle when dealing with the armed civilians in rural society. 
Mobilizing the armed peasants was the first priority, who were then organized to force local elite 
or strongmen to surrender their weapons. The mobilization of armed civilians in rural society 
played an important role in strengthening its military power from 1937 to 1945. 
Private gun ownership in the Republican period indicated a significant degree of power 
devolution. Studying this phenomenon allows me to re-evaluate the dynamic interaction between 
state and society. Previous studies in this field have either focused on elite mobility or have 
scrutinized the organized form of elite activism in local society. Scholars like Mary Rankin, 
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William Rowe, and David Strand have suggested that elites, through their extrabureaucratic 
activities, filled the power vacuum in society.39 A recent approach has been to study the process 
of state making. As Philip Kuhn, Prasenjit Duara, Xiaoqun Xu describe, in the shadow of “state 
involution,” the state’s efforts were jeopardized by local elites.40 Rather than discretely exploring 
elite activism and the state’s endeavors, my study takes these elements in a historical synthesis to 
probe how private gun ownership complicated local society, impeding the practice of state 
power. 
As noted above, while the Nationalist government failed to implement a mechanism to 
regulate private gun ownership, the CCP quickly realized armed civilians’ potential power in the 
base areas. The CCP’s organizational achievement in rural China has been understood by 
historians either as a hegemonizing process or as popular participation based on democratic 
principles. The central question of the previous scholarship on the CCP movement in rural China 
is “What are the strategies and policies that make peasants revolutionary?” Chalmers Johnson, 
for example, attributed the successful rural mobilization to the rise of mass nationalism. 
According to Johnson, the Japanese invasion deepened peasants’ national consciousness. The 
political vacuum made peasants rely on the CCP, which provided the leadership resisting the 
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Japanese Army.41 Mark Selden, on the other hand, criticizes that Johnson over emphasizes the 
CCP’s nationalistic character. He argues that economic motives and the CCP’s mass line policies 
played inevitable roles in strengthening the Party’s power in Shaanxi.42 Other scholars like Ralph 
Thaxton highlights the role of Chinese peasants who themselves possessed revolutionary 
passion, which was embedded in folk culture. According to Thaxton, it was the Chinese 
communists who guided the peasants to the revolutionary course.43  However, these scholarly 
works give little attention to the actual process of popular mobilization under the CCP’s 
organization initiatives in a highly militarized society.44 This research departs from the above 
two approaches that polarize statism and populism. Instead, through probing the CCP’s policy 
towards armed civilians in base areas, I argue that the two paradigms were not mutually 
exclusive. The findings of this project thus make a crucial contribution to the ongoing debate 
about how the CCP built its grassroots organization, leading to its victory in 1949. 
Sources 
 
The scattered nature of source materials was one of the principal challenges for 
completing this dissertation project. A research project on private gun ownership requires an 
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44 The classic work highlighting the people’s voluntary participation is Mark Selden’s The Yenan 
Way in Revolutionary China. Tetsuya Kataoka and Yung-fa Chen reject this view by arguing that 
the CCP had totalitarian ambitions to mobilize the peasants. See Yung-fa Chen, Making 
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investigation of why Chinese people chose to arm themselves with certain types of guns, how 
they obtained these weapons, and the sociopolitical responses generated from the prevalence of 
private-owned guns. However, no particular set of primary documents is available to answer 
each single question, especially given the clandestine nature of many types of gun circulations, 
and because anonymous gun owners left very few traces behind.  
To overcome the barrier, the dissertation relies heavily on the documents produced by 
witnesses and regulators. It uses three kinds of sources: print materials, archival documents, and 
artifacts of material culture. The apparent regional variations, particularly between the urban and 
rural areas, between the north and the south, and between coastal and inland areas, have to be 
obtained through consulting a large range of textual materials. The sociocultural changes 
associated with private gun ownership are documented in a bounty of materials which have 
survived in the archives of governments and private agencies, but have largely been ignored by 
scholars. The legal records and smuggling documents, though scattered in various Chinese 
archives and newspaper reports, provide uneven documentation of intraregional foreign gun 
circulation. While the clandestine nature of many firearm transactions in Chinese society makes 
it difficult to fully understand the patterns of circulation, this project also refers to the statistical 
evidence from the firearm suppliers’ side. For example, I obtained business documents of the 
Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company in the Connecticut state archives, containing 
primary sources encompassing the marketing strategies gun manufacturers used for approaching 
the Chinese market. 
Because the late Qing and Republican governments crafted laws that prevented civilians 
from owning concealed guns and conducted meticulous gun registration, an equally 
indispensable source is the nearly complete registration records preserved in Beijing and 
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Shanghai police archives. These records provide detailed documentation of legal urban gun 
owners’ personal backgrounds and include foreign gun’s models and maintenance records, 
supplying important information about urban dwellers’ motivations and penchants for foreign 
guns. This project also makes use of material culture, visual evidence, literature, and pictorials to 
explore the foreign gun’s cultural implications. The images of foreign guns appeared in many 
literary works. Since a majority of the Chinese population was illiterate, visual evidence, such as 
images in pictorials, caricature, and advertisements, is useful to illustrate the symbolism of guns.  
The published legal documents of both late Qing and Republican China are useful 
sources to study governments’ policies to regulate gun circulation and usage. However, the 
crimes reported in newspapers, government statistics, and officials’ personal memoirs are crucial 
to understanding the complexity of implementing gun control policies. In studying the 
relationship between private gun ownership and national politics, the bulk of evidence is drawn 
from archives in both mainland China and Taiwan. Of extreme importance are the records of 
CCP internal documents scattered in provincial archives that I have visited in Shandong and 
Henan, telling primarily the story of how the CCP in north China mobilized armed peasants, by 
either organizing them into guerrilla resistance, or confiscating guns for its revolutionary agenda. 
In addition to revolutionary documents preserved in archives, numerous memoirs from veteran 
soldiers convey vivid details about the CCP’s endeavor to consolidate rural base areas and 
guerrilla districts, and the strategies they crafted to ally with armed rural dwellers. Similarly, 
another important source is the military documents preserved in the Academia Historica and the 
Bureau of Military History and Translation in Taipei, which include detailed military logs and 
commands, supplying altogether vital information about the KMT’s policy of arming the general 
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population. These military sources are essential for comparing the actions and policies of the 
CCP and the KMT toward armed civilians that might help generate different political outcomes. 
Chapter Overview 
 
This dissertation is organized both chronologically and thematically. The thematic 
approach allows me to examine different implications that the issue of private gun ownership 
generated. The chronological organization provides a comprehensive investigation of the 
influences of privately-owned guns over time and space. The dissertation follows the foreign 
gun’s journey in China from a tool people chose to bear to a symbol of a threat government 
attempted to regulate. The first section contains chapter one explaining why some Chinese 
people embraced guns and how these guns got diffused in local society. The second section, 
composed of chapter two through chapter five, concentrates on how different political entities 
regulated and even controlled civilian possession of firearms from the late nineteenth century to 
1949. As I will present in the following chapters, an investigation of gun control policies adopted 
by the governments of late Qing, early Republic, Nationalist, and the Communist’s border region 
offers an opportunity to detect the continuity and discontinuity of the strategies pursued by 
political entities to approach their relationship with local society.  
Chapter one sets the gun in a social and cultural context and considers the social meaning 
of the gun to Chinese civilians. It suggests that guns lived colorful social lives and exhibited 
themselves as tools of violence, labels of social status, and symbols of self-empowerment. Many 
of these symbols, coexisted and converged, which is evident of just how integral they were to the 
social life of modern China. After discussing the multifaceted manifestations of the gun in social 
life, this chapter goes further and examines the channels that facilitated the gun’s diffusion.  
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As detailed in chapter two, the Chinese state’s inability to maintain its monopoly on 
violence started from the late nineteenth century, when China suffered from both domestic 
rebellions and external invasions. It suggests that the phenomenon of private gun ownership 
became a political issue from this period. To address the problem, the late Qing government was 
to adjust to the new social and political reality. The state’s regulation and control over its armed 
civilians appeared as a dynamic process, hovering between two ideologies. First, the state sought 
to maintain its monopoly on the most advanced weapons. Second, armed civilians were regarded 
as an extension of state power. The state thus exercised a permissive policy towards private gun 
ownership. The legacy of this policy, I argue, was felt in the Republican period. 
The late Qing’s gun policy that mobilized the armed civilians to defend localities did not 
achieve its end, but led to the state’s loss of its monopoly on violence. Revolutionary events 
throughout China were spiraling out of control, which ultimately toppled the Qing dynasty. In 
chronological order, chapter three then examines how the government of the early Republican 
period tried to maximize its control over localities and the setbacks it encountered. To provide an 
in-depth analysis of the dynamic relations between state and society, this chapter mainly focuses 
on Guangdong, from which Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist revolution was initiated to defeat northern 
warlords in China. As discussed above, privately-owned guns were more prevalent in 
Guangdong than in other Chinese provinces. When Sun Yat-sen made Guangdong province the 
base of its revolutionary initiatives, he was obliged to adopt a collaborative stance with gun 
owners. Their relationship was irreconcilable and mutually suspicious, which led to the 1924 
Canton Merchants’ Corps Incident. Dwelling on local newspapers, revolutionary documents, and 
witness accounts, this chapter proves the overall thesis that the government policy towards 
private gun ownership was contingent and dynamic. The collaboration and conflict between Sun 
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Yat-sen’s government and social forces in Guangdong, the Canton Merchants’ Corps in 
particular, suggested that the early Republican government frowned on private armed forces lest 
they threaten the government’s monopoly on power. This chapter enriches our understanding of 
the complexities of revolutionary agenda and local reality during the early Republic.  
Chapter four is devoted to the Nationalist period (1928-1949). The Nationalist 
government realized that civilian possession of guns subverted their authority over local areas, 
affecting the power relationship between the state and commoners. Following the legacy of late 
Qing and early Republican government, the Nationalist government adopted a regulatory 
approach to ensure the gun was in the hands of good civilians. Specifically, the Nationalists 
worked to reduce firearm smuggling and implemented a national policy of gun licensing to 
ensure the compliance of gun owners. However, these gun regulations proved ineffective as 
regional power blocs undercut the central power.  
To make a comparison of gun policies adopted by different government entities, the final 
chapter centers on the mobilization efforts of the Communists from the late 1930s, who saw the 
mobilization of an armed populace as an opportunity to strengthen the CCP’s military and 
political presence in North China. This chapter examines different strategies and tactics that the 
CCP used to mobilize the armed peasants and landlords, and suggests how the CCP appreciated 
the strategic significance of armed civilians in sustaining its revolutionary cause.  
The short epilogue and conclusion chapter briefly examines how the Communist 
Government in the early 1950s launched a movement throughout China to disarm the civilians. 
Rather than taking advantage of the armed populace as the CCP did before the Communist 
regime was established, this gun confiscation movement in the early 1950s echoed the overall 
thesis that the state’s stance towards private gun ownership was contingent and inconsistent, 
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which was determined by political deliberation. This chapter then discusses the issue of private 
gun ownership in contemporary China. A unified China under one-Party rule today guarantees 
the maximum effectiveness of the gun control policy.
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~ CHAPTER ONE~ 
The Prism of Violence: 
The Social and Cultural Life of Gun in Modern China 
 
Introduction 
 
In the late 1920s, Shanghai, China’s leading treaty port and international metropolis, was 
a bustling hub teeming with novelty, wealth, cultural diversity, and, of course, terrible crime.1 
This modern city, nurtured since the late nineteenth century by the frequent exchange of people, 
ideas, and commodities from, was now swollen with nearly three million people of various 
nationalities, races, and social classes.2 Like their counterparts in other countries, foreigners in 
Shanghai brought with them their customs, cultures, and objects, all of which helped make the 
city cosmopolitan, as was evident in its the diverse and colorful urban life. Among these exotic 
objects, some foreigners who themselves were competent marksmen (or women) also brought a 
lust for the use of modern guns to the Shanghai people, who needed them for self-defense or 
were simply fascinated by them. This is evidenced by some local Chinese people’s active 
participation in the revolver shooting club in the foreign concession areas. In May 1928, the 
Shanghai Revolving Association held a shooting competition in which Mrs. Li Junseng 李駿僧, 
                                                          
1 For the transformation of modern Shanghai, see Leo Ou-Fan Lee, Shanghai Modern: The 
Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999); Hanchao Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); For the urban crime in Shanghai, see Frederic 
Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); 
Wakeman, The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
2 For the urban population of Shanghai, see Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights, 26-27. 
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a wealthy lady from an illustrious family won the championship.3 Three months later, her 
husband outshone all other shooting enthusiasts in another competition organized by the 
Shanghai International Pistol Shooting Association.4  
However, the better-off residents’ use of firearms does not present the complete picture 
of the foreign weapon’s ubiquitous presence in a modernizing urban society. The introduction of 
foreign guns also bred social problems such as armed crime and gun running. By this time 
Shanghai crime rates had soared, and the city had gained its reputation as “the crime center of the 
Orient.”5 American journalist Percival Finch, who had traveled extensively in China during the 
Republican period, attributed the city’s poor public security to the ready availability of foreign 
guns to criminals.6 Shanghai newspapers of the time were filled with stories on criminal cases of 
shootings and armed robberies in which foreign-made guns figured prominently. Violent and 
ruthless acts committed by Shanghai gangsters who armed themselves largely with rapid-firing 
weapons such as the semiautomatic Mauser, had almost reached their peak.7 Witnessing the 
                                                          
3 “Shanghai shouqiang zonghui wuyue jingsai diyiming Li Junseng furen” (上海手槍總會五月
競賽第一名李駿僧夫人, Mrs. Li Junseng won the championship in the May shooting 
competition held by the Shanghai Revolving Association), Guohua shibao 國畫時報, May 28, 
1928.  
4 “Li Junseng jun benyue shanghai wanguo shouqiang jingsai hui rongyu jiangzhang” (李駿僧君
本月得上海萬國手槍競賽會榮譽獎章), Guohua shibao, August 28, 1928. 
5 Percival Finch, “The Crime Situation in the International Settlement,” The China Weekly 
Review, October 27, 1928. 
6 Finch, “Gun-Running an Organized Business in Shanghai,” The China Weekly Review, July 3, 
1926.  
7 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), 7.  
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prevalence of gun violence, Finch did not exaggerate when he claimed that “armed crime is one 
of the most difficult problems facing the Municipal Police.”8 
 How the wealthy Chinese like the Li Junseng family and unscrupulous armed criminals 
obtained their foreign weapons cannot be documented with any precision. However, as modern 
Shanghai experienced increasing interactions with the outside world, many Chinese in Shanghai 
would have had ample occasions to encounter this modern weapon and its uses. Well-off 
Chinese in search of comfort and security normally chose to reside in the International 
Settlement or the adjacent French Concession, where they would find no difficulty in buying 
modern guns in foreign trading companies as long as they obtained permission from the foreign-
run municipal police in Shanghai. However, these trading companies, whose clients were largely 
foreigners, were not the only entry channels. Gun running, a lucrative and organized business, 
was fairly prevalent in 1920s Shanghai, and provided a means through which foreign weapons 
found their ways to local gangsters, criminals, and even ordinary residents. For example, as 
Finch marveled in his 1926 report, a first-class Mauser automatic, could be sold for at least four 
times its original selling price in Hamburg, Germany. The huge profit margins generated from 
such an enormous price discrepancy constituted an important incentive to organized gun-runners 
and smugglers. “A huge trade in gun-running,” Finch wrote, “has developed between dealers in 
Shanghai and dealers in European countries, who are able to buy easily and cheaply from the 
manufacturers.” As he spelled out in the report, many illegal foreign arms entering Shanghai 
were “brought in small batches by sailors,” who, serving as traffickers, delivered their clients the 
arms they required from foreign suppliers.9 
                                                          
8 Finch, “Gun-Running an Organized Business in Shanghai.” 
9 Ibid. 
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 The incidents of Chinese men and women’s uses of guns, regardless of their actual 
intentions, frequently appeared in local newspapers and criminal reports of the time. However 
scattered and unconnected, these cases suggest new elements that characterize some aspects of 
Chinese social and cultural life during the early twentieth-century. To the Shanghai residents 
during this period, these newspaper accounts represented at least three different images of the 
gun and its uses. First, the image of the delicate foreign gun was perceived as a symbol of social 
status and modernity. Immediately after the 1928 shooting contest, Mrs. Li’s portrait appeared in 
the influential pictorial magazine Guohua shibao 國畫時報, in which she was holding a 
beautiful Colt pistol, wearing Cheongsam (qipao) dress 旗袍, and having a fashionable hairstyle. 
All these material objects and appearance, as China historians Leo Ou-fan Lee and Henrietta 
Harrison argue, embodied an advancing modernity.10 Second, the frequency of armed robbery, 
abduction, and homicide made Shanghai residents associate guns with violence, crime and 
danger.11 Third, in the face of frequent urban crime, carrying either a foreign gun or Chinese gun 
was seen as most immediate means of defense against potential threats.  
                                                          
10 See Leo Ou-fan Lee, Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 
1930-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Henrietta Harrison, Republican 
Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911-1929 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 179. 
11 Finch, “The Crime Situation in the International Settlement.”  
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Figure 2: Mrs. Li Junseng won the shooting competition (1928). SOURCE: Guohua 
shibao 國畫時報, May 28, 1928. 
Nevertheless, the multifunction of the gun was far from unique to this cosmopolitan city. 
From the late nineteenth-century onward, the numbers of privately-owned guns increasingly 
soared throughout China. The social status of private gun owners was varied in terms of their 
class, gender, and occupation. For example, one social investigation of the 1930s suggested that 
most big landlords in Henan and Hebei provinces owned at least tens of guns to both maintain 
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their dominance over local communities and to protect their properties.12 In both provinces, 
gangsters and bandits endeavored to acquire ample guns to commit crime and banditry. In the 
late 1930s when China suffered from Japanese invasion, the image of the gun appeared in many 
literary works, which illustrated the action of arming oneself as showing Chinese people’s 
resolution to fight for the country. 
 Thus, guns lived in a colorful social life and exhibited itself as tools of violence, labels of 
social status, and symbols of self-empowerment. It played a larger role as traditionally supposed 
in the theatre of modern China. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the social and cultural 
life of gun from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. It tends to answer the questions 
like why the gun became socially acceptable in modern China, what roles the gun played in 
social life, and how it made itself accessible. As it turned out, many types of the symbolism of 
the gun, including violence, modernity, and self-protection, coexisted and converged, which was 
integral to the social life of modern China. Based on a variety of sources, including newspaper 
reports and archival documents, this chapter starts with how the demands for guns were 
generated by people with different needs, and then discusses the image of the gun in public 
culture and social discourse. Finally, this chapter examines various channels through which the 
guns got diffused in both coastal and interior areas.  
The Traditional Image of the Gun: Violence and Crime 
 
In his seminal work on the role of violence in Chinese history, anthropologist Steven Harrell 
argues that Chinese culture, in contrast to many other cultures, condemns violence and “plays 
                                                          
12 See Zheng Qidong 鄭起東, Zhuanxingqi de Huabei Nongcun Shehui 轉型期的華北農村社會 
(Transformation of rural society of Huabei) (Shanghai: Zhongguo shudian, 2004), 133.  
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down the glory of military exploits, awards its prestige to literary, rather than martial, figures, 
and seeks harmony over all other values.”13 Nevertheless, in the social and cultural trajectory of 
late imperial and modern China, against which traditional literati claimed Chinese culture as 
pacifistic and demilitarized, violent actions assumed a much more visible role in social life. 
Violent conflict was endemic in many regions, which, according to Harrell, can be classified into 
two kinds: vertical violence (“dominance by one group over another”), and horizontal violence 
(“disputes between equals).14 Both kinds of violence existed in a variety of ways, such as class 
conflicts, lineage feudings, class conflicts, rebels, banditry, and many others. Chinese elite 
culture, according to William Rowe, holds contempt for the violent behaviors.15 Negative lexical 
items in the Chinese language including fei 匪, zei 賊, or dao盜 are used to describe bandits, 
rebels, or robbers, whose behaviors should not “exist in the eyes of good society.”16  
A violence-prone person would use any tools to commit violence, but from the late 
nineteenth century on, evidence from many sources suggest that modern gun either imported 
abroad or produced in Chinese new arsenals were the preferred weapons in many criminal cases. 
When the foreign gun was introduced into China in the late nineteenth century, its usage in 
crime, banditry, and other conflict behaviors reinforced its symbolism of violence. Thus, how do 
we understand the relationship between the circulation of foreign guns and the frequency of 
                                                          
13 Steven Harrell, “Introduction,” in Violence in China, Essays in Culture and Counterculture, 
eds., Jonathan Lipman and Stevan Harrell (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 
1.  
14 Ibid., 2. 
15 William Rowe, Crimson Rain: Seven Centuries of Violence in a Chinese County (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 4. 
16 Jean Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China, 1840-1949 (London: Thames & Hudson, 1973), 9. 
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banditry or crime in modern China? Based on the computer-aided analysis, Chinese legal scholar 
Michael Ng suggests that crime was overwhelmingly concentrated in major treaty ports and 
modern cities, which witnessed dramatic social and economic transformation owing to the rapid 
modernization.17 In the early twentieth century, shooting incidents commonly reported in local 
newspapers, mainly in major modern cities. These incidents were not isolated and had continued 
sporadically to be automatic response of social insecurity in many major Chinese cities like 
Beiping, Tianjin, and Shanghai during the Republican period. Sidney D. Gamble (1890-1968), a 
renowned sociologist who travelled in China between 1917 and 1932 to collect social-economic 
data, investigated that the violent crime rates grew rapidly for most of the period in Beiping.18 
Gamble’s survey of Beiping’s urban crime was echoed by Chinese leading criminologist and 
Professor at Yenching University Yan Jingyue (嚴景躍 1905-1976), whose empirical study on 
the crime in the 1920s also confirmed the trend, particularly the rise of homicide rates.19 Because 
the gun-involved incidents were not tallied separately in the official crime statistics, it is difficult 
to perceive the role of private-held firearms in committing crime or homicide from Gamble and 
Yan’s crime data supplied by the police agency of Beijing.20  
                                                          
17 Michael Hoi Kit Ng, “The Ordering of Crime in Republican Beijing from the 1910s to the 
1930s,” in New Narratives of Urban Space in Republican Chinese Cities: Emerging Social, 
Legal and Governance Orders, ed. Billy K. L. So and Madeleine Zelin (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 
113-134. For the connection between crime and modernity, see Børge Bakken, “Introduction: 
Crime, Control, and Modernity in China,” in Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China, ed. 
Børge Bakken (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 1-26. 
18 Sidney D. Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey (New York: George H. Doran, 1921), 80-86. 
19 Yan Jingyue, “Beijing fanzui zhi shehui fenxi 北京犯罪之社會分析” (A social analysis of 
crime in Beijing), Shehui xuejie 社會科學, no.2 (June 1928): 38-42. 
20 Both the Beiyang and the Nationalist governments followed the criminal codes adopted by the 
Late Qing. The criminal codes enumerated thirty-five types of crimes. See Michael Hoi Kit Ng, 
“The Ordering of Crime in Republican Beijing from the 1910s to the 1930s,” 116. 
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And yet, other contemporary sources such as newspaper reports and criminal cases 
suggested the illegal use of guns was the major perceived reason driving the rise of homicide 
rates. For example, commenting on the poor public security of Beijing, a reporter stated in a 
Dagong bao 大公報 editorial that “gun robbery was a fairly common occurrence.”21 In another 
influential field study of crime in relation to social change in China, Yan Jingyue claimed that 
the means of committing crime had been vastly modernized with the introduction of rifle or 
pistol.22  
The penetration of foreign guns into China’s territories was also observed by many reporters 
and social survey practitioners.23 In his 1920s interview with a bandit in Manchuria, Yan Jingyue 
was astonished to learn of the easy availability of gun among bandits. According to one bandit 
named Liu T.C., they managed to purchase guns from a Japanese pharmacy store in Shenyan 瀋
陽 (Mukden) clandestinely. The owner of the store concealed a rifle, pistol, as well as bullets at 
the bottom of a dry well. Liu later found that “almost all the stores operated by Japanese engaged 
in arms and drug dealings.”24 The availability of foreign-made firearms and ammunition was also 
noted by foreign visitors. One of them was Dr. Harvey Howard, a missionary and professor of 
Ophthalmology at Peking Union Medical College, who observed the proliferation of foreign 
                                                          
21 “Beijing de zhian北平的治安” (Public security in Beiping), Dagong bao, May 3, 1946.  
22 Yang Jingyue, Zhongguo de Fanzui Wenti yu Shehui Bianqian de Guanxi 中國的犯罪問題與
社會變遷的關係 (The issue of crime in relation to social change in China) (Beijing: Beijing 
daxue chubanshe, 1986), 192.  
23 In the early twentieth century, China witnessed the emergence of a “social survey movement.” 
Social scientists in a large number who sought to transform China into a nation-state were ardent 
in the movement. See Tong Lam, A Pasion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the 
Chinese Nation-Sate, 1900-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
24 Yan Jingyue, Zhongguo de Fanzui Wenti yu Shehui Bianqian de Guanxi, 13. 
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weapons in the late 1920s Manchuria. During his tenure at the college, Howard and his eleven 
year-old son were kidnapped by a group of Manchurian bandits in 1926 and were held for ten 
weeks. As noted in his famous memoir of this adventure Ten Weeks with Chinese Bandits, “most 
of the rifles [used by these bandits] were of Russian manufacture, of the years 1904 or 1917 as 
indicated by the stamps upon them. Several had Japanese rifles with the emblem of the ‘rising 
sun’ on their barrels.” Some other rifles included German type and that of Chinese manufacture 
by Hanyang or Mueken arsenals.25 With respect to the small arms, Dr. Howard noted they were 
exclusively Mauser pistols of German origin. Speaking in fluent Chinese and treating the 
bandits’ ailments with care, Howard quickly gained their trust. He was informed that these rifles 
were typically expensive, ranging up to $150 per piece, while a German made Mauser pistol 
might cost over than $350.26 Because of this, these guns mostly served a deterrent purpose, and 
none of the bandits had ambition to learn shooting through costly practicing. The sources of their 
weapon supply could be myriad: some of them retained the guns during their service as soldiers; 
some guns were procured from smugglers in an underground market in Harbin, an already 
                                                          
25 Harvey J. Howard. Ten Weeks with Chinese Bandits (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 
1927), 93. 
26 Ibild., 93-94. 
 
  
42 
 
international city at the time;27 bandits might also benefit from their secured relations with 
nearby warlord soldiers who supplied them with needed weapons. 
 Yan’s social survey and Howard’s eyewitness account, on close scrutiny, displayed one 
significant historical transition in modern China: outlaws and bandits gradually replaced their 
cold steel weapon or bird guns to the powerful foreign guns, including the ones manufactured by 
newly established arsenals in China. Both the popular belief and government action held that the 
gun is intrinsically the more lethal weapon than other weapons like swords, knives, or daggers. 
As it will be addressed in the next few chapters, both the Qing and Republican governments took 
efforts to maintain the monopoly of the most powerful weapons, and enacted restrict laws to 
regulate private gun ownership. Their policies with respect to firearms reflected an anxiety that 
unregulated guns had the potential to endanger public security or even the basis of legitimate 
rulership. Because the gun was more powerful weapon whereas alternative weapons including 
sword and knife were less so. Urban crimes or rural bandits chose guns precisely because they 
were determined to bring death or deterrence when they committed the crime. From the late 
nineteenth to the early twentieth century, urban outlaws and rural bandits took advantage of the 
underground firearms circulation network, seeking to arm themselves with advanced foreign 
                                                          
27 Following the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1898, Harbin, once a small 
village, grew into one of the most modern metropolis in the Far East. In the early twentieth 
century, especially after Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), sixteenth 
countries established their consulates and foreign merchants started to operate business. See 
James H. Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916-1932 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). The cases of gun smuggling were frequently reported in 
local newspapers. Westerners took advantage of extraterritoriality in China and engaged in gun 
smuggling, while Chinese officials were not able to control. See “Zhu jiangjun qing jihe junxie 
zhi biantong banfa朱将军请稽核军械之变通办法” (General Zhu called for using alternative 
means to investigate military weapon smuggling,” Shengjing Shibao, September 4, 1915.  
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guns. The symbolism of the gun as a tool of violence was reinforced given the frequency of 
criminal activities.  
Guns, Self-defense, and Modernity 
 
From the late nineteenth century, there was a multiplicity of Chinese terms denoting 
modern guns. The characters yangqiang 洋槍 (foreign gun) might be the first terms used to 
distinguish this Western weapon with traditional bird gun. Another term kuaiqiang 快槍 (quick 
gun) denoted the foreign gun’s accuracy and advanced technique. During the Republican period, 
for the urban civilian, another term ziwei qiangzhi 自衛槍支 (self-defense gun) was commonly 
used, which blurred the gun’s place of origin and style, but denoting its function in self-
defense.28 We have no clue how the civilians accepted these terms in their social life. What is 
confirmed is that most terms were initiated by the state rather than society. The state allowed the 
civilians to own guns to defend themselves. For the most people other than bandits and crimes, 
the foreign gun provided them the means to protect themselves and their communities.  
Therefore, armed people were comprised of not only these rural bandits and urban outlaws, 
but also many ordinary civilians. The urban middle class was the first group to embrace foreign 
guns.29 The introduction of foreign guns from the late nineteenth century allowed the new middle 
                                                          
28 Governments of the late Qing and early Republic made clear difference between the guns used 
by ordinary civilians and the ones by crimes. The legal documents referred the guns owned by 
civilians as self-defense guns. See Cai Hongyuan 蔡鴻源 ed. Minguo Fagui Jicheng 民國法規集
成 (The collections of law in Republican China) (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1999).  
29 According to Richard Curt Kraus, “the makeup of the Chinese middle class has varied over 
time.” During the late Qing and Republican periods, members of the urban middle class were 
mostly urban bourgeoisie, government officials, and intellectuals. See Richard Curt Kraus, 
Pianos and Politics in China: Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle over Western Music 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 24. 
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class to use the modern firearms directly, rather than experiencing a transition from the 
traditional weapons to the modern ones. For the urban wealthy dwellers, the foreign gun brought 
them both security and a feeling of elevated social status. First, as discussed above, the frequency 
of criminal activities pushed them to acquire more powerful weapons. Second, they were 
interested in most recent foreign guns as a symbol of prestige. For example, 143 pistols owned 
by ordinary civilians were registered with the Beiping municipal police department in 1947, over 
ninety percent of which were manufactured by foreign firearm companies, including Remington, 
Colt, Winchester, Browning, and many others.30  
 
Figure 3: The Types of Guns Owned by Beijing Dwellers in 1947. SOURCE: Beijing Municipal 
Archives, J181-014-00746. 
                                                          
30 Beijing Municipal Archives, JH00122-22122-1321. 
Mauser Colt Browning Hanyang Unspecified
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The small number of registered guns on file would not give the Beiping police a sense of 
security. Certainly, for a majority of gun owners, firearm registration was meaningless. At the 
same time, gun licensing was not harshly enforced. The fluid character of armed bandits and 
large number of unregistered guns in society make any conclusion about the distribution and 
extent of gun ownership among different groups must be tentative. All these accounts, 
nevertheless, suggest that gun ownership, as one major sign of serious social instability was 
particularly prevalent in modern Chinese society. These eyewitness accounts also indicate the 
civilian weapon underwent a dramatic transition from cold steel arms and bird guns to more 
powerful guns manufactured by foreign firearms companies or their Chinese counterparts. Prior 
to the late nineteenth century, civilian weapon was always composed of knives, spears, swords, 
and low-quality bird gun, which could be made locally with indigenous method (土辦法 
tubanfa). 
 In the years following Qing China’s dramatic decline through foreign aggression and 
devastating popular uprisings, owning a foreign made gun gradually became a prerequisite for 
exhibiting strength. The bandits, as mentioned by Dr. Howard, obtained the foreign guns in the 
black market at an expensive price, though they only displayed their weapons rather than 
shooting others. This transition was also embodied in the practices of collective defense. When 
local community decided to organize a militia for self-defense purpose, their first act was always 
to search for powerful foreign guns. For example, when Linyu County of Zhili 直隸 Province 
was constantly harassed by roving bandits, local community led by commercial gentry elite 
contributed funds to purchase two hundred Mauser guns and other armament in Tianjin, a nearby 
port city, which appeared as a convenient inlet for arms due to the city’s frequent foreign 
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contacts.31 As will be discussed in the second chapter, militia was poorly equipped in pre-modern 
period partly because their defense activities were monitored by the government, and also due to 
their weapons outclassed the sporadic outlaws. When bandits started to arm themselves with 
powerful weapons, local militia resorted to more powerful weapons to maintain their defensive 
poise. As indicated in the Linyu’s case, one source of foreign guns was treaty ports where 
civilians could the weapons they needed to fight rebels or defend themselves. 
To understand the tremendous social change brought about by foreign gun ownership, the 
foremost question deserved to be studied is what factors account for the ready access to guns for 
non-military individuals. The foreign gun’s pouring into modern China did not mean Chinese 
traditional bird guns withdrew from the historical stage completely. Rather, it is much safer to 
argue that the diffusion of foreign guns added complexity to public order situations, especially in 
some violence-prone regions that were already filled with obsolete bird guns. The diffusion 
pattern of private weapons developed from the late nineteenth century and bore many similarities 
with the one of traditional bird gun. Just as the matchlock introduced into China in the sixteenth 
century, regions differed apparently in how readily they received the exotic weapon. In some 
most interior provinces, living without frequent foreign contacts, the spread of foreign 
commodities was less rapid than the coastal regions or treaty ports that were subject to the 
intrusion of foreign elements. Another similarity is that both periods witnessed a process of 
foreign weapon’s domestication, which took place not only in state-operated arsenals, but also 
among civilians themselves.  
 
                                                          
31 “Juban Xiangtuan 舉辦鄉團,” Dagong bao, January 11, 1910. 
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Beyond Violence: The Gun’s Symbolism in Popular Culture 
 
 Prior to the early twentieth century, gun’s symbolic role as a brutal and evil implement 
was always highlighted in popular culture. The elite ideal in traditional China was to esteem 
literacy and to despise martiality (重文輕武 Zhongwen qingwu).32 The cultural tradition made 
ordinary people’s use of firearms inevitably marginalized. Chinese writers of the late Qing did 
not conceal their disdain and disgust about the private gun ownership, which was associated with 
banditry and outlaw activities, if their use of the gun was not officially sanctioned. Liu E (刘鹗 
1857-1909), expressed such sentiment in his famous late Qing semi-autobiography The Travels 
of Lao Can (老殘遊記 Lao Can youji). He presented a story, in which a local magistrate found a 
wealthy and educated family concealed bird guns when the magistrate chased a group of bandits. 
Even though the family explained they purchased guns for self-defense against roving bandits, 
the magistrate himself believed that the family had colluded with bandits, because “good 
civilians would never dare to obtain military weapons.”33  
The frequency of urban crime and banditry created an urgent need for self-defense, which 
also reinforced the symbolism of gun as tool for deterrence and protection from danger. The 
gun’s image in public culture was not limited to its instrumental role in the early twentieth 
century. As China’s sovereignty was severely trampled by Japan from the early 1930s, another 
                                                          
32 For the elite ideal on wen and wu, see Nicolas Schillinger, The Body and Military Masculinity 
in Late Qing and Early Republican China (Lanham: Lexington Book, 2016); Kam Louie, 
Theorising Chinese Masculinity: Society and Gender in China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).  
33 Liu E, Lao Can Youji (Taipei: Shijie shuju, 2004), 25.  
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symbolism was attached to the gun by Chinese intellectuals, who used cartoons, woodcuts, or 
other forms of art to articulate its new meanings.  
An analysis of the image of gun presented in visual arts allows us to examine how the 
popular culture illustrated the image of the gun. These intellectuals, through their brushes and 
pens, gave gun another meaning beyond killing or self-defense.34 More explicitly, they tended to 
show the gun as a weapon to protect the nation and to fight against Japanese imperialist. One of 
the practitioners was Zhang Mingcao (張明曹 1911-1978), one of major woodcut artists and 
painters in Republican China. During the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), Zhang used 
his woodcut and cartoons to stir people’s emotion and to increase people’s patriotism.35 The 
frequent appearance of the image of the gun in his woodcut indicated that Chinese intellectuals 
like Zhang Mingcao vested gun another symbolism.  
Zhang Mingcao received training in painting and woodcut in Shanghai in the early 1930s, 
when the Chinese modern woodcut movement was reaching its climax.36 After the outbreak of 
the Second Sino-Japanese War, Zhang and other artists were active in promoting people’s 
patriotism by using their vernacular arts. In 1938, Zhang Mingcao published the woodcut work 
hostility (仇 chou), which made him well-known in the field of Chinese woodcut. 37 In this work, 
                                                          
34 See Paul Graham Bevan, “Manhua Artists in Shanghai 1926-1938: From Art-for-Art’s-Sake to 
Wartime Propaganda,” PhD dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, 2010. 
35 For the biographical introduction of Zhang Mingcao, see Ma Chengyuan 馬成源, Zhongguo 
Meishu Dacidian 中國美術大辭典 (Encyclopedia of Chinese painting) (Shanghai: Shanghai 
cishu chubanshe, 2002), 936.  
36 For the woodcut movement, see Xiaobing Tang, Origins of the Chinese Avant-garde: The 
Modern Woodcut Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
37 Zhang Mingcao, Zhang Mingcao Ji: Banhua Juan 張明曹集: 版畫卷 (The collections of Zhan 
Mingcao, Woodcuts) (Shanghai: Shanghai shuhua chubanshe, 2002).  
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Zhang illustrated a blacksmith who and his family were forced to seek refuge from the Japanese 
invasion. They met a group of Japanese army on the way, who looted their belongings and 
arrested them. His wife was raped and killed, while he was ordered to work for the army. Later, 
the gunsmith escaped and stole a rifle from the Japanese soldier. Zhang Mingcao used a couple 
of woodcuts to illustrate how the gunsmith used the gun to take part in the guerrilla war against 
the Japanese. In this woodcut work, the image of gun was subjected to change. It was initially 
described as a tool to kill Chinese people, which was later transformed into a tool against 
Japanese invaders. When the gunsmith took up the rifle that he stole from a Japanese soldier to 
participate in the guerrilla war, the symbolism of gun was to provoke Chinese people’s 
resolution to fight and to defend the nation.  
Zhang Mingcao’s other cartoon and woodcut similarly indicated gun’s symbolism as a 
determination to fight against the Japanese. In another woodcut work entitled Reaphook (鐮刀 
Liandao), Zhang described a rural woman who encouraged her husband to kill the Japanese 
enemies with a rifle. She took up the reap-hook instead. Similarly, Zhang’s work Arming the 
Masses (民眾武裝起來 Mingzhong wuzhuang qilai) conveyed the message that motivated 
Chinese people armed themselves with rifles against the threat.  
  
50 
 
 
Figure 4: Reaphook by Zhang Mingcao. SOURCE: Zhang Mingcao, Zhang Mingcao Ji: 
Banhua Juan, 61. 
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Figure 5: Arming the Masses by Zhang Mingcao. SOURCE: Zhang Mingcao, Zhang Mingcao Ji: 
Banhua Juan, 77. 
Zhang’s work was one among many art forms that illustrated the image of guns. Historian 
Chang-Tai Hung believes these works reflected “the political and social conditions of the age 
and offered valuable insight into popular attitudes.”38 However, in the war context, we have no 
clues about how the general public understood these works. In other words, it is unclear how 
many civilians then sought to arm themselves after reading these works. Chinese intellectuals 
and artists drew images of the gun in the belief that they would arouse people to “resist rather 
than cooperate with the Japanese invaders.” As Louise Edwards’ work on wartime cartoons on 
                                                          
38 Chang-Tai Hung, “War and Peace in Feng Zikai’s Wartime Cartoons,” Modern China 16 
(1990): 39-84. 
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sexual violence suggests, “the efficacy of these images as instruments designed to spur resistance 
and resolve remains in doubt.”39 This similar uncertainty also happened on Zhang Mingcao’s 
woodcut on the image of a gun. Ultimately, these images reveal the attitudes of Chinese 
intellectuals and artists on violence and resolution against Japanese invasion, in which the power 
of arming the masses loomed largely. These artists’ works indicated that the meaning of the gun 
was floating. More than a symbol of cruelty, it was a tool could be used to defend the nation.  
Chinese Women with Guns 
 
Unlike during the Qing period when the use of the gun was a monopoly of man, the 
transformative Republican period witnessed the involvement of women. As mentioned in the 
beginning, in the early twentieth century, wealthy ladies in modern Shanghai played a part in the 
shooting clubs or participated in competitions held by male-dominated associations. In this case, 
her sporting shooting activity was sanctioned and even encouraged by her husband, who was 
also interested in shooting in the club. Of course, the experience of Li Junzeng, who lived in an 
illustrious family in cosmopolitan Shanghai could not apply to all Chinese women in the early 
twentieth century, whose subordinate feminine roles had not been shaken.40 As many cases 
suggest, Chinese women’s involvement in the use of guns extended beyond shooting activities. 
They took up either pistol or rifles for several other reasons. Some women showed out their 
skills in shooting to protect themselves, their families, and their communities. Foreign guns also 
provided female criminals the tools to practice violence or to take part in banditry. However, it 
                                                          
39 Louise Edwards, “Drawing Sexual Violence in Wartime China: Anti-Japanese Propaganda 
Cartoons,” The Journal of Asian Studies 72 (2013): 581. 
40 A number of works have been dedicated to the position of women in modern China. For a 
historiographical review of the existing literature, see Gail Hershatter, Women in China’s Long 
Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).  
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would be misleading to argue that that Chinese women empowered themselves with guns to alter 
their subordinate position. Then, how does the women’s use of guns broaden our perspective of 
gender and feminism in modern China?  
When foreign gun appeared in Chinese society, it was deemed an efficient tool to commit 
violence. In the urban areas where female offenders had little difficulties to obtain firearms, 
foreign guns were more likely to be used in homicides and other criminal activities. From these 
criminal cases, the role of Chinese women in these gun-involved cases could be detected. In the 
early spring of 1935, Liu Jinggui 劉景貴, a twenty-four years old female student at Beiping Fine 
Arts Academy realized that his rival in love (情敵 qingdi) Teng Shuang 騰雙 taught physical 
education at Zhicheng Girl’s Middle School. On March 16, 1935, Liu made her way to the 
school’s dormitory where Teng had been residing. Teng Shuang had never met Liu Jingming 
before, nor had she discovered her husband, Lu Ming 錄明, had an extramarital affair with Liu. 
When the two young women met in the dorm, Liu quickly pulled out her American Browning 
pistol hidden in her satchel, and instantly shot Teng Shuang seven times in her head, shoulder, 
chest, and elbow. Recognizing her death, Liu fled the scene, but was apprehended immediately 
by the school guard, who heard the gunshots on campus.  
After two years’ interrogation by the Beiping municipal court, Liu was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. As the interrogation went on, more details about the 
Liu Jinggui’s case were released. According to Liu Jinggui’s confession, she got engaged to Lu 
Ming, an award-winning shot-put player in the April of 1934, who, however, broke their 
betrothal promises months later as he fell in love with Teng Shuang. Liu agreed finally by 
accepting six hundred yuan from Lu and Teng. However, their relationship continued to be 
intimate underground. In March of 1935, they had been engaged in a clandestine love affair in a 
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Beiping hotel for five days. After that, Liu personally realized that it was Teng who broke their 
engagement and decided to kill her for revenge.41  
Liu Jinggui’s crime resembled another well-known homicide case that happened in the same 
year. Shi Jianqiao (施劍翹 1906-1979) assassinated former warlord Sun Chuanfang (孫傳芳
1885-1935) in Tianjin’s foreign concession with a Browning pistol, the same model as Liu 
Jinggui’s weapon. In that scene, Shi declared that she avenged the death of her father who was 
killed by Sun ten years earlier. Both cases immediately received considerable coverage and 
crystallized extensive public debate over whether passion, or qing would help exonerate the 
assassins. In her pioneering studies of both cases, Eugenia Lean likewise considered that the 
public sentiments surrounding the assassinations indicated the formation of a new “critical urban 
public,” through which different social groups could interact with the government, and ultimately 
could “sway legal proceedings, threaten the moral authority of cultural elites, mediate center-
warlord relations, and influence the state’s tactics in legitimating its power” in the Republican 
period.42 Contemporary writers and reporters who vigorously made commentary on Liu and 
Shi’s cases indeed helped arouse such public sympathy, underlying the role of passion (qing) 
squeezed from love or filial piety in exonerating female’s violent behavior in Republican China.  
                                                          
41 Beijing Municipal Archives 北京市檔案館, Beiping Difang Fayuan Xingshi Panjue Anjuan 
北平地方法院刑事判决案卷 (Criminal Judgement Document of Beiping Local Court) (Beijing: 
Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 2005). 
42 Eugenia Lean, Public Passions: The Trial of Shi Jianqiao and the Rise of Popular Sympathy in 
Republican China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 12. For a detailed analysis of 
Liu Jinggui’s case, see Lean, “Liu Jinggui Qingsha’an: Sanshi Niandai Beiping de Dazhong 
Wenhua yu Meiti Caozuo 劉景詩案：三十年代北京的大眾文化與媒體操作” (Love with a 
vengeance: media sensation in Republican-era Beiping), in Beijing: Urban Culture and Historial 
Memory, eds., Chen Pingyuan and David Wang (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005), 269-
84. 
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Moreover, yet, once we delve into the details of the case, especially the actual process of the 
murder, we may realize some new and heretofore unnoticed elements in the early twentieth-
century Chinese urban life. When contemporary reporters and writers commented on both cases, 
they did not feel astonished that even educated Chinese women, who were always portrayed as 
delicate, docile, and dependent in the pre-modern period had no difficulties to obtain foreign-
made guns to commit violence.  
Given that successive Chinese governments constantly introduced controls regulating the 
sale and ownership of weapons of any kind, how were Liu Jingshi and Shi Jianqiao able to 
acquire Browning pistols? According to the intricate and thoroughly documented interrogation 
carried out by the professional Beiping police officers, Liu Jingshi confessed that she had 
brought the gun along with seven bullets from an unknown rickshaw puller for eighty-four 
yuan.43 Existing records, however, do not tell us whether the policemen searched the rickshaw 
puller who sold gun, or even further investigated a potential black market that helped the gun 
diffusion. Due to the large number of rickshaw pullers and demographic mobility in Republican 
Beiping, it was of course impracticable for the police agency to trigger an optimistic 
investigation. In Tianjin, Shi Jianqiao claimed that she bought the Browning along with six 
bullets from a defeated solider for sixty yuan.44  
 The function of the gun was not confined to commit violence, modern women who 
acquired gun aimed to protect themselves and their families. In Shanghai, a shooting club 
organized shooting practices for wealthy ladies, showing them how to protect themselves with a 
                                                          
43 Beijing Municipal Archives, Beiping Difang Fayuan Xingshi Panjue Anjuan, 25. 
44 “Shi Jianqiao Qingsha weifu baochou 施劍翹情殺為父報仇” Dagong bao, November 22, 
1935. 
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gun. Trading companies also sold women tiny pistols, which could be easily put in their purses.45 
In wartime China, when their husbands were drafted into the army, women learned shooting to 
protect their communities. In the Nanhai County of Guangdong province, for example, a 
majority of males joined the army during the Second Sino-Japanese War, leaving mostly women 
and elderly in the villages. Local women organized all-female militia forces to protect their 
villages. They got the weapon from local elite or government.46  
 
Figure 6: “In farming, In training, and in practicing.” SOURCE: Zhanwang 展望, no. 10 (1939): 
25. 
                                                          
45 “Shouqiang de Renshi 手槍的認識,” Zhonghua 中華, no. 46 (1936): 27.   
46 “Nanhai Nuzhuangshi Chudong 南海女壯士出動,” Zhanwang 展望, no. 10 (1939): 25.  
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Women’s use of guns did not mean they successfully altered their subordinate position by 
participating in masculine activities. Rather, their use of guns suggested at least two important 
changes in modern China. First, the introduction of the foreign gun, which was much easy to 
operate, shortened the power gap between male and female. If Liu Jingshi’s case was not 
sufficient to prove it because both the victim was another woman, Shi Jianqiao’s case certainly 
did. A woman with no shooting experience was able to kill a former warlord with her Browning 
pistol. The introduction of the foreign gun made hand to hand combat unnecessary. Second, 
women’s use of guns against the perceived threat reveals how these armed Chinese women 
placed themselves in national politics. The gun gave them certain degree of autonomy to protect 
themselves, rather than relying on their husbands as before. In this sense, the use of the gun 
legitimized their engagement with the politics. 
Gun and Power Domination in Republican China 
 
In Republican China, access to weapons became a resource for ambitious individuals or 
groups of men who saw opportunities in the wielding of local power. For example, the Sangzhi 
County 桑植縣 of Hunan Province established a salt tax bureau in the early 1915 and obtained 
twelve guns to defend against rapacious bandits. He Long (賀龍 1896-1969), a local bandit 
organized a group of adherents to attack the bureau with two cleavers and seized these guns. He 
Long then utilized the guns to commit banditry, and later formed military unit to obtain his local 
dominance. Gradually, his military prominence allowed him to become a Communist general. It 
is clear from this case that the guns acquired new meanings along with the change of context. 
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They alternated from the tools of defense to the tools of committing violence, and finally 
facilitated ambitious individuals to obtain power dominance. 47 
In the early twentieth century, China underwent rapid and tremendous changes: the keju 
system (科舉 civil service examination) was abolished; the late imperial dynasty was 
overthrown; the whole country was exposed to the outside world. One of the most striking 
features was the process of militarization had accelerated, transforming the traditional power 
structure, in which Confucian elites collaborated with the state officials to manage local affairs. 
Under the condition of local militarization, local elites, who were previously authorized 
privileges through classical education, now had to find other ways to secure their local 
dominance or gave away to newly emerged martial elite. For example, in the early 1910s, the 
Qian family of Wuxi City, a great literary elite lineage in the prosperous Jiangnan region, wasted 
little time to purchase foreign guns and trained local people to use them to defend their 
communities. At least in part, this was a response to the new social and political situation, in 
which traditional ways of obtaining social status gradually gave way to the channels of obtaining 
military dominance.  
Circulation Mechanisms 
 
We have examined the circumstances under which Chinese people of different strata 
owned and used guns. By the early twentieth century, mainly as a consequence of increasing 
social turmoil and the fears of personal safety, the private gun ownership became widespread in 
many regions. The diverse values and meanings people attached to their arms were also 
                                                          
47 Zhonggong dangshi renwu yanjiuhui 中共黨史人物研究會, ed. Zhong Gong dangshi renwu 
zhuan 中共黨史人物傳 (Chinese Communist party history biographies), vol. 2 (Xian: Shanxi 
Renin chubanshe, 1980), 129-31. 
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embodied in the circulation mechanisms, which provided people with varied demands the 
weapons. The circulation of guns shared some characteristics of the circulation of other 
commodities. That is to say, a two-tiered pattern of consumption was in place. As what historian  
Frank Dikötter has argued in the research on Chinese consumer culture, “[I]n a country marked 
by opposition between the poverty of the many and the riches of the few,” the “imports were 
used by elites as visual evidence of social status, while cheap imitations satisfied the demand for 
new products among ordinary people both were included in a culture which worshipped the 
tangible and craved the new.”48 Dikötter’s assertion of the two-tiered consumption of everyday 
commodities also applied to the circulation of guns. A wide gap existed between the well-off 
elites who conspicuously demanded sophisticated and accurate foreign guns of greater quality 
and the ordinary individuals or groups who armed themselves with affordable and even primitive 
ones. Another reason to examine the circulation mechanisms lay in the transformation of values 
when guns moved from one location to another. Whether by purchase, theft, or pickup, the 
weapon’s original values and function also underwent some sorts of transformation. 
Commerce 
 From the late nineteenth century, as China was no longer hermetically sealed off from the 
outside world, foreign guns, like many other exotic commodities, found their ways into China, 
making them available to many non-military individuals. To some extent, the circulation of guns 
shared some common features of the circulation of other commodities, which required the 
concerted effort among manufactures, intermediaries, and consumers. Previous scholarship has 
identified China’s position in the global arms market. The arms acquisitions from abroad started 
                                                          
48 Frank Dikötter, Exotic Commodities: Modern Objects and Everyday Life in China, 262.  
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from the 1860s when the late Qing reformers endeavored to modernize its military equipment, 
and reached peak in the warlord period as the acquisition of powerful weapons was a major 
determinant for warlords to obtain power.49 The internecine military conflicts and China’s urgent 
need for military modernization made many western gun manufacturers regard China as a 
potential market.50 Previous research on the arms trade does not provide a full picture as 
historians tend to underestimate how these foreign guns made themselves available to a large 
portion of the non-military population.  
 Innovations in guns started to accelerate in the Western countries, manufacturing 
revolvers first and the later semi-automatic pistols. The advent of easily operated and accurate 
foreign guns provided modernizing elites and the emerging middle-class people the weapons 
they required to protect themselves and their families. As discussed above, the gun registration 
records of the Beijing Municipal Archives suggested the wealthy people always chose Mauser, 
Colt, and Browning pistols as their weapons. Even though an underground black market 
flourished in the early twentieth century, through which some criminals found no difficulties to 
obtain foreign guns to commit violence, most wealthy civilians like Mr. and Mrs. Li Junseng 
turned to foreign trading companies to purchase foreign guns at high prices.  
 From the late nineteenth century, foreign companies actively explored the Chinese 
market to sell their arms. In contrast to the Western countries, in which gun manufacturers 
portrayed their products as symbols of masculinity or social status to attract their customers, 
                                                          
49 For the arms trade in modern China, see Anthony Chan, Arming the Chinese: The Western 
Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928 (Vancouver: The University of British 
Columbia Press, 2010). 
50 Ibid.  
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arms sellers in China always promoted the connection between firearms and self-defense.51 In a 
period marred by internecine military conflicts, robbery, and banditry, Western gun 
manufactures were aware that their potential consumers placed a higher priority on the gun’s 
ability to defend themselves. According to the private gun registration records preserved at the 
Shanghai and Beijing Municipal Archives, the emerging Chinese middle-class preferred Colt, 
Browning, and Mauser.  
These three firearm manufacturers ardently explored the Chinese market, by either 
dispatching sales representatives or distributing advertisements to attract Chinese consumers.52 
Sales representatives were sent to China in large numbers to dispose of their surplus of firearms. 
Their primary consumers were undoubtedly contending military powers. During the early 
Republican period, when China suffered from the political turmoil caused by warlordism. As 
Anthony Chan suggests, “the issue of an armaments stockpile was always a concern of the 
warlords,” who competed to purchase powerful foreign arms to secure their political dominance 
in their sphere.53 Sales representatives were sent to China in a large number, who built 
consolidated personal relations with various warlords. Existing documents reveal little about 
their activities in China. It is extremely difficult to detect how these sales representatives came to 
contact directly with Chinese civilians. What can be conjectured was that they took advantage of 
the trip in China and advertised their products by all means. For example, Henry Brewer, who 
were dispatched by the Winchester Repeating Company based in Hartford, Connecticut in the 
                                                          
51 For the information of the gun advertising in Western countries, see R. Blake Brown, Arming 
and Disarming: A History of Gun Control in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2012), 81-131. 
52 Chan, Arming the Chinese, 20.    
53 Ibid., 129. 
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late 1890s to sell the arms to the late Qing government. While he was in China, he took any 
occasions to promote the image of Winchester rifles to local Chinese elites. When he was in 
Hankou, he found that local people were firing the cannon to break down and drive away the 
cloud devils, as the region had had months of heavy rains. However, their firming seemed not to 
bring any change. The clouds did not break up. As recalled by Henry Brewer, he saw the 
opportunity and used his arms manufactured by Winchester to shot at the sky. A few days later, 
the weather was fair, and he thus produced “an excellent ad for their guns.”54  
Advertising was a major channel for the circulation of modern commodities, which also 
applied to the sale of weapons. The Colt Company placed this Chinese pamphlet in the major 
trading companies of China, which were then available for Chinese consumers to read. We have 
no clues about the role of advertisements played in selling their products. Since most western 
arms manufacturers sold Chinese people weapons through intermediaries, which appeared as 
trading companies in treaty ports. Trading companies in many cases simply published their 
advertisements in local newspapers. In the early twentieth century, gun advertisements appeared 
in the Shengjing Shibao, a major newspaper in Manchuria. Japanese trading companies such as 
Mitsui and Taicho had the list of their weapons in the newspaper.55 Existing sources do not 
reveal detailed information about their consumers. In the late Qing and early Republican period, 
ordinary civilians and local militia forces were eligible to purchase firearms in these trading 
                                                          
54 William Henry Brewer Papers, Yale University Archives.  
55 Some trading companies published advertisements in local newspaper, in which the types of 
guns were listed. A few examples include “Taicang yanghang gaobai 太倉洋行告白,” Shengjing 
Shibao, September 1, 1906; “Gangcun yanghang guanggao 廣存央行廣告,” Shengjing Shibao, 
September 7, 1906. 
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companies, only if they obtained licenses from the local government. It is hard to suggest how 
many civilians purchased guns from these companies.  
The Colt Manufacturing Company, headquartered in West Hartford Connecticut sought 
to expand the Chinese market by emphasizing Colt pistol’s superior performance. The 
company’s marketing strategies offer a prime case to reveal how arms manufacturers were 
connected with Chinese consumers. Given the social context of China in which the sentiment of 
insecurity dominated civilian life from the late nineteenth century, Colt advertised to wealthy 
Chinese civilians with language that portrayed its pistol as the “treasured object for self-
defenders.” In this printed advertisement, the Colt emphasized its product was the “most stable, 
most accurate, and most reliable.” 56 
                                                          
56 The Colt Repeating Company Collection, Connecticut State Archives, HS 4803. 
  
64 
 
 
Figure 7: Gun Advertisements from the Colt’s Manufacturing Company. SOURCE: Colt 
Collection, Connecticut State Library, 974.62. H2572. 
 Regular commerce became an important way for Chinese people to obtain firearms. As 
discussed above, the prevalence of private gun ownership was determined by two factors: 
availability of firearms in market and increasing demand from Chinese consumers who required 
guns for self-defense. Though not in large numbers, regular commerce provided eligible 
individuals or groups to obtain guns of the most recent design. However, it does not mean the 
wealthy middle class and some militia forces were only customers of trading companies. In 
many cases, urban outlaws and bandits could purchase guns from trading companies 
clandestinely. Though the Nationalist government enacted law prohibiting these companies from 
selling arms to individuals or groups without government permit, the prohibition was not 
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effectively implemented.57 The distribution of guns in modern China was highly uneven. 
Determining social status, many other Chinese had limited access to the foreign guns from 
regular commerce. Other heterodox channels ranging from smuggling, self-production, and 
transference from military, played more dominant role in making firearms circulate in local 
society.  
From Military Weapon to Civilian Weapon 
While the 1911 Revolution had successfully brought down the Manchu reign and 
established the new Chinese Republic, China had continued to experience a rising level of social 
disorder and disunity until 1949. Yuan Shikai’s betrayal of the revolution and eagerness to 
restore the monarchy provoked immediate protests from revolutionaries and military governors 
of most provinces. Yuan’s death in 1916 shook off the restraints he imposed upon provincial 
militarists and created a political vacuum which military governors or warlords competed to fill 
in. A period of warlordism ensued from 1916 to 1928, appearing as one of the most disastrous 
episodes in modern China. The whole nation was sucked into chaotic military struggles among 
warlords and Sun Yat-sen’s National Revolutionary Army. One Republican economist calculated 
that almost all the provinces had suffered from military conflicts during this period. On average, 
bloody conflicts hit more than seven provinces annually from 1916 and 1924, and about 14 
provinces after 1924.58 Since military force always played a decisive role in consolidating and 
expanding political influence, warlords competed to accumulate military strengthen through 
recruiting soldiers and acquiring weapons. By the 1920s, the total number of military individuals 
                                                          
57 “Shanghai haiguan jinyun junxie zhi xinguize上海海關禁運軍械之新規則,” Shengjing 
Shibao, February 10, 1916.  
58 Shaohua Hu, Explaining Chinese Democratization (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 56. 
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was being conservatively estimated at over two million, four times than that of ten years 
before.59   
The increasing numbers of soldiers and incessant military conflicts during the early 
Republican period facilitated the diffusion of weapons into local society. In many cases, defeated 
or runaway soldiers either carried their guns away with them, or transferred their weapons to 
bandits or militia forces.60 It was during the period of warlordism that the transference from 
military weapons to civilian weapons reached its climax. For example, after the Feng-Zhi War 奉
直戰爭 in 1922, “warlords’ army was dismissed, and many soldiers ran away. Almost all the 
soldiers took away their arms, which endangered public security.”61 After the battle, local 
peasants picked up the leftover guns or ammunitions and then sold them to either bandits or 
militia forces. According to a 1922 newspaper report, local police found a peasant drove a big 
cart with six baskets on it. It was found that he put more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition in 
the basket.62 In other cases, bandits or outlaws stole or seized guns owned by either individuals 
or militia forces, which, too, helped the gun’s transference from military guns to non-military 
ones.  
Self-Production 
The final means by which guns circulated was by private production. As discussed above, 
for the most rural population, foreign guns at an expensive price were hardly affordable to the 
                                                          
59 Diana Lary, Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911-1937 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 189.  
60 This phenomenon was explicitly identified by Edward McCord. See McCord, Military Force 
and Elite Power in the Formation of Modern China, 88. 
61 “Tongzhi Zhuijiao Qiangxie 通知追繳槍械,” Shengjing shibo, July 11, 1922. 
62 “Chahuo Siyun Qiangxie 查獲私存槍械,” Shengjing shibao, August 6, 1922.  
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most ordinary people, who also needed guns to defend themselves. Many underground channels, 
in addition to smuggling, provided these people the primitive guns they required. When the 
foreign guns were introduced into China in the late nineteenth century, local gunsmiths quickly 
acquired a rudimentary technical know-how, producing less sophisticated weapons. If the gun 
smuggling was an integral part of the coastal landscape, private production became one major 
ways for the interior regions to get their weapons.  
Conclusion 
 
Traditional Chinese values placed a heavy importance on harmony and benevolence, 
which gave preference to civil rather than military virtues. Of the major philosophical schools 
that deployed pacific sentiments, Daoism arguably displayed the most disgust over the use of 
weapons. This belief was duly reflected in Laozi’s Daodejing 道德經 as follows “Now arms, 
however beautiful, are instruments of evil omen, hateful, it may be said, to all creatures. 
Therefore, they who have the Dao do not like to employ them.”63 Notwithstanding the 
predominance of the pacifistic value in Chinese tradition, the presence of weapons among 
civilians was not uncommon in history. When the first explosive small arms first landed in China 
through Japanese pirates in the sixteenth century, many Chinese civilians had been arming 
themselves with traditional cold steel weapons for millennia. Ordinary people had various 
occasions to bear weapons, including hunting, self-defense, or practicing martial arts.64 In the 
period of political tension and deteriorated economic situation, peasants in an attempt to advance 
                                                          
63 James Legge, trans., The Texts of Taoism, in The Sacred Books of China (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1962), 73-74. 
64 For the weapons used by Chinese martial artists, see Peter A. Lorge, Chinese Martial Arts: 
From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
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their marginal social status might take up their primitive weapons at hand against wicked rulers. 
One typical example was the late Ming peasant rebellion led by Li Zicheng 李自成 (1606-1645), 
whose rebel army successfully overthrew the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). When the rebellion 
was still in its infancy, their primary weapons consisted of spears, swords, bows, and arrows.65 
The representations of weapons also appeared in literary forms. Wandering knights-errant, 
righteous bandits, and armed swordsmen were portrayed in classic literature as intrepid heroes, 
who devoted themselves to helping the poor and the oppressed. Water Margin 水滸傳, a great 
classic novel dedicated to a group of rebel heroes who organized a brotherhood community to 
defy the North Song Dynasty (960-1127), illustrates the magic use of eighteen types of weapons 
by those romantic rebels in the fight for justice.66 The manifestation of arms into both material 
and virtual forms attested that the privately-owned weapon had more or less penetrated into 
everyday lives of a large section of the population. 
When China started its military modernization efforts in the 1860s, foreign guns were 
introduced into China, which provided Chinese people alternative choices of weapons. Since 
then, the gun was no longer a monopoly of the government. In 1880, Zou Tao (鄒濤 1850-1931), 
a novelist and newspaper editor moved to Shanghai, where he devoted himself to writing a 
courtesan novel, The Shadows of Heaven and Earth in Shanghai (海上塵天影 Haishang 
chentianying), which was published in 1904. Zou lived in a colorful life. He obtained the 
prestigious Flowering Talent (秀才 xiucai) degree, and then became ardently interested in 
                                                          
65 Peng Sunyi 彭孫貽, Ping kou zhi 平寇志 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1984), vol 6. 
87. 
66 Zhang Qiyun 張其昀, eds., Zhongwen Dacidian 中文大辭典 (Taipei: Zhongguo wenhu daxue 
chubanbu, 1993), Vol 9. 839. 
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Western culture and technology. In the novel, there was an episode in which a xiucai of Shanghai 
was talking about foreign guns to a courtesan. He enumerated very quickly the most recent types 
of foreign guns and their detailed description, ranging from the American-manufactured 
Remington rifle to the Mauser semi-automatic pistol. The xiucai then compared these foreign 
guns in terms of their range, accuracy, and penetration. Scholars who study Zou Tao and his 
work have suggested that his novel appeared with “copious and explicit connections to the 
author’s life.”67 From the novel, it can be assumed that even an educated elite of the late Qing 
like Zou Tao had the channel to grasp the knowledge of foreign weapons. As the late Qing 
government initiated and deepened its military modernization from the 1860s, a growing number 
of Western works on modern weaponry were translated into Chinese in Shanghai, through which 
people might learn about modern guns. We have no clue if Zou Tao himself either owned or 
carried a foreign gun. The episode in the novel attested that a section of population in China 
started to be intertwined with the global military trend. A few decades later, some Chinese 
people not only grasped the knowledge of firearms, but also obtained and leaned to use these 
guns. The introduction of the foreign gun generated social and cultural responses. 
During this period, the gun’s symbolism of violence was subjected to change in 
transformative modern period. Its social meaning was not confined to violence and killing. This 
chapter presents a social and cultural history of guns in China. One non-military individual might 
arm himself to embrace modernity, or to pursue power for local dominance, or to show his 
determination to fight against a potential threat. All these symbolisms and uses coexisted and 
coverged in modern China. In a period when the weak government was not able to provide 
                                                          
67 Patrick Hanan, Chinese Fiction of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: Essays by 
Patrick Hanan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 24. 
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protection to its civilians, people empowered themselves through the acquisition of powerful 
weapons. Unlike the traditional period, when bearing a gun was a monopoly of soldiers and 
rebels, in the modern period, the action of arming with guns was socially and culturally 
sanctioned.  Nevertheless, this does not mean the government was willing to give up a monopoly 
on violence. How to regulate gun ownership will be a theme in the next four chapters. 
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 CHAPTER TWO  
Between Social Control and Popular Power: 
The Circulation of Private Guns and Control Policies during the mid to late Qing, 1781-1911 
 
Introduction 
 
On February 29, 1908, Shen Jiaben (沈家本 1840-1913), a prominent jurist and legal 
reformer of the late Qing Dynasty, presented the throne with a draft version of the criminal code 
called the Current Criminal Law of the Great Qing (大清現行刑律 Daqing xianxing xinglü). The 
new legal code was officially promulgated in 1910, just one year before the overthrow of the 
Qing court. As a crucial part of the New Policies reform (新政 xinzheng, 1901-1911) initiated by 
the Qing court to revitalize the fragile government after many years of domestic uprising and 
humiliating foreign invasion, the radical revision of the traditional legal code aimed to build a 
modern and independent judicial system. One prominent revision that marked a departure from 
traditional criminal legal practice was the statute on private possession of weapons. Unlike the 
Great Qing Code (大清律例 Daqing lüli), which strictly prohibited most common people from 
possessing firearms, the new criminal law loosened the state’s grip on private firearms, 
proposing that ordinary individuals be allowed to own either bird guns or foreign guns for self-
defense purposes as long as they had their weapons registered.1  
                                                          
1 According to the Great Qing Code, the Qing government permitted three groups of people to 
carry bird guns. People living in the dangerous mountains and valleys were eligible to own 
firearm against wild beast; people living along the coast could use gun to protect themselves 
against pirates; ordinary individuals who lived in Gansu and Shanxi provinces were allowed to 
use gun because the regions were figured by tense ethnic conflicts. See The Great Qing Code, 
trans. William C. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 205-06. 
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For the first time in Chinese history, the criminal code removed settled legal provisions 
that only those living in remote mountainous and coastal regions could carry firearms, and even 
then under strict government surveillance. In the draft statute, the state officially loosened harsh 
restrictions on gun ownership. This radical change indicated judicial reformers of the late Qing 
adjusted their reform agenda to the new social situation. As Shen Jiaben and his colleagues 
explained, 
[Right] now most bandits and robbers can obtain guns, and ordinary people are not 
capable of effectively defending themselves without equally lethal firearms ….Thus, all 
people should henceforth be permitted to carry foreign guns or bird guns for self-
defense.2  
Bureaucrats of the late Qing were not alone in capturing the reality of social turmoil and 
preparing to reassess firearm control efforts. After witnessing the increasing rates of armed 
violence, Hu Xueyan (胡雪岩 1823-1885), a notable businessman of the late Qing, asked 
“[Wouldn’t] it be foolish for the government to stamp out civilians’ guns, if it was incapable of 
banning outlaws or bandits’ guns?”3 Shen Jiaben and Hu Xueyan’s recognition of the 
government’s impotence in exercising authority over violence captures a new facet of social 
reality that has been largely ignored in the existing historiography. In contrast to the High Qing 
period (1680-1820) when the strong and centralized government had the capacity to secure a 
monopoly on coercive power, the general social turmoil accompanying the prevalence of private 
guns in late Qing local society helped shift the government away from clinging to its monopoly 
on guns.  
                                                          
2 Shen Jiaben, Current Criminal Law of Great Qing (Current criminal law of the great Qing), 
juan 25: 24. 
3 Hu Xueyan, Hu Wenzhong quanji (胡雪岩全集 Complete collection of Hu Xueyan), juan 55:3.  
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The Qing government never launched a national program of firearm registration as many 
modern states did. The absence of such statistics in the Qing dynasty makes any estimation of the 
level of firearm dissemination tentative. However, it is clear that as accelerating domestic 
rebellions, protracted military conflicts, and the process of local militarization dominated the 
decades of the 1850s and after, the circulation of firearms among non-state actors increased. The 
Taiping rebellion, arguably the most destructive peasant insurrection in human history to that 
time, kicked off successive popular uprisings in the late nineteenth century, in which the rebels 
armed themselves against the Qing troops with a mixture of obsolete Chinese weapons and 
imported Western firearms against the Qing troops. The chaotic social order, by consequence, 
led to a proliferation of local militia or other forms of self-defense forces in local society, which 
acclimated ordinary men (and even some women) to the use of firearms. Village-based militias 
(團練 tuanlian), for instance, organized by local gentry, learned to use modern guns or rifles 
manufactured by foreign countries against potential threats. The presence of armed militia and 
individuals, however, failed to make society safer. Local gazetteers and newspapers were still 
filled with evidence of gun-provoked violence or lurid reports of armed banditry. The diffusion 
of firearms in local society thus not only deteriorated social and political stability in the late 
Qing, but also spurred more ordinary people to pursue comparable or more powerful weapons 
for self-defense. Village elites, too, who had enhanced their status through the holding of 
degrees, started exercising their power through the procurement of guns in their functions in 
local defense.4  
                                                          
4 For example, the Qian family of Wuxi City, a great literary elite lineage in the Jiangnan region, 
wasted little time to purchase foreign guns and trained local people to use them in the early 
twentieth century. See Jerry Dennerline, Qian Mu and the World of Seven Mansions (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press, 1988), 71-73. 
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This chapter traces the dynamic process through which the state adjusted its stance 
towards private weapon ownership in accordance with the changing social and political reality of 
the mid to late Qing periods. Previous studies have examined thoroughly both military logistics 
in the High Qing period and the late Qing’s military transformation efforts, with their focus on 
weapon use in military operations. Nevertheless, the social and political implications of powerful 
gun ownership by non-state actors remains unclear. As my research proves, the military use of 
these weapons during the Qing period had been very much interwoven into the broader social 
fabric, forcing the state to take steps to maintain the monopoly on violence. Shen Jiaben’s 
proposal leads us to ask some important questions about the state’s stance over private gun 
ownership. First, what were continuities and changes of firearm control policies from the mid to 
the late Qing? Second, how did social ecology, geography, political considerations, and other 
factors help shape the circulation mechanisms of civilian guns? Third, how did private gun 
ownership affect the relationship between state and society?  
Drawing on both central government documents and local sources, this chapter 
introduces the manifold ways in which the state was increasingly unable to maintain its 
monopoly on violence. Its novel approach was to adjust to the new social and political reality. 
This chapter argues that through most of the Qing period, the private gun’s diffusion in local 
society, to a large extent, was determined by the state’s stance between two ideologies: the 
reliance on social power exercised through a permissive policy towards private gun ownership to 
defend the localities, and the resolute maintenance of its monopoly on the most advanced 
weapons. The state’s regulation and control over its armed civilians appeared as a dynamic 
process, hovering between the two ideologies until the end of the Qing dynasty. In several 
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important ways, the late Qing’s shifting policy towards armed civilians also left a legacy to the 
Republican period.   
Regulating Private Weapons before the Age of the Gun 
 
Unlike the modern era, in which explosive small arms were widely circulated, most 
ordinary people before the late nineteenth century who needed tools to fight, hunt, and protect 
their property always sought weapons that were made from cold steels and other easily 
accessible materials. The late Ming official Chen Renxi (陳仁錫 1581-1636), in his A 
Compendium of Contemporary Regulations of the Ming Dynasty (皇明世法錄 Huang Ming shifa 
lu) noted that civilians’ weapons included swords, bows and arrows, knives, spears, and 
cudgels.5 It is extremely rare to find direct evidence in which armed civilians articulated their 
motivation for weapon ownership and the channels through which they acquired weapons. What 
can be arguably addressed here is the social and institutional foundations that made the 
circulation of cold steel weapons possible in late imperial China. 
 Those who armed themselves with locally forged weapons did so for both practical and 
institutional reasons. Practically speaking, the state’s exclusive monopoly over the use of 
violence and force prevented civilians from acquiring sophisticated and advanced weapons, 
compelling them to seek easily-accessible arms. Successive governments developed a highly 
centralized and state-controlled mechanism for weapon production. During the Ming dynasty, 
artisans and their families working in the state-run arsenals were constantly and closely 
monitored. They were not allowed to leave their work places without governmental permission. 
Placing these weapon artisans under strict surveillance resulted from the hereditary occupational 
                                                          
5 Chen Renxi, Huang Ming shifa lu (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1965), vol 44. 13a-13b.  
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household system (戶籍 huji), under which ordinary men and women were primarily categorized 
into three groups: military (軍籍 junji), civilian (民籍 Minji), artisan (匠籍 jiangji), and saltern 
(鹽籍 yanji). As historians Ray Huang and Wu Han’s works have suggested, the restrictions on 
artisans were the most complicated. They were supposed to be permanently confined to their 
district of registration, and their sons and close relatives were required to take over their 
positions.6 Though the hereditary occupational system was finally abolished in the early 
eighteenth century, most ordinary people had no means to master weapon-making techniques. 
The secrecy of arsenal operations kept non-military individuals from obtaining and copying 
military weapons produced by the state. Meanwhile, it was also hardly possible for them to 
access the knowhow and expertise to produce these weapons, which were seen as the symbol of 
the state’s coercive power. The methods of crafting sophisticated weapons, especially the 
explosive firearms, could be found in numerous military texts, such as the Exploitation of the 
Works of Nature (天工開物 Tiangong Kaiwu), the Treatise of Armament Technology (武備志 
Wubei Zhi), and the Essentials of the Military Classics (武經總要 Wujing Zongyao). All the 
military classics, however, were banned for reading in the Ming. They were ultimately buried 
when the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1796) initiated the compilation of the Complete Library of 
Four Treasuries (四庫全書 Siku Quanshu). In most occasions, the general public had no way to 
access and even to possess firearms and advanced powerful weapons. It was the state that always 
played the pioneering and leading role in the efforts at practicing weapon making technology.  
                                                          
6 Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 32-33; Wu Han, “Yuan-Ming liangdai zhi jianghu” 
(元明两代之匠戶 Artisans in the Yuan and Ming dynasties), Tianjin yishi bao shixue 天津益世
報史學 44 (December 1936). 
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The state’s acquiescence to an armed populace was another reason for the possessing of 
cold steel weapons.  In comparison with firearms, which were subject to harsh regulation by the 
Ming and Qing governments (which will be discussed below), the state rarely restricted or 
prohibited civilian possession of primitive and less sophisticated weapons. This is particularly 
reflected in the Great Ming Code (大明律 Da Ming lü): 
In all cases where some persons among the people possess, without authorization, 
prohibited military equipment such as armor for horses or men, shields, tubes of fire, 
catapults for throwing fire, banners, and signaling devices, for one such item, they shall 
be punished by 80 strokes of beating with the heavy stick. For each additional item, the 
penalty shall be increased one degree more than that for possessing them without 
authorization…. [The possession or manufacture of] bows and arrows, lances, swords, 
crossbows, fishing forks, and pitchforks is not prohibited.7 
According to the Code, the state attempted to make a clear division between “military” 
and “civilian” weapons. Military equipment (軍器 junqi) referred to those lethal arms for regular 
troop use exclusively, which included both superior cold steels and firearms, while civilian 
weapons were inferior cold steels and weapons without firepower or firing capability. Under the 
Code, civilians were allowed to manufacture, circulate and carry a variety of weapons that posed 
less threat than military weapons.  
The different treatments towards the use of military and civilian weapons in the legal 
provisions, in fact, indicated the state provided some sorts of justification for the civilian 
possession of cold steel weapons. The prerequisite was that their action of arming themselves 
would not challenge the state authority. As an excerpt from the Official History of the Ming 
Dynasty (明史 Mingshi) illustrates, the Ming government took an armed populace for granted, 
                                                          
7 The translation comes from The Great Ming Code/Da Ming lü, trans. Jiang Yonglin (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2005), 133-134.  
  
78 
 
and saw civilian mastery of less sophisticated arms as an integral part of regional identity and an 
effective way to defend the localities: 
Village troops (鄉兵 xiangbing) could be conscripted in terms of their specialization to 
assist the regular troops…. [Many recruited villagers] were adept in using wolf brush (狼
筅 lang xian) and trident (叉 cha). During Chongzhen’s reign (1611-1644), village troops 
from Chuan and Liao [of Zhejiang Province] were widely conscripted to suppress 
wandering bandits. Besides these recruited strong men, there were also many armed 
villagers who were not drafted. Peasants in the Song County of Henan Province were 
good at using maohulu, and were good at fighting in mountainous regions. The counties 
next to Song, including Lushi and Lingbao contained many mines. The owners employed 
many village braves, who were called jiao’nao or dashou. Village braves in Shandong 
were good at using long poles, while people in Xuzhou armed themselves with arrows…. 
The dart was widely employed in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, especially in the war at sea. 
These braves had successfully defeated Japanese pirates during the Zhengtong reign. 
Those salt merchants organized paramilitary forces, who armed themselves with firearm 
cannon, powerful crossbow, and cart to fight against bandits.8 
The reasons for the state’s tolerance of the existence of private weapons in society were 
twofold. First, as discussed above, the primitive and less sophisticated weapons in local society, 
in the eyes of government officials, could not challenge state military power. Second, the state 
believed that the armed populace, if properly trained, could constitute an invaluable source of 
military force when the social security was at stake.  
An armed populace was embodied in the practice of local government during the Ming 
and Qing dynasties. Of the major scholar-officials in the Late Ming, one statesman who strongly 
advocated arming local villagers was Lü Kun (呂坤 1536-1618), a high ranking official with a 
                                                          
8 Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al., Mingshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 91:2252. The Ming 
founder established the weisuo 衛所 system to guard provinces. Each wei 衛 or “guards” 
consisted of a guard unit of 5,600 men, which was then divided into five battalions. As a 
hereditary system, these weisuo armies were scattered along the frontiers and at strategic spots. 
The system declined starting from the mid-sixteenth century. The state gradually relied on 
xiangbing (village troops) for local defense. As a paramilitary apparatus, the xiangbing was 
formed locally and also subject to state surveillance. See Frederic E. Wakeman, Telling Chinese 
History: A Selection of Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 178.  
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long career in both local and provincial governments in north China provinces and central 
government.9 Recognizing the widespread presence of weapons, Lü proposed to take advantage 
of the armed populace, who would be beneficial to the state’s social control. His proposal on the 
mechanism for local security was explicitly recorded in his Record of Practical Government (實
證錄 Shizheng lu), and revealed a reliance on collective defense that was built upon a 
neighborhood basis. Lü suggested that  
[A]fter the autumn harvest was gathered in October and before the spring sowing in 
March, all local adult residents in the village were expected to take their family owned 
spears, swords, bow and arrows, short cudgels, rope whips and many others to receive 
military training under guidance of professional instructors to chase bandits and 
outlaws.10  
Lü’s efforts to exploit the military potential of armed civilians was consistent with the 
state promotion of the bao-jia 保甲 system, a neighborhood-based collective defense mechanism 
that was adopted from the Song dynasty (960-1279). Once the Ming Empire was consolidated, 
the bao-jia was readily adopted by the Ming rulers, who endowed the system with the new 
function of mutual surveillance. Under the system, selected peasants were organized into militia 
units and made to learn the use of arms. These units were headed by the local rural elite and also 
supervised by the government. The quasi-military organization, appearing as a state-sanctioned 
militia with local policing functions, as historian Philip Kuhn has argued, was designed to repel 
                                                          
9 For a detailed biography about of Lü Kun, see Joanna F. Handlin, Action in Late Ming 
Thought: The Reorientation of Lü Kun and Other Scholar-Officials (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983). 
10 Lü Kun, Shi Zhenglu (reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2008), 1069.  
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bandits and outlaws, as well as to strengthen the state’s total control over the country through 
developing collective defense corps.11 
Another parallel self-defense force that was independent of the bao-jia system was the 
crop-watching association described by Qi Biaojia (祁彪佳 1602-1645), a late Ming playwright 
and local official. In times of famine, bandits became rampant and widespread crop loss was 
hard to control. According to Qi, each village organized its police force to guard crops at harvest 
time. Training in the village, crop-watching militiamen who were armed with cold steels always 
offered paid service for landowners against bandits. The corps were organized voluntarily by 
local elites. As historians have painstakingly documented, the Chinese imperial state possessed 
limited capability for local governance, leaving a power vacuum to be filled by indigenous 
gentry.12 The existence of such private armed forces attests to what sociologist Fei Xiaotong (費
孝通 1910-2005) claims about China’s “two-track politics,” in which social forces in various 
forms had sprouted outside the bureaucracy.13 Appearing in the form of independent self-defense 
corps, the crop-watching associations, continued to exist throughout China until the Republican 
                                                          
11 Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social 
Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 33. 
12 For a review of Chinese gentry and their local functions, see Joseph W. Esherick and Mary 
Backus Rankin, “Introduction,” in Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance, eds., Joseph 
W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 1-26. 
13 Fei Xiaotong, “Zai lun shuanggui zhengzhi” (再論雙軌政治 Restudy the two-track politics), 
in Xiangtu chongjian (鄉土重建 The reestablishment of the countryside) (Shanghai: Shanghai 
shudian, 1948), 58. 
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decades (1912-1949), when the collapsing social order required more powerful collective 
defense forces.14  
Arming and Disarming: The Issue of the “Bird Gun” before the Late Qing 
The Ming-Qing state’s authoritarian rule, under which the monarch exercised disciplinary 
power and empowered ordinary people to defend themselves through individual or collective 
means were inseparable aspects of the state’s social control mechanism. As we have seen, the 
Ming and Qing governments did not jealously defend their exclusive monopoly on the 
production and possession of certain types of arms, which were officially defined as “civilian 
weapons.” Allowing law-abiding civilians to be armed with less sophisticated weapon not only 
would not challenge state authority, but also assisted the state to maintain local order. 
Maintenance of an effective monopoly of powerful weapons through enforcement of the law 
against private possession of military weapons and reliance on armed populace for local defense 
were crucial to the imperial state’s control over its territory.  
Nevertheless, the model of what I term “control/reliance” began to be challenged when 
the bird gun was introduced into China and diffused in society. Under this model, the state rarely 
took serious efforts to measure the degree of civilian weapon ownership. State intervention in the 
possession of private weapons happened only when offenders used lethal arms to conduct crimes 
or rebellious activities. However, with the diffusion of the bird guns, the government consciously 
tightened its control over civilian weapons, taking deliberate measures to minimize the potential 
                                                          
14 Qi Biaojia, Qi Biaojia ji 祁彪佳集 (The Collection of Qi Biaojia) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
1959), 122-26. Also see Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China,33-34; Jerry 
Dennerline, “Hsu Tu and the Lesson of Nanking: Political Integration and the Local Defense in 
Chiang-nan, 1634-1645,” in From Ming to Qing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in 
Seventeenth-Century China, eds., Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979), 111-13. 
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threat to political stability brought about by the large numbers of unregulated guns in society, 
whose prowess equaled or even exceeded those of military weapons.  
The Diffusion of the Matchlock Gun into Chinese Society 
The matchlock gun’s arrival in China can be dated to the Jiajing 嘉靖 period (r. 1521-
1567) of the Ming dynasty.15 When the exotic weapon crossed the sea, Chinese gave this black-
powder muzzle-loading matchlock weapon a special name, the “bird gun” or “fowling piece” (鳥
槍 niaoqiang).16 As many military historians writing from a global perspective have suggested, 
the introduction of guns and other firearms indicate that China was never insulated from Western 
                                                          
15 During this period, China’s southeastern coast was constantly plagued by hordes of Japanese 
pirates. The Ming writer Lang Ying (郎瑛 1486-1566) in his compendium the Classified Essays 
Seven Times Revised (七修類稿 Qixiu leigao) speculated that the matchlock was probably 
introduced into China by these Japanese armed pirates, who were arrested in Zhejiang province 
and then instructed local arsenal artisans to manufacture the gun. A contemporary Japanese 
source by Minamiura Fumi recorded that the Japanese learned the craft in manufacturing 
matchlock from Portuguese travelers in the year of 1544, who landed off the coast of 
Tanegashima, an island to the south of Kyushu, with a purpose to conduct formal trade with 
Japan. For the introduction of matchlock into China, see Lang Ying, Qixiu leigao (reprint, 
Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1963), 18:228. For a systematic study of the Japanese piracy during this 
period, see Kwan-wai So, Japanese piracy in Ming China during the 16th century (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1975). According to So, many of these pirates or known as 
wokou were southern coastal Chinese, joined by some Japanese. He argues that one major reason 
of piracy was the population pressure during the Ming dynasty. Recent study by Gang Zhao also 
highlights the advent of the Europeans in the formation of piracy. See Gang Zhao, The Qing 
Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684-1757 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2013). 
16 See F. Mayers, “On the Introduction and Use of Gunpowder and Firearms among the 
Chinese,” Journal of the North China Branch Royal Asiatic Society, 6 (1871), 93-103.   
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military technology when the “Military Revolution” was initiated in the sixteenth century.17 
Although the introduction of firearms had radically transformed the way of fighting, the 
matchlock or bird gun was never adopted as the predominant weapon on the battlefield before 
the late nineteenth century. The primary reason lay in technological restraint in the Chinese 
                                                          
17 For the Military Revolution Theory, see Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military 
Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
Nevertheless, Parker’s Military Revolution Theory is not without critics. First, Parker’s 
Eurocentric argument positing the Military Revolution started in Europe was challenged by a 
group of China historians, who regard the use of matchlock firearms and cannons by the early 
Ming military force, at least one century earlier than Europe, as the inauguration of Military 
Revolution. Sun Laicheng has persuasively identified the Ming China as the first gunpowder 
empire in the early modern world and primary transmitter of military technology to Southeast 
Asia. See Sun Laicheng, “Ming-Southeast Asian Overland Interactions, 1368-1644,” PhD 
dissertation, University of Michigan, 2000. Second, the success of the European imperial 
expansion overseas before 1800s have also prompted Parker and other historians of the time, to 
be convinced about the absolute superiority of Western military technology. Since then, this 
view sparks intense debate among military historians who assert the military-technological gap 
between the West and East, China in particular, was not huge and easily made up before the 18th 
century. While acknowledging China had lagged far behind European nations and adopted 
European guns substantially after the sixteenth century, the Chinese Military Revolution School 
argue that China’s strong technological foundation facilitated the adoption of European arms, 
and later came up new designs that were in many respects more advanced than the West. See 
Kenneth M. Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during 
the Sino-Japanese-Korean War, 1592-1598,” Journal of Military History, no.1 (2005): 11-42. 
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context.18 During the Qing dynasty, the state’s hesitation over the adoption of bird guns for 
military use was also contingent on cultural and logistical factors.19 Although the Qing imperial 
state engaged in a consistent effort to strengthen its military establishment, due to the bird gun’s 
high manufacturing cost and inherent shortcomings, the new weapon remained subordinate to the 
cold steel arms in military practice until the late nineteenth century. As one Japanese general 
staff estimated at the end of the 1890s, only three-fifths of the Green Standard soldiers were 
armed with bird guns, whose casting technique would date back to the Ming Dynasty, while the 
                                                          
18 When the gun first landed China, the weapon, owing to its portability and long range accuracy 
was readily recognized by the renowned Ming general and strategist Qi Jiguang (戚繼光 1528-
1587).  In his military manual Miscellaneous Records (練兵實記 Lianbing Shiji), Qi exclaimed 
that “the newly imported matchlock, serving as a supplement to the conventional weapons, 
would improve the Ming’s military capabilities.” However, as Ray Huang points out, the Ming 
military did not apply the alien weapon effectively on the battlefield due to the lack of a unified 
logistics system and substantial support from local officials. The second reason ascribed to the 
ineffective use of the musket was the nature of the military challenges that Chinese armies 
encountered. In comparison with bird guns and other light arms, Chinese warriors favored 
cannons because they always loomed large in siege warfare. Chinese towns and cities were 
always surrounded by high and strong walls and moats, which were designed not only to mark 
the boundaries of administrative units, but also assumed the function of protecting the residents 
against invaders. In comparison, the bird gun has its shortcomings, which were in particular 
embodied in its loading time and accuracy on horseback. Late Ming military theorist Zhao 
Shizhen (趙士楨 1554-1661), in his Treatise on Firearms and Their Use with Illustrations (神器
譜 Shenqi Pu), informed us that “muskets are effective on wagons, on boats, and on foot, but it 
was impossible to ensure accuracy on horseback.”  The complicated firing mechanism also kept 
soldiers from loading quickly. The bird gun held a burning or slow match in a clamp on the end 
of the curved arm known as the serpentine. To fire the gun, one had to pull the end of the 
serpentine, which then ignite the priming powder in a flash-pan, which engendered flame 
travelling through the main propellant charge. This ignition system, though had revolutionized 
the manufacturing technology of modern weapons, had many obvious flaws− wind and rain 
could extinguish the match or disperse the priming powder away from the pan. Qi Jiguang, an 
enthusiast of bird gun, also could not help but recognize its drawbacks. In practice, he did not 
dare to arm his soldiers with bird guns extensively, but regarded them as supplements to other 
weapons.  See Qi Jiguang, Lianbing shiji, in Zhongguo bingshu jicheng 中國兵書集成 
(Collections of Chinese military books) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1994), vol. 19, 644; Ray 
Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981), 170-71. 
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rest still used spears or swords.20 The state’s indifference towards small arms affected the degree 
of its circulation in society. Without mastering the production technique of advanced weapons, 
civilians’ attempts to upgrade their weapons seemed impossible. 
Evidence of banditry, insurgency, and other forms of rebellious activities are 
indispensable to measure the spread of arms among the population. Such armed activities 
consistently drew official attention, which therefore made then part of the historical record. 
                                                          
19 Achieving competency in shooting a bow and arrow, like the hairstyle of Manchu males and 
Manchu language, appeared as one of the major means of preserving Manchu ethnic identity. 
The firm adherence to the cultural tradition, in turn, hindered the extensive use of bird guns 
among the elite Manchu cavalry forces. The Manchus, once the semi-nomads and warlike people 
scattered beyond the Great Wall, similar with the Ming warriors, did not fully integrate the bird 
gun within its military apparatus, nor did the Qing engage in developing small arms technology. 
The primary military forces of the Qing army were the Eight Banners, which, as the emperor’s 
hereditary military units, played a central part in consolidating the Qing power and maintaining 
the Manchu identity. Even though musketry became an established part of military training for 
Banner garrisons from the early Qing dynasty, archery’s predominant position had not been 
shaken, as the early Qing emperors saw horsemanship and archery as essential in preserving and 
consolidating a distinct Manchu cultural identity. The Yongzheng 雍正 emperor (r. 1723-1735) 
more than once commanded that the Manchu banners should not allow their archery skills to 
languish. Besides the Banner troops, the Qing also created the all-Chinese Green Standard Army, 
the central body of regular troop dispersed throughout the empire to police the interior provinces. 
Unlike some of the elite Manchu cavalry forces, the Green Standard Army soldiers were given 
the rights to bear bird guns during the Yongzheng period. Although bird guns were adopted in 
warfare and routine drills, the weapon was not elevated to a predominant role in military 
practice. In the second Jinchuan campaign 第二次金川戰役 (1771-1776), one of the 
vainglorious Emperor Qianlong’s self-proclaimed “Ten Complete Military Victories” (十全武功 
shi quan wu gong), only 3,574 bird guns were forged by the imperial state, while the amount of 
normal arrows was 478,500. For the Eight Banners and Manchu identity, see Mark C. Elliot, The 
Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001). For Yongzheng emperor’s view on musketry, see Zhao Er’xun 趙爾巽, 
et al., Qingshi Gao 清史稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1928), juan 130, 422. For the use of bird 
guns in the second Jinchuan campaign, see Ulrich Theobald, War Finance and Logistics in Late 
Imperial China: A Study of the Second Jinchuan Campaign (1771-1776) (Leiden and Boston: 
Brill, 2013), 77-83. 
20 Ralph L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1955), 39. 
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Evidence also shows that these restless individuals and groups were always at pains to acquire 
the most advanced weapons for their violent ends. Nevertheless, many criminal cases and 
rebellion records suggest that the qualitative gap in weapon technologies between the Qing 
troops and rebels in local society was still insurmountable. During the Qing dynasty, bird guns 
and other firearms were not common among outlaws, bandits, and rebels as they were in the 
modern period. For example, the Conspectus of Penal Cases (刑案會典 Xing’an huilan), the 
largest collection of Qing criminal cases serving as legal guide for local magistrates, involved 
few bird gun homicide cases before the nineteenth century. Criminals always used swords, 
knives, daggers, and other nonexplosive weapons.21 The Lin Shuangwen Uprising (林爽文起義 
1786-1788) was another prime example to look into how the rebel force, which was composed 
largely of Ming loyalists and peasants, equipped the rebel army against Qing troops. In the early 
1780s, Lin joined the Heaven and Earth Society (天地會 tiandihui), which was characterized as 
both a secretive folk religious sect and a criminal organization in Taiwan.22 Within a short time, 
the secret society, organized by Lin grew to some 50,000 men, many of whom were former Ming 
loyalists, peasants (mostly unattached single men), and local bullies.23 In 1786, Lin’s followers 
with anti-Qing resentments started a rebellion and occupied most of Taiwan within a short time 
period. However, these insurgents were quickly suppressed by the government in 1786, mainly 
owing to the Qing’s well equipped and disciplined troops. According to a memorial presented by 
                                                          
21 See Zhu Qingqi 朱慶琪 ed. Xing’an Huilan sabian (Beijing: Beijing guji chubanshe, 2000). 
22 Dian Murray, The Origin of the Tiandihui: The Chinese Triads in Legend and History, in 
collaboration with Qin Baoqi, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).  
23 David Ownby, “Chinese Hui and the Early Modern Social Order: Evidence from Eighteenth-
Century Southeast China,” in “Secret Societies” Reconsidered: Perspectives on the Social 
History of Modern South China and Southeast Asia, ed. Robert J. Antony (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1993), 52-3.  
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Li Shiyao (李世堯 ?- 1788), the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, the government 
deployed 8,468 bird guns and many other weapons for the suppression.24 In comparison, the 
insurgents were mostly armed with swords, knives, arrows, and spears. Although some of them 
obtained bird guns and other firearms, these weapons were in short supply for fighting against 
well-equipped Qing armies. These armed rebels, though ferocious and militaristic in nature, did 
not shift away the state monopoly on advanced weapons.   
There are both institutional and social reasons that affected the bird gun’s relatively low 
degree of circulation before the late nineteenth century. The foremost reason for bird gun’s 
relatively low degree of circulation at the time certainly lies in the restrictive bird gun control 
policies. Although bird guns were marginally useful in military campaigns, their greater lethality 
than primitive cold steel weapons made the government suspicious over the use of them by non-
military individuals. In the meantime, the diffusion of bird guns in society before the late 
nineteenth century was highly uneven, dependent on local conditions and the accessibility of bird 
gun sources. This was particularly true in some regions where outlaws were less rampant, and 
civilians’ armed self-defense was less needed. In such areas, gun-related cases rarely appeared in 
the local magistrate’s archives. As Susan Naquin in her research on eighteenth- century 
Shandong has suggested, the ordinary people’s indifference towards powerful weapons was due 
partially to “the existence of the civil order [in eighteenth- century China] that made self-defense 
unnecessary.”25 Naquin’s argument may have been valid in North China or prosperous Jiangnan 
                                                          
24 Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Qing shi Yanjiusuo 中國人民大學清史研究, Tiandihui 天地會 
(The Heaven and Earth Society), vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin daxue chubanshe, 1980), 51. 
25 Susan Naquin, Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981), 24.  
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regions, which, according to William Skinner, were garrisoned well by the Green Standard 
soldiers.26  
This view, however, naturally tends to minimize regional differences, assuming an 
unconditional judgment that bird gun ownership was not common elsewhere. Depending on 
geographic location and social conditions, regions differed greatly in how readily the bird gun 
circulated among civilians during most of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Considerable empirical 
evidence suggests that the carrying of bird guns was by no means a marginal activity to ordinary 
people in violence-prone regions. Rather, the use of the bird gun became an integral part of local 
social life in some coastal provinces. In such areas where gentry activity was either weak or 
absent and the state was unable to provide sufficient support, ordinary people were more likely to 
own firearms, especially the bird guns to protect themselves from becoming victims of banditry. 
William Rowe’s recent research on Macheng 麻城, a county in northeastern Hubei province 
which was notorious for endemic banditry, reveals that bird guns appeared among civilians in 
large numbers at least during the seventeenth century.27 The use of bird guns was also 
continuously reported in many feud-afflicted areas of coastal provinces. For example, owing to 
scarce resources, expanding population, and unstable social ecology, constant lineage feuding 
became endemic in Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Zhang Jixin (張集馨 1800-1878), the 
                                                          
26 William G. Skinner, “Social Ecology and the Forces of Repression in North China: A 
Regional-Systems Framework for Analysis,” Unpublished paper, 1979. 
27 William Rowe, Crimson Rain, Seven Centuries of Violence in a Chinese County (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 338. According to Rowe, the bird gun’s diffusion to the 
Macheng region was probably affected by local people who served in the military service and 
learned the gun crafting technique. 
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prefect of Tingzhanglong 汀漳龍 in Fujian province, noted in 1842 that bird guns had been 
widely used in lineage feud strife in southern Fujian for years.28 
As we can see, people living along the Southeast Coast and borderland areas had 
encountered the bird gun earlier than those living in other areas. Bird gun users before the late 
Qing were mostly anonymous peasants, who armed themselves for hunting, self-defense, or even 
committing violence. Clues about the civilians’ use of firearms can be obtained from 
contemporary eyewitness descriptions. The famous Cantonese scholar Qu Dajun (屈大均 1630-
1696), writing in the early Qing dynasty, noted that “bird guns were commonly found in 
Guangdong. In the hill areas, men learned to use them from the age of ten, and Xinhui County 
was known for making them.”29 Existing related documents did not uncover how Guangdong 
people came to learn the gun technique originally. What has been confirmed is that by Qu’s time, 
southern Guangdong, in comparison with other Chinese regions, had more opportunities to come 
into contact with the outside world, given its geographic adjacency to Macau, which had been 
under Portuguese control since the mid-sixteenth century. Thereafter, Macau not only displayed 
its pivotal position as the hub of Asian trade before the late Qing, but also served as a conduit 
                                                          
28 Zhang Jixin, Dao Xian huanhai jianwenlu 道咸宦海見聞錄 (Officials’ working documents 
during the Daoguan and Xiafeng’s reigns) (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju, 1981), juan 91, 94-95. 
29 Qu Dajun, Guangdong Xinyu 廣東新語 (New words on Guangdong) (Beijing: Zhonghua 
Shuju, 1998), 441. 
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through which some Chinese people living in the Pearl River Delta could witness product 
innovation in the West, including cannon and quick-firing guns. 30   
When the Portuguese arrived in China in the early sixteenth century they were armed 
with matchlocks. In his detailed analysis of Macau’s fortification and weapons, historian Richard 
Garrett finds that frequent coastal attack from pirates offered the Portuguese settlers a great 
incentive for the development of firearms in Macau, which later became an important source of 
armament to Japan, China, and other countries in Southeastern Asia.31 Portuguese adventurer 
Antonio Fialho Fereira, who travelled to Macau in 1640, noted that “a great quantity of powder, 
many matchlocks, and arquebuses, which likewise made there, and are sold very cheaply albeit 
that they are amongst the best in the world.”32 
                                                          
30 Portuguese adventurer Antonio Fialho Fereira, who travelled to Macau in 1640, noted that “a 
great quantity of powder, many matchlocks, and arquebuses, which likewise made there, and are 
sold very cheaply albeit that they are amongst the best in the world.” See Richard J. Garrett, The 
Defences of Macau: Forts, Ships and Weapons over 450 years (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2010); Zhidong Hao. Macau History and Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2011).  
31 Ibid. 
32 Garrett, The Defences of Macau, 176. Matchlocks and arquebuses were named bird guns in 
Chinese context. 
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Figure 8: Macau in China. SOURCE: https://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/timeline.htm#maps.  
Macau’s role as the primary source of foreign armament had been consistently in place 
until the mid-nineteenth century. Firearm trafficking and gunrunning in Macau along with their 
impact on social order, despite appearing sporadically, always elicited a great deal of official 
attention during the Qing dynasty. In the ninth year of his reign (1804), the Jiaqing 嘉慶 emperor 
(r. 1796-1820) issued an edict to the Macau sub-prefectural magistrate on the prevalence of 
firearm trafficking from Macau to Guangdong. The emperor complained that “contraband trade 
flourished in Macau. Profit-driven barbarians from the West in Macau sold saltpeter, sulfur, and 
military weapons openly without checking their clients’ identity. Firearms falling into the hands 
of civilians seemed inevitable.”33 Recognizing rebels and bandits might arm themselves with 
contraband weapons, the Jiaqing emperor urged local magistrates to interrogate Chinese buyers 
seriously, if caught, about the origins and use of their firearms. To uphold social order, he also 
                                                          
33 Garrett, The Defences of Macau, 20. 
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required local officials to submit annual reports with respect to any firearm-involved incidents in 
Macau and surrounding vicinity.  
The Jiaqing emperor was hardly the first statesman who voiced complaints about the illicit 
firearm trade. Five years later, a similar complaint came from Peng Zhaoshun (彭兆順 1758-?), 
the Magistrate of Xiangshan 香山 County, who was famous for stamping out pirates activities 
along the Guangdong coast during the Qianlong-Jiaqing period.34 In his memorials and private 
writings, Peng had more than once expressed the frustration with the uncontrollable gun-running 
activities that led to a general breakdown in public order. Although the Qing government enacted 
strict firearm laws to ban non-military people from owning and distributing firearms of any 
kinds, officials quickly found their efforts at stamping out gun trafficking were undermined by 
manufacturers and dealers in Macau, who were free of central control, owing much to the 
pluralistic polity, and by Guangdong civilians with powerful desire of arming themselves for 
violent purposes. After the Portuguese established a settlement on the Macau peninsula in 1557, 
the Chinese government rarely claimed jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the 
islands. Recent research by Par Cassel suggests that the Qing government only claimed 
jurisdiction “in cases where Chinese had been killed by foreigners.”35 Such a pluralistic legal 
order prevented Chinese governments from suppressing gun-running activities in foreign 
settlements, through which foreign weapons found their way into Chinese coastal regions.  
                                                          
34 Ibid., 451. 
35 Par Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgement: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in 
Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 42. 
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Nor were bird guns in China ever exclusively smuggled from Macau and other coastal areas. 
Rather, private guns scattered in societies for the most part were locally produced.36 The bird gun 
became a favored weapon in some violence prone regions because it was relatively easy to make 
without less sophisticated techniques. In a period marked by “esteeming literacy while despising 
martiality” (重文輕武 zhong wen qing wu), bird gun owners were traditionally either illiterate or 
semi-literate, including hunters, peasants, or other outlaws. It can be assumed that the 
construction method was not complicated, and could be transmitted through oral narratives. 
Given what has been addressed about the government’s monopoly on the manufacture of any 
types of firearms, it remains unknown in what exact ways the details of bird gun technology got 
diffused. As suggested above, the Ming government carried out the “status system” strictly, 
under which the artisans in state arsenals were constantly and closely monitored. The system 
became loose after the sixteenth century, and was ultimately abolished by the Yongzheng 
emperor to establish a society with “commoner equality.”37 It can be assumed that those artisans, 
who mastered the skill of producing bird guns in state arsenals, were no longer treated as slaves 
during the Qing period. One criminal case filed in the Xingan huilan, reveals that Wang Si, a 
native inhabitant of Beijing, worked for an iron shop to manufacture bird guns for the state 
arsenal. He took this occasion to sell numerous bird guns to his neighbors and instructed them to 
make firearms privately.38 Once these artisans were no longer under tight control, as Wang Si’s 
case shows, it was entirely possible that these artisans transmitted gun making techniques. By the 
                                                          
36 This is a universal phenomenon. One example was the Malay people. See Peter Boomgaard, 
Frontiers of Fears: Tigers and People in the Malay World, 1600-1950 (New Haven: Yale 
Univesity Press, 2001), 134.  
37 Philip A Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 34. 
38 Zhu Qingqi, Xingan huilan, 225.   
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end of the nineteenth century, the bird gun was not regarded as an exotic import, but rather a 
weapon that could be forged indigenously, though its diffusion was not prevalent nationwide. 
Disarming Civilians: Bird Gun Control during the Qing Dynasty 
 As addressed above, the Ming government did not place severe restraints on the civilian 
possession of cold steel weapons, mainly because the state had the capability, resources, and 
confidence in maintaining its monopoly on power and violence. In its legal code, the Ming 
government did not enact any statutory provision to prohibit or limit possession of guns. This 
was probably because the relatively low degree of bird gun circulation was not worthy of 
political attention. However, the state’s policy towards civilian possession of arms, especially 
bird guns, began to move to another direction during the Qing period. Alarmed by the bird gun’s 
lethal power and its potential to impair central authority, the Qing rulers in the mid-nineteenth 
century moved to strengthen the regulations regarding the bird gun’s use and circulation. As this 
section will show, the state’s attitude towards private possession of bird gun was by no means 
static, but was a dynamic process, which was contingent on the social situation and political 
deliberations. 
As aliens, the Qing emperors were deeply distrustful of Han Chinese, which prompted 
them to ensure that elite Manchu forces had better weapons than Chinese soldiers and populace. 
During the Qing period, the type of gun that qualified individuals carried was determined by 
their political status. The Qing emperors were by no means insulated from the changes in gun 
technology initiated in the West.39 In the early seventeenth century, a more advanced musket 
with flintlock mechanism was invented, transforming the traditional matchlock musket which 
                                                          
39 See Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), 117-21. 
  
95 
 
employed a flammable wick to ignite the powder. The flintlock musket arrived in China first and 
foremost as a gift from Western travelers or foreign envoys. As suggested by the Qing’s royal 
collections, the Qing emperors, being aware of the rapid development of gun technology in 
Western Europe, deliberately maintained the use of flintlock muskets for royal use exclusively. 
The most advanced guns were labeled as “for imperial use (御用 yuyong)” indicating these guns 
were reserved for the exclusive use of the emperor. 40  
With respect to the guns for military use, the allocation was highly hierarchical. Recent 
work by Ulrich Theobald and Yingcong Dai on the Qing’s war expenditure and logistics suggest 
that the eight banner garrisons which were stationed at the capital were allowed to be armed with 
the most advanced bird guns to guard the emperor and his noble family. What followed were 
other Manchu banner soldiers scattered among local provinces, who armed with less powerful 
guns. The last category was the Green Standard Troops, who were poorly equipped with obsolete 
matchlocks.41 Though skill in archery remained an essential part of Manchu identity, as 
addressed above, they still made efforts to retain their exclusive rights over the most 
sophisticated and developed military equipment.  
Just as with the cautious policy on military use of bird guns in military use, the control of 
bird guns among civilians became an inseparable aspect of Manchu rulership that guaranteed its 
legitimate power over Chinese subjects. The Qing rulers, for the most part, granted people the 
right to arm themselves with civilian weapons. Nevertheless, the definition of “civilian weapon” 
                                                          
40 For a list of the flintlock muskets collected by the Qing emperors, see 
http://www.dpm.org.cn/search/shuziziliaoguan/cangpin/common/search.html?A.objName%20lik
e%27%25%E6%9E%AA%25%27%20.   
41 Theobald, War Finance and Logistics in Late Imperial China, 44; Yingcong Dai, “Military 
Finance of the High Qing Period: An Overview,” in Military Culture in Imperial China, ed.  
Nicola di Cosmo (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 306.  
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during the Qing changed over time. As the Manchus entered the Great Wall in 1644 and settled 
down in China proper, the alien rulers learned the lessons passed down by the Ming dynasty. 
Having witnessed the rise of a highly-militarized population in the areas like the northwest, 
where armed peasants on many occasions joined rebel armies, the early Qing rulers soon banned 
any non-military individuals from possessing weapons.42 In 1648, the Board of War ordered the 
local magistrate to confiscate all manner of weapons owned by peasants. In the meantime, the 
state placed people under surveillance with the adoption of the bao-jia system. Under the 
community-based system, village residents were under tight administrative control. The chief of 
each bao unit was responsible for reporting any private weapons to local government in his 
jurisdiction.43  
The early Qing policy with respect to private arms reflected the anxieties of alien 
conquerors especially when their attempts to establish solid control could be hindered by a 
highly militarized population. The policy did not last long, as less than a year later it had been 
replaced by a new order, requiring local magistrates to return all the confiscated weapons to their 
owners and also ensure their rights to possess them.    
Recently we have heard that the people have no weapons and cannot repel aggressors.   
Bandits on the other hand can profit, and the good people have to endure bitter and 
poisonous [misfortunes]. Now we think that the weapons and armor which the people 
originally ought not to have had, and which were strictly forbidden in the past, such as 
muskets, fowling pieces, bows and arrows, knives, spears, and horses, ought now to be 
                                                          
42 For the Local militarization of the late Ming dynasty, see Roger V. Des Forges, Cultural 
Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History: Northeast Henan in the Fall of the Ming 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
43 Wenxian congbian (文獻叢編 Historical documents), vol. 23 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan 
chubanshe, 2008), 485.  
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retained in their possession and not forbidden. Return to their original owners those 
[weapons] which were initially turned over to the officials.44 
This imperial edict issued in the sixth year of Shunzhi’s 順治 reign (1644-1661) 
indicated the state’s stance over private procession of weapons changed greatly from what it had 
envisioned. One striking difference was the Qing government’s definition of civilian weapons, 
which included not only cold steel weapons as formulated during the Ming period, but also bird 
guns. The order also distinguished the “good people,” from “bandits.” The former group, which 
belonged to the bao-jia units were again granted the right to own guns for self-defense.  
Thereafter, the state did not place any particular restriction on the proper use of the bird 
guns, but regarded putting some kinds of weapons in the hands of peasants as a potential way to 
guard the localities against bandits and potential rebels. Huang Liuhong 黃六鴻, a district 
magistrate of the early Qing and the author of the Complete Book of Happiness and Benevolence 
(福惠全書 Fuhui quanshu), the largest magistrate handbook in existence, advocated the arming 
of peasants for local defense. In his book, Huang urged that village braves’ important role in 
guarding localities would be strengthened by instructing them to shoot with bird guns.45 Though 
the bird guns were not widely diffused among these village braves, who were still primarily 
armed with cold steel weapons, Huang’s suggestion indicated that arming qualified individuals 
in local society with bird guns was permitted at least in the early Qing. 
                                                          
44 Shizu shilu 順治實錄 (Veritable Records of Shunzhi emperor), juan 43: 505a. For the 
translation of this edict, see Frederic Wakeman, The Great Enterprise: The Manchu 
Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985).  
45 Huang Liuhong, Fuhui Quanshu, in Guanzhen shujicheng 官箴書集成 (Compendium of 
Administrative Handbooks), vol. 3 (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1997), 135.  
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Huang’s stance rested on two assumptions. First, when local peasants armed themselves 
with bird guns, they had the power to deter or fight against bandits, whose weapons were much 
weaker. Second, these peasants who received proper military training would not join the bandits 
against the state and disturbed local communities. These two assumptions, however, became the 
Qianlong emperor’s major worries decades later. This is shown in an edict issued by him in 
1777. In this year, Guotai (郭泰 ? -1872) , the governor of Shandong province and one of 
Qianlong’s most favored officials, presented a memorial to the emperor, requesting approval to 
train village braves with bird gun shooting for collective defense. Qianlong rejected his request 
by arguing that  
The village braves were used to arrest robbers and bandits, and guard local barns. They 
were supposed to assist regular troops and played similar roles. However, they were 
ordinary peasants, and possessed many different characters from soldiers. If they became 
skilled at shooting with bird guns, and then conducted illegal activities, that would be 
disastrous for local society…. For instance, if Wang Lun and his followers mastered bird 
guns, we would not suppress them so easily. 46  
The same year that Guotai sent his memorial, Gao Jin (高晉 1706-1779), the governor-
general of Liangjiang (covering the provinces of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui), put forth his 
proposal to the emperor that the imperial military examination should be revised to examine 
candidates on bird guns, which would be more pragmatic than swinging swords.47 Qianlong was 
enraged and firmly rejected his idea. Fearful that village braves with bird guns in their hands 
might endanger local security and be harder to suppress, Qianlong once again ordered his 
                                                          
46 Gaozong Shilu 高宗實錄 (Veritable Records of Qianlong emperor), juan 1727, fol: 23a-23b.   
47 Gugong Bowuyuan 故宮博物院, comp. Gongzhongdang Qianlong chao zouzhe 宮中檔乾隆
朝奏摺 (Palace memorials of Qianlong reign), vol. 72 (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1982), 
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provincial officials to replace the existing firearms with bows and arrows. The emperor sharply 
denounced Gao Jin for his ignorance of the bird gun’s potential risk: 
If bird gun shooting becomes a component of military examinations, military talents will  
practice shooting frequently, which might give rise to the illicit production and 
trafficking of gunpowder and lead shot. Both are contraband in society. The growing 
number of ordinary people who are capable of shooting in a single county will 
undoubtedly generate a great deal of influence over local society.48 
Why did the Qianlong emperor issue an order radically departing from the policy adopted 
by the Shunzhi Emperor, who regarded arming the common people as an effective way to repel 
bandits? The Wang Lun rebellion, as Qianlong mentioned in his 1777 edict, made the emperor 
reassess Qing policy on the use of bird guns by peasants. Wang Lun was the leader of the White 
Lotus in Shandong Province. As a sect master skilled in meditating and healing, he quickly 
gathered several thousand followers and rebelled in 1774, to create a religious community. After 
successfully occupying several cities in Shandong province, the insurgents were suppressed by 
the well-equipped Qing defenses within a month.49 General Shuhede (舒赫德 1710-1777), who 
was in charge of the suppression, wrote a memorial to Qianlong: 
The quick suppression of the Wang Lun Uprising not only benefited from the brave and 
skillful warriors in the battle, but was also due to the factor that insurgents were poorly 
equipped. Most of them were not armed with bird guns. It thus could be argued that the 
possession of bird guns mattered a lot and deserved our attention. If we do not take steps 
to prohibit these private guns, I am worried it may incur serious influence in the future. I 
think all the merchants and peasants should not be allowed to own guns. Local 
magistrates should confiscate all the bird guns in their jurisdictions…. In so doing, there 
will be no illegal bird guns in local society, which will avoid rebellious activities in a 
long run. 50 
                                                          
48 Gaozong Shilu, juan 1144. 
49 For a detailed analysis of the Wang Lun rebellion, see Naquin, Shantung Rebellion. 
50 Qianlong chao hanwen zhupi zouzhe 乾隆朝漢文朱批奏摺 (Imperial edicts of the Qianlong 
emperor), Catalogue no. 555/10-24, First Historical Archives, Beijing.  
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Shuhede in his edict presented his anxiety over the potential threat posed by the bird gun 
owners in local society. In 1781, the forty-sixth year of Qianlong’s reign, the emperor approved 
Shuhede’s suggestion and issued an imperial edict forbidding the private manufacture of bird 
guns. He proclaimed that: 
The private manufacture of bird guns in local society has always been a prohibited 
behavior for ordinary civilians. Provincial Commanders (dufu), however, did not take this 
issue into serious consideration in their daily affairs, leading to the emergence of this 
phenomenon. As a result, some outlaws might take this occasion to conduct illegal 
activities, rather than using guns for self-defense purpose or weeding out the wicked 
criminals. Thus, I order all provincial commanders to investigate this issue in your 
jurisdiction to guarantee that no artisans manufactures or sells bird guns. If private 
possession of bird guns is detected, their guns should be confiscated. Provincial 
commanders also need to report all the cases to the emperor annually.51 
Qianlong’s edict shows his genuine concern over the prevalence and ready availability of 
bird guns in local society and their threat to public security. The year after Qianlong issued the 
edict, provincial commanders continuously sent memorials to the emperor, reporting how the 
bird gun regulation policy was implemented, regardless of whether any private guns were 
detected in their respective jurisdiction. For the most part, local magistrates always asked the 
chief of each bao-jia unit to report any bird guns found in their jurisdictions. For the confiscated 
bird guns, local government would pay a minimum amount of money to their owners. They also 
notified local artisans that making bird guns was prohibited. According to the annual statistics 
reported by provincial governors through the palace memorial system, more than forty-four 
                                                          
51 Qing Gaozong Shilu, juan 11: 44. 
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thousand bird guns were confiscated from the forty-sixth year to fifty-ninetieth year of 
Qianlong’s reign. 52 
Provinces Amounts of Confiscated Guns Year 
Sichuan 16,987 1782-1792 
Jiangxi 14,500 1782-1793 
Fujian 4500 1782-1792 
Yunnan 927 1782-1783 
Shaanxi 800 1782-1786 
Henan 40 1782-1793 
Hunan 100 1782-1793 
Guizhou 2,100 1782-1784 
Hubei 350 1781-1792 
Zhili 120 1782-1787 
Table 1: The Confiscation of Bird Guns (1781-1787) 
Under Qianlong’s order, the ordinary people were deprived of the right to self-defense 
with bird guns. The early Qing’s effective gun control policy depended on distinguishing 
between “good people” and “bandits,” and between “civilian weapons” and “military weapons.” 
Under the bao-jia system, the “good people” were permitted to own “civilian weapons,” 
                                                          
52 I have collected and read these annual reports, which included the amounts of bird guns that 
local government confiscated from 1782 to 1787. The statistics is based on the information 
provided by provincial governors. Historian Zuo Buqing also includes the figure in the research 
on Qianlong’s local control mechanism. See Zuo Buqing, “Qianlong zhenya wanglun qiyihou de 
fangmin cuoshi 乾隆鎮壓王倫起義后的防民措施 (Qianlong emperor’s policy on suppressing 
peasant rebellion),” Gugong bowuyuan yuankan 故宮博物院院刊 (Palace Museum Journal) 
2(1982): 29-69.   
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including bird guns, for self-defense. The Wang Lun Uprising set off an alarm about the danger 
of the existence of an armed populace in local society. The 1781 edict on bird gun control not 
only indicated the government’s firm intent to guard its monopoly on the production and 
distribution of powerful weapons, but also reflected the rulers’ anxiety when encountering a 
militarized population who had potential against his legitimate control.  
The Introduction of Foreign Guns in the Late Qing 
While the number of bird guns in circulation appeared moderate during Qianlong’s reign, 
authorities still banned civilian gun ownership to prevent popular insurgent movements. Until the 
early twentieth century, the Qing government had no intent to mitigate the prohibition. The strict 
control measure had, to some extent, limited firearm ownership before the late nineteenth 
century. The state’s indifference towards the application of advanced firearms in the military also 
circumscribed ordinary people’s opportunities to upgrade their weapons.  
Even in Guangdong, for example, where a militarized society was being formed, local 
militia and peasants still used a mixture of cold steels and antiquated bird guns up to the mid-
nineteenth century. When the British troops attacked Guangdong in May 1841, local peasants in 
Sanyuanli 三元里, a market town near the port city, displayed resolute determination and 
bravery to resist the invasion of the imperialists. A contemporary account by Lin Fuxiang (林福
祥 ?-1862), a local gentryman who recruited villagers to defend the town, revealed that ordinary 
men and women largely turned iron agricultural tools such as swords, axes, plowshares, and hoes 
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into weapons.53 Concerning the firearms, as a British military officer noted with contempt, only a 
slight number of less accurate matchlocks could be found among Chinese villagers.54  
However, the balance between state power and popular force was destabilized and 
ultimately toppled from the late nineteenth century when the Qing dynasty entered a period of 
decline. As China suffered from both Western imperialist penetration and domestic unrest, the 
gradually decreasing power of the state eventually made the strict gun control impossible. As the 
ruling elites realized the need to modernize China’s defense industry, many non-state groups or 
ordinary individuals started pursuing foreign guns or replacing their outmoded bird guns with 
modern ones for purposes of self-defense or committing violence. As this section will describe, 
the political decentralization and chaotic social order of the late Qing allowed the government to 
reexamine its stance towards private gun ownership in the new social situation.  
Orthodox and Heterodox Camps: the Circulation of Foreign Guns in Local Society 
For many late Qing ruling elites, China’s vulnerability to foreign invasion from the 1840s 
onwards was viewed in terms of the tremendous gap in weapon power between China and that of 
the West. While the small arms technology in the West was advancing rapidly, undergoing what 
has been dubbed the “breech-loader revolution,” China’s efforts to augment its armed strength 
had diminished in the midst of stability and prosperity from the eighteenth century.55 In the 
                                                          
53 Lin Fuxiang, “Sanyuanli dazhang riji三元里打仗日記” (Diary of the Fighting in Sanyuanli) 
from Pinghai xinchou 平海新籌 (New Plans for Pacifying the Oceans), in Zhongguo jindaishi 
ziliao xuanbian 中國近代史資料選編 (Selected Documents in Modern Chinese History), 23-4. 
For a detailed exploration about the incident, see Frederic E. Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate: 
Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). 
54 Duncan MacPherson, Two Years in China: Narrative of the Chinese Expedition, from its 
Formation in April, 1840 till April, 1842 (London: Saunders and Otley, 1842), 307.  
55 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution, 90 
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Opium War (1839-1842), the British army outfitted with modern warships and artillery easily 
defeated Qing army troops which were armed largely with obsolete weapons. The humiliating 
failure did not set off alarm bells for the Chinese bureaucrats that prompted a fundamental 
military reform, though some statecraft scholars like Wei Yuan (魏源 1794-1857) called for 
“learning the barbarians’ techniques to subdue them.”56 A little over ten years later, China’s 
military failure in the second Opium War (Arrow War) once again demonstrated the unparalleled 
development in military capabilities between China and the West. The Mongolian general 
Sengge Rinchen (僧格林沁 1811-1865), who failed to resist the attack of the Anglo-French 
alliance troops at the Dagu Forts, lamented that even the banner garrisons in Tongzhou (a suburb 
of Beijing) were rarely armed with firearms, and were powerless to deter the mighty enemies.57 
Responding to the embarrassing defeats after 1842 when Western imperialism accelerated the 
political encroachment on Chinese mainland, and to the domestic popular movements including 
the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1854) and the Nian Rebellion (1851-1868), Qing statecraft literati 
who saw possession of advanced weapons as a guarantee of military efficacy advocated military 
                                                          
56 Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi 海國圖志 (An illustrated gazetteer of maritime countries) (N.P., 
1852), juan 1, 1. 
57 Chouban yiwu shimo (Xianfeng chao) 籌辦夷務始末咸豐朝 (Documents on the handling of 
barbarian affairs during the Xianfeng era) (Reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1964), juan 6, 
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modernization.58 As numerous scholars have pointed out, the significance of these initiatives 
which appeared for the first time in China’s military annals, lay not only in providing the Qing 
officials with the weapons to fight rebels or defend themselves, but also in their pivotal roles in 
the introduction of Western science and modern technology.59   
After the mid-nineteenth century, as some reform-minded officials vigorously 
implemented military reform, the state’s monopoly over the most advanced weapons, of which 
the imperial government used to be proud began to be loosened. As China became gradually 
integrated into the global arms network, some modern firearms either imported from abroad or 
                                                          
58 Initiated by the famous late Qing reformist thinker Feng Guifen (馮桂芬 1809-1874), and 
implemented by Li Hongzhang and like-minded officials, their modernization endeavors, known 
as the self-strengthening movement, led to the creation of Western-style arsenals in Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Suzhou, and other port cities. Starting from the 1860s, the famous Kiangnan Arsenal in 
Shanghai, Hanyang Arsenal in Hankou, and many others started providing regional armies with 
modern weapons and ammunition with the assistance of American and European engineers, 
mostly Germany.  Although orthodox scholar-officials who emphasized the decisive role of the 
people in the conduct of war, were reluctant to endorse foreign weaponry, late Qing’s consistent 
military setbacks silenced their doubts of Western– style arms and its military Westernization 
was accelerated. See Thomas L. Kennedy, The Army of Kiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese 
Ordance Industry, 1860-1895 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978). 
59 The modernizing initiative was successful up to the point at which these Chinese arsenals 
helped introduced Western-style weapons, breech-loading guns in particular, which were 
dramatically superior to traditional bird guns. For example, as the largest arsenal in East Asia, 
the Kiangnan Arsenal was able to produce foreign-style small arms that were based on 
sophisticated technological know-how, including Mauser cartridges, Lee and Snider rifles, and 
Remington breechloaders and cartridges. With the aid of foreign technicians, its production 
capacity reached 3,500 rifles per year by 1875. The official statistics shows that the Arsenal 
produced 65,300 rough breechloaders between 1873 and 1904. As the Kiangnan Arsenal grew 
rapidly under the endorsement of Li Hongzhang, military industries were beginning to spring up 
elsewhere in China. As observed by a French military officer Henri Fray, the Hanyang Arsenal 
established by Zhang Zhidong in Hubei Province possessed the capability to manufacture fifty 
Mauser rifles and twenty-five thousand cartridges a day with the guidance of German engineers. 
For the Self-Strengthen Movement and its results, see Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of 
Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874; Wang Ermin, Qingshi junshishi 
lunji; Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisition from Abroad: A Quest for “Supeb 
and Secret Weapons” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 10. 
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manufactured domestically occasionally appeared in local society. In Eastern Guangdong, for 
instance, which was famous for its frequent lineage and village feuds, local inhabitants quickly 
adopted Western-type rifles, which were brought in from nearby Hong Kong or Macau in 
committing communal violence.60 The presence of the foreign gun was gradually not regarded as 
a novelty in some urban areas as well. One prominent example was the armed escort companies, 
known as biaoju 鏢局, which had developed during the Ming and Qing dynasties to provide 
security services for wealthy individuals and merchant caravans. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, Beijing dwellers were accustomed to seeing these escorts, who were also expert martial 
artists, wandering in the street with foreign guns in hand.61 Serious offenders like bandits or 
rebels with intent to injure others, too, actively acquired guns to facilitate crime. Late Qing 
officials were well aware of the potential threat posed by these illegal gun owners. Gun shooting 
was not an item to be tested in imperial military examination from Qianlong’s reign onward. The 
frequent report on the armed banditry allowed the naval commander Zhang Peilun (張佩俊 
1848-1903) to comment, “if offenders have armed themselves with foreign guns, can the military 
candidates (武生 wusheng) who were just adept at bow and arrow beat them?”62 
Apart from regular troops and modern police forces, gun carriers during the late Qing 
were comprised of a variety of people, including but not limited to gentry-led militia forces, 
ordinary peasants, urban dwellers, rebels, and bandits. It is also difficult to determine which 
                                                          
60 See Harry J. Lamley, “Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern Guangdong under 
Qing Rule,” in Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture, eds., Jonathan N. 
Lipman and Stevan Herrell (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 27-64.  
61 Xunjingbu 巡警部 (Police department), Catalogue no. 477-37-1-192, First Historical Archives, 
Beijing.  
62 Lishi wenxian 歷史文獻 (Historical documents) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006), 
143. 
  
107 
 
types of guns these people carried. When gun-involved violence appeared in late Qing 
newspapers or government documents, the brand or other details of the weapons were seldom 
identified; rather they were roughly classified into “native” (土 tu) or “foreign” (洋 yang). The 
match-loading gun transferred from Japan during the Ming dynasty had already been 
indigenized, and was called the bird gun or local gun (土槍 tuqiang), while the new Western gun 
was given the prefix “yang”, which served to denote their superiority over the traditional ones. 
However, as Sherman Cochran suggests, Chinese people’s distinction between “Chinese” and 
“Western” was very broad and inexplicit.63 Similarly, though some major modernizers like Li 
Hongzhang had an intimate knowledge of foreign weapons and their respective performance, 
most civilian gun carriers lacked such expertise, labeling them simply as general foreign guns, no 
matter their place of production.64   
The emergence of armed forces in local society during the late nineteenth century 
confirmed what scholars like Philp Kuhn have characterized about the militarized nature of 
Chinese local society. As suggested by Kuhn, the nineteenth-century militarization of local 
society “could be visible within both the orthodox, gentry-dominated Confucian culture and the 
various heterodox, secret-society dominated sectarian subcultures.”65 The village tuanlian 
militia, which was always tied with other militia nearby and developed into regional army 
embodied the orthodox side of militarization. Bandit bands, secret societies, or “communities in 
arms” such as the Taiping rebel armies constituted the heterodox aspect of militarization. In a 
                                                          
63 Sherman Cochran, Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 161. 
64 “Chouyi haifangzhe 籌議海防折 (On the coastal defense),” in Li Hongzhang Quanji 李鴻章
全集 (Collections of Li Hongzhang) (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2008), 161.  
65 Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China, 165.  
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general sense, the primary distinction between the two modes of militarization is that militia 
forces had no intent to challenge state authority, though their existence objectively decentralized 
state power, while the latter behaved to disrupt social order and stability. Borrowing Kuhn’s 
theoretical framework to categorize late Qing private gun ownership in the shadow of increasing 
militarization, it can be assumed that gun carriers could also be detected within both the orthodox 
and heterodox camps.  
When massive social unrest, ranging from the unremitting popular movements, frequent 
banditry, to the foreign encroachments, became chronic problems from the mid-nineteenth 
century, the Qing government’s central authority and capability to maintain local order were 
gravely damaged. As the Taiping and Nian rebellions reached their climax in the 1860s, the 
government again emphasized the role of popular power in stabilizing social order, as 
exemplified by the local gentry-led private defense organizations.66 Known as tuanlian or 
“grouping and drilling,” the quasi-official armies and their other administrative functions in local 
society indicated the devolution of central power and the emergence of militarism, which allows 
scholars like Franz Michael to use “regionalism” to define the late Qing’s political structure.67  
One of the tuanlian militia’s distinct features compared with the Banner and Green 
Standard armies were the adoption of Western weapons. In the rural areas, tuanlian were mostly 
organized by influential local landlords, who were responsible for recruiting mercenaries, 
building fortifications, acquiring weapons, and training militia members to defend the localities. 
                                                          
66 See, Kwang-ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, "The Military Challenge: The North-west and the 
Coast," in The Cambeidge History of China, vol. 11, eds., John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching 
Liu (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 202-73. 
67 Franz Michael, “Introduction: regionalism in nineteenth-century china,” in Stanley Spector, Li 
Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth Century Chinese Regionalism (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1964), xxi-xiii.  
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The tuanlian’s private and semi-independent nature made the leaders better able to seek 
advanced weapons, as long as they received local magistrate approval. In the regions that had 
easy access to the weapons market and purchasing power, foreign guns were more likely to be 
adopted by tuanlian members. For example, in the early 1900s, a gentry association in 
Guangdong’s Xinning County wrote the local government demanding approval to purchase 
firearms for organizing militia. The request was promptly granted, allowing the militia leaders to 
purchase 1550 foreign guns from nearby Hong Kong. In the coastal provinces like Guangdong, 
the wealthy gentry probably had little difficulty procuring foreign guns from Hong Kong and 
Macau. As Guangdong Governor Guo Songtao lamented in 1880, “foreign guns were sold 
without any restrictions.”68  
Militia forces also surged in newly emerging commercial cities like Shanghai, Suzhou, 
and Tianjin to preserve local peace in the crisis of war and social unrest. Following in the 
footsteps of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps (上海商團 shanghai shangtuan) which was 
established in 1853 to defend the Shanghai International Settlement, Chinese merchants 
organized a militia in the city’s Chinese district in 1907. The militia, as Elizabeth Perry and 
Bryna Goodman’s works point out, substantially remedied the government’s manpower shortage 
to quell the opium den crisis  (1910) and rice riots (1911).69 The local government thus was not 
afraid to trust the militia with powerful arms. Once receiving permission from the governor-
general of Liangjiang, Shanghai Daotai Cai Naihuang supplied the militia 120 “seven-nine” 
                                                          
68 David Faure, Emperor and Ancestor: Stare and Lineage in South China (Stanford: Stanford 
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69 Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern 
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rifles and 5000 bullets, and also issued a license to purchase guns. As one memoir suggests, 
almost all the militia members had guns in hand at the militia’s inception.70 Almost 
simultaneously with Shanghai, Suzhou merchants Ni Kaiding 倪開鼎 and Hong Yulin 洪毓麟
organized the Suzhou Merchant Sports Association (蘇商體育會 Sushang tiyu hui), which later 
evolved into the militia corps (蘇州商團 Suzhou shangtuan). In early 1907, the Association was 
allowed to purchase 50 Mauser rifles and 10,000 bullets from Shanghai’s foreign trade 
companies.71  
The militia forces, the above mentioned armed escort companies, and ordinary armed 
civilians were overwhelmingly defensive in nature, and their gun ownership was visible to the 
government, while armed outlaws posed explicit threats to social order and state power. The 
rebel forces, ranging from the tremendously destructive Taiping rebels to the heterodox secret 
societies and bandits, all actively sought to purchase or smuggle foreign weapons, though some 
of these groups were anti-foreign zealots. The primary motive of their actions was essentially to 
bring about radical changes in political and social spheres, while the foreign gun acquisition and 
possession could facilitate that end. For instance, when the Taiping Army reached the Suzhou 
and Shanghai area in 1860, the military commander Li Xiucheng (李秀成 1823-1864) was very 
taken with foreign guns and cannons. Though the major weapon-supplier countries adopted a 
neutral stance towards the Taiping and prohibited producers from selling military weapons to the 
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army, Li was able to get his favored ammunition through an underground channel from 
Shanghai. As the North-China Herald noted in 1860: 
[I]t may be scarcely credible to honest folk in Shanghai that during the whole time the 
firing was going on from the allied troops, Europeans from among us, one or two of them 
received as, at least, respectable persons, were actually engaged at various places up the 
two rivers selling the insurgents gunpowder and arms; the gunpowder under the name of, 
and packed like Chinese snuff!72  
A few years earlier, the Small Sword Society (小刀會 xiaodaohui), a branch of the 
underground Heaven and Earth Society, staged an uprising and captured Shanghai in 1853. The 
rebel leaders took advantage of Shanghai’s position as a major port of weapon smuggling, 
acquiring flintlocks and gunpowder from Western traffickers. In his memorial to the court, the 
governor-general of Liangjiang Yi Liang (怡良 1791-1867) expressed his deep anxiety regarding 
the rebel’s acquisition of more advanced guns. “The ruffians bought brass caps and flintlocks 
from vicious Westerners. Without firing match and powder, these guns were not vulnerable to 
the rainy condition.”73 The rebels’ adoption of foreign guns had promised to diminish the Qing’s 
military advantage. As Yi Liang depicted the battle scene, “when the rebels attack the city wall, 
their bullets, falling like rain, were a lot harder to avoid than shells, which caused a lot of 
injuries.”74 In the 1850s, most Chinese armies were still armed with a mixture of cold steels and 
inferior matchlocks. Whereas, the secret societies like the Small Sword Society were able to get 
some better arms, which increased the difficulty of suppression. The uprising had not been 
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73 Shanghai shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo 上海社會科學院歷史研究所 (The Institute of 
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utterly subdued until two years later, following joint operations by the Qing military and the 
Western powers. As we have seen above, one reason for Qianlong’s quick suppression of the 
mid-Qing rebellions initiated by Wang Lun in Shandong and Lin Shuangwen in Taiwan during 
the eighteenth century lay in the fact that the weapons of regular troops were far superior to those 
of their antagonists. Comparatively, what can be drawn from the armed rebellions of the late 
Qing is that the state’s monopoly over advanced weapons began to dissolve. The late Qing’s 
frequent ensuing receptiveness to foreign technology imports, including foreign firearms, added 
to the complexity of the state’s firearm control, which lasted until the fall of the dynasty in 1911.  
If we scrutinize other forms of what Philip Kuhn termed the heterodox camps of military 
force, the outlaws with no revolutionary agenda constituted another important category of 
firearm carriers. These outlaws were largely comprised of robbers spread through both urban and 
rural areas, Robin Hood-like gangsters hid in the mountainous regions, and some spontaneous or 
casual criminals who committed violence with pre-supposed motives. Like other agrarian 
societies, the activities of these outlaws became an imperative part of China’s social ecology 
which ran through the whole Qing dynasty. In the criminal documents or other official written 
records, the government used the general term bandits (賊 zei) to identify them. These men and 
women, who depended on the use of violence to achieve their purposes, were typically eager to 
pursue the new, more powerful weapons. Through their illicit activities, their weapon choice, and 
acquisition channels were shown, which provides particular perspective to gauge how military 
innovation penetrated into local society.  
Even though there are no official statistics available on firearm-related crime in Imperial 
China, instances of armed conflict were observed in many different textual forms. During the 
Qing dynasty, most severe criminal cases were reported to and handled by the local magistrates 
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first, who then were obliged to report some issues that were considered of primary significance 
to the central bureaucracy.75 Most cases involving large-scale violence, armed conflict, or 
homicide were considered extremely serious incidents, which were required to be reported to the 
central government. The local officials, who were normally subject to multi-layer oversight were 
unlikely to hide the problems.76 The ministry officials in the capital would send some 
representative ones to the emperor. Besides these regular memorials (known as tiben 題本), the 
energetic emperors from Kangxi onward had increasingly used the “secret palace memorial” 
system to get across local information from his inner circle of trusted officials, including local 
officials, inspecting censors, and even retired officials.77 After the death of one emperor, the 
annalists would organize tons of memorials and edicts, including the ones related to violence and 
firearm-relate crime into chronological order, which were then published in the Veritable 
Records of the Qing (清實錄 Qing Shilu) for later reference.78 During the whole Qing dynasty, 
most cases involving large-scale violence, armed conflict, or homicide were considered 
extremely serious incidents, which were required to be reported to the central government. The 
local officials, who were normally subject to multi-layer oversight were unlikely to hide the 
                                                          
75 The ministry officials in the capital would send some representative ones to the emperor. 
Besides these regular memorials (known as 題本 tiben), the energetic emperors from Kangxi 
onward had increasingly used the “secret palace memorial” system to get across local 
information from his inner circle of trusted officials, including local officials, inspecting censors, 
and even retired officials. See Silas Wu, Communication and Imperial Control in China: 
Evolution of the Palace Memorial System, 1693-1735 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1970). 
76 Thomas M. Buoye, Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes Over 
Property in Eighteenth-century China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 239-240. 
77 Silas Wu, Communication and Imperial Control in China. 
78 The records of gun-involved crimes are drawn from the Daqing lichao shilu (Tokyo: Okura 
shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1937-1938). 
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problems.79 Certainly, these records were by no means completely comprehensive but 
represented a considerable amount of information about the gun-related cases nationwide 
through which the penetration of private guns and its social consequences might be assessed. 80 
 
Table 2: The Frequency of Armed Robbery in Late Qing 
The incidence of armed robbery and banditry gave an explicit indicator of the circulation 
of firearms in society. Several points emerge from this trending chart. First, among the heterodox 
groups, the bandits or robbers lagged behind in adopting advanced weapons. Before the 1860s, 
no criminal case involving the use of a foreign gun was reported, whereas the insurgent forces 
like the Taipings or Small Sword Society had already acquired some sophisticated weapons from 
munitions dealers. The diffusion of foreign weapons among bandits or robbers had occurred 
coincidentally with the Qing state’s military modernization efforts. Second, from the 1860s 
onward, the number of criminal cases involving foreign guns far exceeded the number of bird-
gun related crimes. Although the flow of the reported cases to the central bureaucracy was not 
                                                          
79 Thomas M. Buoye, Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes Over 
Property in Eighteenth-century China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 239-240. 
80 The records of gun-involved crimes are drawn from the Daqing lichao shilu (大清歷朝實錄
Veritable records of the great Qing) (Tokyo: Okura shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1937-1938).  
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huge, these cases to some extent indicate that aggressive outlaws exhibited a penchant for 
foreign-style arms. With the coming of quick-firing guns, there were indications that the low-
quality bird guns gradually were replaced by more advanced ones. The proliferation and use of 
foreign guns by these outlaws after the 1860s exemplified what historians have argued about the 
endemicity of violent conflict in Chinese society, which was not limited to the major uprisings 
and rebellions.81  
The Unstable Relations between the State and Orthodox Armed Forces 
The foreign invasions and persistent civil unrest from the early nineteenth century 
appeared as the catalysts for the spread of Western firearms. The government found itself in a 
difficult position to restrict the heterodox camps from obtaining the powerful guns from an 
underground production and distribution network. As we have seen above, the fierce Taiping 
rebellion and the widespread peasant revolts which plagued the Qing Dynasty from the mid-
nineteenth century allowed the government to delegate power to orthodox local elites who were 
encouraged to organize armed self-defense forces. One significant departure from the earlier 
strict control of firearms was that these collective defense forces were sanctioned to use firearms, 
either low-quality local guns or foreign guns, to defend their own interests when the state was 
unable to perform its police functions. These burgeoning militias, either gentry’s rural tuanlian 
scattered throughout the country or Merchants’ Volunteer Corps established in the major 
commercial cities, were all under official supervision. The Chinese term “official oversight and 
popular management (官督民辦 guandu minban)” was suitable to describe the relationship 
between the militia and the government. As mentioned above, the orthodox local elites who had 
no means to stockpile the needed weapons always resorted to local and provincial governments’ 
                                                          
81 Steven Harrell, “Introduction,” in Violence in China, 1-26. 
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assistance, who might either agree to borrow or sell them the surplus or obsolete firearms, or 
approve their request to purchase foreign weapons through intermediaries in foreign concessions. 
For example, in 1907, the Suzhou militia leaders wrote to the city’s merchants’ association, 
expressing their eagerness to practice shooting in military drills.  
Without practicing shooting with rifles, the militia must be deficient, nor could our spirit 
be kindled… Now some obsolete firearms, which were no longer used by the Army, sat 
idle in the Arsenal Bureau. These old guns would be adequate for the militia to drill... 
Only then could the merchant corps worthy of the name be established to protect the local 
community and public welfare.82  
After deliberate consideration, the Jiangsu provincial government approved the militia 
leaders’ request to borrow forty-two quick rifles. Another similar organization in Wuxi, a major 
commercial hub adjacent to Suzhou, chose to purchase Mauser rifles and bullets from Shanghai’s 
foreign corporation (洋行 yanghang), upon approval by the provincial government.83 
Obviously, given the semi-independent nature of local genty-led militias, their acquisition 
of firearms was contingent on a host of social and political factors, including the affordability 
and accessibility of weapons, the necessity of advanced arms in defense determined by local 
governments, and the consistency of official sponsorship. First, like the bird gun’s initial 
diffusion trajectory, the foreign gun’s circulation was remarkably impacted by the new weapon’s 
uneven distribution between the coastal and interior provinces, and between peaceful and 
violence-prone areas. As seen in cases mentioned above, wealthy regions or the areas with better 
access to weapon sources always spawned well-equipped militias and vice versa. A good 
                                                          
82 “Suzhou tiyuhui binggao (蘇州體育會稟告 Reports on the Suzhou Sports Association),” in 
Suzhou Shanghui Dangan Huibian (蘇州商會檔案彙編 Historical documents on Suzhou 
Merchants’ Association) (Wuhan: Bashu shushe, 2008), vol.4, 947. 
83 Tang Keke 湯可可, “Jindai wuxi shangtuan de xingshuai ji shehui gongneng (近代無錫商團
的興衰及社會功能 Dang’an yu Jianshe (檔案與建設 Archival Documents and Construction) 8 
(2005): 21. 
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example is the militia of Shawan, a township in southwestern Canton. By the early 1910s, as one 
internal document shows, the militia was equipped with fifty Mauser rifles (single-shot), seventy 
muti-shot rifles, thirty Mauser-type gingals, and ninety traditional bird guns or gingals.84 At 
about the same time, some militias of northern provinces took advantage of Tianjin’s position as 
the area’s primary gateway for the flow of foreign goods to purchase foreign arms. Local gentry 
of Zhili Province’s Linyu County 臨與縣 successfully raised money to purchase two hundred 
Mauser rifles and other small arms in Tianjin to arm the militia against constant banditry.85 
Comparatively, in some inland provinces, the relatively advanced weapons among militia troops 
hardly appeared in common use. One such case is that of the militia in Shangcai County of 
Henan Province. As the magistrate of this chronically poor county, Xu Shouzi (徐壽茲 1852-
1917) was deeply aware that the region’s endemic banditry stemmed from disrupted social 
conditions. He advocated organizing highly trained militia by local gentry in each village against 
gangs of bandits. Regarding weapon use, Xu approved the production of traditional bird guns or 
gingalls locally, while ignoring some local gentry’s request to procure more expensive foreign 
guns, for his was anxious about the financial burden incurred as a consequence of weapon 
acquisition.86 
                                                          
84 Liu Zhiwei and Chen Chunsheng, “Qingmo minchu Guangdong xiangcun yipie (清末民初廣
東鄉村一瞥 A glimpse of the rural society of Guangdong province in the late Qing and early 
Republican period),” in Qingzhu Wang Zhonghan Xiansheng Bashiwu ji Wei Qingyun Xiansheng 
Qishi Huadan Jinian Lunwen Heji (慶祝王鍾漢先生八十五暨魏清雲先生七十華誕紀念論文
合集 Essays to commemorate Wang Zhonghan and Wei Qingyun), ed. Bai Hua (Anhui: 
Huangshan shuhe, 1999), 433-35. 
85 “Juban Shangtuan 舉辦商團 (Establishing militia),” Dagon gbao, January 25, 1910.  
86 Xu Shouzi, Xuezhi Shiduan 學知治端 (Thoughts on Learning and Governance), reprinted in 
Guangzhenshu jicheng (Anhui: Huangshan shushe, 1997), vol.9, 465-470. 
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 Second, we should also bear in mind that these gentry-led local militias were encouraged 
and mobilized only when the state had a pressing need to maintain social order. That means the 
state viewed an armed militia as an extension of state power, while simultaneously being wary of 
such force. The milita’s potential for thwarting centralization endeavors was not ignored by 
major statesmen. Yuan Shikai (袁世凱 1859-1916), for example, himself exhibited deep distrust 
of local gentry and indigenous forces. Rather, as Stephen MacKinnon points out, he was 
dedicated to training the New Army in Tianjin, fully employing a top-down initiative during the 
late decades of the Qing dynasty.87 As many historians have evidently proven, the militarization 
of local society after the mid-nineteenth century was not persistent, as many militias were not 
supported by the government or dissolved naturally after the defeats of the Taiping and Nian in 
South China.88 When the local order was undermined by the Boxers and foreign powers in the 
late 1890s, the Qing court’s initiative to meet the new challenges paralleled what they had done 
in the 1850s and 1860s, through forming and training militias in North China to defend the 
country. 
The inconsistency of government policy and the lack of trust towards of militia activity 
had prevented the popular forces from obtaining the equivalent weapons as the regular army 
units. The Qing state’s attitude towards militia weapons was explicitly expressed in the May 
1899 imperial edict, which tended to restrict local militias’ access to advanced firearms:  
Recently, robbery has frequently been reported in many provinces. Thus the 
neighborhood mutual support is urgently required. With respect to the expenditure, all the 
localities should not create a burden to the common people. As for the weapons, the use 
of guns of new foreign type would not be recommended, if not under special 
                                                          
87 Stephen R. MacKinnon, Power and Politics in the Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-kai in 
Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 3-36.  
88 Edward A. McCord, “Militia and Local Minimization in Late Qing and Early Republican 
China: The Case of Hunan,” Modern China 2 :14 (1988), 156-87. 
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circumstances. Other ordinary foreign guns and bullets are not necessary. Currently, local 
guns and traditional gunpowder are not uncommon in many inland provinces. They 
would provide effective defense against restless robbers.89 
 The 1899 edict which directed local officials to deliberate on the issue of civilian 
weapons when mobolizing people for local defense indicated that the state painstakingly sought 
to maintain its monopoly over the sophisticated weapons. Comparatively speaking, the late Qing 
government’s stance over legitimate weapon ownership resembled its policy over bird guns 
during the Qianlong reign, as the state adhered to the principle of maintaining its monopoly over 
the most advanced weapons, although it delegated certain defense responsibilities to local power 
holders after the mid-nineteenth century. According to a Tianjin Dagongbao 大公報 report in 
1909, two years before the fall of the Qing, the Anhui provincial government rejected one local 
magistrate’s request to purchase fifty breech loading rifles and plenty of bullets to arm the local 
militia. The provincial Bureau of Weapons explained that “these new-style guns were 
exclusively reserved for the regular army units.” Eventually, the militia was entitled to purchase 
the less powerful muzzle-loading Mauser rifles.90 Under such political circumstances, the militia 
forces normally had no legal channels to obtain state-of-the-art weapons, but adopting traditional 
arms or outdated surplus guns of foreign-style, as we have seen in many cases. 
Conclusion 
In 1894, American diplomat Thomas Jernigan (1847-1920), who had traveled extensively 
in China as a hunting enthusiast, marveled that matchlocks were still in use among the Miao 
                                                          
89 Chen Baochen, et al., Dezong jinghuangdi shilu (德宗景皇帝實錄 Veritable Records of the 
Guangxu emperor) vol. 44 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 504.  
90 “Qingling houtang kuaiqiang buzhun 請領后膛快搶不准” (Rejection on the purchasing quick 
guns), Dagon bao, October 31, 1909. 
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people, a major ethnic group living in Southwest China. Jernigan, who himself carried a first-
class W.W. Greener rifle, openly derided the backwardness of China’s firearms: 
The Chinese sportsman of the present day is, in every essential equipment, as far behind 
the western sportsman as China is behind western nations in civilization. He shoots with 
an old pattern muzzle-loading matchlock gun which he calls niaoqiang. The barrels may 
be from four to six feet long, sometimes longer, and is mounted on a stock something like 
an old fashioned horse pistol.91 
 Jernigan was correct in his assertion that China was falling too far behind the West in 
firearm technology, as the single shot breech-loading rifle, the later magazine repeating small 
arms, and many other military innovations had become widely used in Europe and America since 
the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Jernigan’s 1894 observation was unilateral and 
oversimplified the complexity of weapon dissemination in all of China. The Miao society, as 
revealed in Jernigan’s report, had experienced a unique historical trajectory that defined its 
firearm diffusion patterns.92 The remoteness and inaccessibility of the region blocked the Miao 
people from experiencing military technological change that was being underway in many other 
provinces from the second half of the nineteenth century. 
As the late Qing government found it hardly possible to implement an effective gun 
control policy, the model of “control/reliance” gained official attention again. Starting from the 
                                                          
91 Thomas R. Jergan, Shooting in China, 206.  
92 The use of bird gun among the Miao people dated from the end of the seventeenth century. As 
one account published in the local gazetteer reveals, the Miao people learned the use of firearms 
from the remnants of a defeated Wu Sangui’s army after Kangxi’s victorious campaigns against 
the Three Feudatories in 1670s. These defeated soldiers, who then retreated to the Miao region, 
taught local people the use of the bird guns and helped them to cast weapons with available 
materials. As one of the visible hallmarks of Miao culture, the introduction of firearms helped 
transform the way of hunting. In her ethnological report, German scholar Inez de Beauclair 
(1897-1981), who traveled to the Miao tribes in southeast Guizhou in 1948, marveled that the 
Miao hunters still did not discard their primitive methods to cast guns, which were handed down 
from the seventeenth century. See Liping fuzhi (Gazetteer of Liping prefecture), 1892; Inez de 
Beauclair, “A Miao Tribe of Southeast Kweichou Cultural Configuration,” Bulletin of the 
Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica 10 (960): 149-69. 
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1860s as the Chinese state faced major rebellions across much of its territory, the government 
sought to mobilize people to defeat rebels and maintain order. The state believed that these 
armed groups or individuals would become another extension of state power. In 1910, two years 
before the fall of the Qing dynasty, the government proposed the new version of the criminal 
law, which, unlike the Great Qing Code, loosened the state’s grip on private firearms, proposing 
that any ordinary individuals were permitted to own either bird guns or foreign guns for self-
defense purpose as long as they had their weapons registered.  
This chapter examines the manifold ways in which the Qing state was gradually impotent 
to maintain the monopoly of violence and made an adjustment to the new social and political 
situation. As the whole country was plagued by civil disorder, the existence of armed populace, 
in the eyes of the state, constituted an extension of state power in local society, as long as their 
activities could not challenge state authority. Through an overview of the history of gun control 
policy during the Qing dynasty, this article illustrates that the Qing’s authoritarian rule, under 
which the monarch exercised disciplinary power and empowered ordinary people to defend 
themselves were inseparable aspects of the state’s social control mechanism. As we have seen, 
the state did not jealously defend its exclusive monopoly on the production and possession of 
certain types of arms, which were officially defined as civilian weapons. Maintenance of 
effective monopoly on the most lethal weapons through enforcement of the law against private 
possession of military weapons and reliance on the armed populace for local defense were 
crucial to the imperial state’s control over its territory. However, “civilian weapon” was not a 
fixed concept. For example, alarmed by the bird gun’s potential to impair central authority, the 
Qianlong emperor believed that it was imperative to strengthen the regulations regarding bird 
gun’s use and circulation. During the late Qing, carrying a private firearm was once again 
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allowed to defend localities, but under strict surveillance. This chapter argues that the Qing’s 
policy on private weapons was determined by the stance between two ideologies: the resolute 
maintenance of their monopoly over violence, and the reliance on social power to defend the 
localities. Therefore, the state’s stance over the armed populace was by no means stationary but a 
dynamic process, which was contingent on the social situation and political deliberation.  
Did the late Qing’s gun regulation policies help the government achieve its aims? Local 
governments indeed implemented policies of gun registration and licensing in the 1910s. For 
example, the police department of Beijing allowed the city’s escort companies to purchase 
foreign guns, which were all engraved and licensed.93 Local government also encouraged the 
formation of militia forces equipped with rifles, which were expected to take up some police 
functions in local society. Nevertheless, the rise of armed forces in local soceity, either orthodox 
or heterodox camps, helped create a social milieu, in which military power became essential in 
the pursuit of power.94 Putting guns in the hands of “good civlians,” was an effective way to 
defend localities, but it failed to play a role in defending the state, which collapsed in 1911.  
The last decade of the Qing dynasty was dotted with rebellions and revolutions initied by Sun 
Yat-sen and his Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會 Tong menghui). When these revolutionaries 
were planning revolts, they raised money overseas and then purchased a large amount of 
firearms mainly from Japan, which was extremely active in firearm smuggling in the early 
                                                          
93 “Waicheng Zongting Shensong Guanli ge Biaoju Qiangzhi Laoyin Guize ji Cunqiang Qingce
外城總廳申送管理各鏢局槍枝烙印規則及存槍清冊” (The regulation and inventory on the 
guns held by escort companies submitted by the police department of the outer city), Catalogue 
no. 477-37-1-192, First Historical Archives, Beijing. 
94 See Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun, 119.  
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twentieth century.95 Sun in particular encouraged the armed people to support his endeavors. For 
example, he actively recruited armed bandits to take part in the revolution. Once the new regime 
had been established, Sun Yat-sen’s government, like his late Qing predecessors, had to deal 
with the problem of armed individuals and groups in local society. This subject will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  
                                                          
95 See Feng Ziyou 馮自由, Geming Yizhi 革命逸史 (Miscellaneous events about the revolution), 
vol.4 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1947), 77-88.  
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~ CHAPTER THREE~ 
Perilous Equilibrium: 
State Power and Indigenous Armed Forces in Early Republican Guangdong, 1912-1924 
 
Introduction 
 
Sparked by a revolt of New Army troops in Wuchang in October 1911, revolutionary 
events throughout China were spiraling out of control, which ultimately toppled the Qing 
dynasty. However, social instability and political fragmentation did not come suddenly to an end 
with the founding of the new Republic. Indeed, local militarization and the proliferation of 
weapons in local society were still present in China, even when the central government tried to 
maximize its control over localities.1 In the midst of political turmoil and social unrest in the 
1910s and 1920s, one thing was clear: no single political entity possessed the power to claim the 
exclusive use of violence in China. The crisis of authority reached its peak in the years following 
the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916 when regional warlords manipulated their military power to 
establish control over independent territory. While various warlords were struggling for power, 
Sun Yat-sen was dedicated to organizing the National Revolutionary Army 國民革命軍 to fulfill 
his dream of unifying China through the Northern Expedition. Headquartered in Guangdong 
Province, Sun established a provisional revolutionary government, formed an alliance with the 
                                                          
1 For the local militarization in early Republican China, see Edward McCord, The Power of the 
Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993). 
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Communists, and founded the Whampoa Military Academy.2 His goal was to build a 
revolutionary government that would gain popular support.  
Nevertheless, following a series of setbacks before his ongoing Northern Expedition, Sun 
came to realize that the mobilization of social forces to support his revolution did not run 
smoothly. One major group of dissenters to his national objectives was the merchants in Canton, 
who in the early twentieth century organized the influential self-defense force known as the 
Canton Merchants’ Corps (廣州商團 Guangzhou shangtuan). By the summer of 1924, the Corps 
grew to a force of over 50,000 people, most of whom were either shopowners or mercenaries 
hired by local merchants. Initially, Sun Yat-sen believed that the wealthy and well-equipped 
merchants were an important social force to be reckoned with. However, the merchant 
community in Canton, having military backing, was not favorably impressed by Sun’s social 
policies and gradually defied his political authority. Ultimately, the irreconcilable conflict 
between Sun’s Guangdong government and armed merchants was exposed with the Canton 
Merchants’ Corps Incident (廣州商團事變 Guangzhou shangtuan shibian) in the October of 
1924. When the leaders of the Merchants’ Corps purchased arms and ammunition from Belgium, 
Sun became suspicious of their anti-government activity, and ordered to confiscate the shipment 
upon its arrival in Canton in August 1924. Over the next two months, negotiations failed to result 
in settlement and the conflict escalated dramatically to an armed fight. The Canton merchants 
                                                          
2 The Whampoa Military Academy was established in 1924 when Sun Yat-sen and his newly 
organization Nationalist Party stationed in Canton as their revolutionary base against warlorism. 
For the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy, see Lincoln Li, Student Nationalism 
in China, 1924-1949 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 22-40. 
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staged an uprising on October 15, which was brutally suppressed by Sun with his Soviet-trained 
army.3  
The bloody conflict in October 1924 was an accumulation of long-term discontent 
between indigenous armed forces, represented by the Canton merchants, and Sun Yat-sen’s 
Guangdong government. The social and political chaos following the collapse of the Qing 
accelerated the spread of local militarization throughout China. This incident in Canton provides 
us a prime example of how the early Republican government, despite its frailty, tried to 
monopolize armed force and how the already militarized local society responded to the agenda of 
claiming legitimacy of political power. As discussed in chapter two, the late Qing government 
adopted the model of “reliance/control” to manage its relations with the armed individuals and 
groups. This approach continued to be adopted by the early Republican government, which 
chose to cooperate with armed forces in local society when the state was weak. For example, the 
Merchants’ Corps played an increasing role in maintaining local order. Since its inception, the 
Corps was able to keep neutrality with shifting political powers, including Sun Yat-sen’s regime, 
who sometimes relied on the Corps to maintain social order.4 However, this cooperative 
relationship had a prerequisite. As this chapter will argue, Sun Yat-sen’s shifting stances towards 
                                                          
3 For the Sun Yat-sen’s military cooperations with the Communists and the Soviet Union, see F. 
F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 
1972), 1-24; C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976), 112-65. 
4 A prominent example was that Cen Bozhu, the founding leader of the Corps, was invited by 
Long Jiguang in 1916 to participate in an official meeting on maintaining social order of Canton 
on the eve of his defeat by Sun Yat-sen and Chen Jiongming. See “Haizhu huiyi zhi dacanju 海
珠會議之大慘劇” (The tragedy of the Haizhu Meeting), Huazhi ribao, April 14, 1916.  
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armed merchants indicated that the early Republican government frowned on private armed 
forces lest they threatened the government’s monopoly on power.   
Previous studies on the Merchant Corps Incident, though offering in-depth analyses on 
the complexity of merchant community and the KMT’s efforts for local control, have seemingly 
downplayed one important bone of contention in the controversy: the confiscation of arms 
ordered by the Merchants’ Corps.5 Though the clash between two bodies had been brewing for 
                                                          
5 In the English-language literature, almost all the studies of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution 
(1922-1928) and Sun Yat-sen’s frustrated political life invariably mention the controversy 
between the Canton merchant community and Sun’s revolutionary government. Scholars of the 
field have adopted two general approaches. Pioneered by C. Martin Wilbur, the first approach 
placed the government agencies at the century of inquiry, and was to fathom the multiple ways 
Sun and his revolutionary alliances met the challenges imposed by the social and political 
environment of Canton. It is argued that Sun’s economic initiatives and the presence of extra-
provincial mercenary forces together helped shatter the city’s tranquility, which aggravated the 
antipathy of the merchant community. Beyond just scrutinizing the governmental interventions 
in the city, other scholars also seek to give voice to indigenous perspectives and to underscore 
local responses towards the Kuomintang dominance in Canton. In his brilliant study on the early 
twentieth-century Canton, Michael Tsin rejects the notion that the conflict indicated “a simple 
dichotomy between new and old forces.” Conversely, his research on the merchant community 
shows that they did not have antipathy towards Sun’s revolutionary agenda. The conflict 
stemmed from “the general disenchantment with the failed promise of the new regime.”  Given 
its historical role in impeding Sun’s unification enterprise, there have been voluminous studies of 
the origins of the conflict and its political implications. Both the Nationalist and Marxist 
historians who posit a revolutionary and national view in writing Chinese history have 
unanimously sunk the Merchants’ Corps and its leader Chen Lianbo (陳廉伯 1884-1944) into 
obscurity. In 1956, the Marxist historian Xu Songling 徐嵩龄 portrayed the Merchants Corps as 
a “counterrevolutionary group” led by Chen, an “imperialist running-dog.” Similarly, Nationalist 
historiography has perpetuated this view, blaming Canton Merchants’ anti-government activities 
that plagued Sun Yat-sen’s North Expedition plans. See C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: 
Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 229-269. Wilbur, Forging the 
Weapons: Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang in Canton, 1924 (New York: East Asian Institute of 
Columbia University, 1966), 89-106; Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 19-23; Michael Tsin, Nation, Governance, and 
Modernity in China: Canton, 1900-1927 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 88, 91; Xu 
Songling, “Yijiuersi Nian Sun Zhongshan de Beifa yu Guangzhou Shangtuan Shibian 一九二四
年孫中山的北伐與廣州商團之變 (Sun Yat-sen’s northern expedition and the Guangzhou 
Merchants’ Corps Incident of 1924,” Lishi Yanjiu (Historical Studies) no. 3 (1956): 59-69; Luo 
Jialun, ed. Geming Wenxian 革命文獻 (Documents on the Revolution), vol. 10 (Taipei: 
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years, it was the incident of arms confiscation that made the hatred reach its climax. After the 
suppression of the Corps, Sun Yat-sen ordered his son Sun Ke (孫科 1891-1973) who was 
appointed as the mayor of Canton in 1922, to meet warlord Zhang Zuolin (張作霖 1875-1928), 
head of the Fengtian Clique 奉天系. Wondering what the Merchants’ Corps was, Zhang was 
deeply puzzled why these prosperous merchants also obtained weapons passionately and 
opposed the government.6 Zhang’s query to Sun raises another theme addressed in this chapter. 
What role did the Merchants Corps play in Canton city and Guangdong province? How did the 
merchant community build its relationship with Sun Yat-sen and his government? Why did the 
Merchants Corps obtain weapons? In order to show how Sun dealt with the armed merchant in 
Guangdong, it was inevitable to identify the armed force itself. Through a detailed examination 
of the social circumstance of modern Guangdong, this chapter also suggests that the social 
ecology manifested in the proliferation of guns in Guangdong society made the notion of “self-
defense” overwhelmingly acceptable, which promoted the formation of the Canton Merchants’ 
Corps. 
The case study of Guangdong illustrates the general trend in many other provinces of the 
early Republican period. The 1911 Revolution did not bring political stability and social 
tranquility to China. As discussed in the Introduction, the proliferation of private guns during this 
period emerged in reaction to both internal social pressure armed banditry, intensified lineage 
                                                          
Zhongyang wenwu gungyingshe, 1973), 1470-83; Zou Lu, Zhongguo guomindang shigao 中國
國民黨史稿 (An outline history of the Chinese Guomindang) (Changsha: Minzhi shuju, 1931), 
1093-95. 
6 Wu Tiecheng 吳鐵城, Wu Tiecheng Huiyilu 吳鐵城回憶錄 (The memoirs of Wu Tiecheng) 
(Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1968), 139.  
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feuding, and persistent military conflicts and external condition: the easy availability of firearm 
sources. In the meantime, the diffusion of guns into local society not only helped support the 
formation of militia forces, but also fostered the conditions under which ambitious individuals or 
groups strengthened their power through the acquisition of weapons.7 Such social circumstances 
were especially obvious in Guangdong.  
In this southern province, various political entities who claimed themselves the legitimate 
ruler dipped in and out in early Republican period. Immediately after the 1911 Revolution 
ending the Qing Dynasty, the province was under control of Chen Jiongming (陳炯明 1878-
1933), a loyal follower of Sun Yat-sen. In 1914, Chen and Sun were chased out of Guangdong 
by the Old Guangxi Clique army, allied with President Yuan Shikai, who then appointed warlord 
Long Jiguang (龍濟光 1867-1925) from Guangxi, who ruled most of Guangdong until late 1917. 
At that time, Long was pushed out of the province after his defeat with Sun Yat-sen and his 
alliance. Sun then established an anti-Beijing regime in Canton, which served as headquarters for 
his famous Constitutional Protection Movement 護法運動 (1917-1922). Sun’s revolutionary 
initiative was backed by his old ally, Chen Jiongming, who, however, broke their alliance and 
refused Sun’s plan of national reunification in 1922. Sun was forced to flee to Hong Kong, but 
within the same year, he returned and chased Chen from Guangdong with the help of the Yunnan 
and Guangxi Armies (known as guest armies, 客軍 kejun). Sun then established a new regime 
that “ushered in a new era of radical, nationalistic politics in Guangdong under the leadership of 
                                                          
7 Edward McCord, Military Force and Elite Power in the Formation of Modern China (New 
York: Routledge, 2014), 89-90. 
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the Guomindang (GMD).”8 With the aid of Soviet advisers and the newly formed Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), Canton once again became the headquarters of Sun’s campaign against 
Beijing warlord’s government.9                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
This chapter provides new perspectives on the incident and the conflicts underlying the 
arms confiscation by taking an in-depth look at the government’s stance towards the possession 
of weapons by non-state actors through the lens of social and institutional history. In order to 
explain why the merchants of Canton organized private armed forces that grew to a Corps of 
more than 20,000 men, this chapter first sets Canton in a broad social and political context of 
Guangdong province, which paves the way for an exploration of the formation of private armed 
forces, and an analysis of the role these forces played in local society. This chapter then presents 
a detailed study of the Corps itself and investigates how the conflicts escalated surrounding the 
seizure of arms. Placing the incident in the broad context of the government’s stance towards 
private gun ownership and armed militia forces, this section argues that the early Republican 
government frowned on private armed forces lest they threaten the government’s monopoly of 
power. Utilizing government documents, newspaper reports, private writings, and juridical cases, 
the research thus not only enriches our understanding of the complexities of revolutionary 
agenda and local reality during the early Republic, but also provides deeper insights into the 
dynamic mechanisms through which government coexisted with armed individuals and groups.  
 
                                                          
8 Elizabeth J. Remick, Regulating Prostitution in China, Gender and Local State building, 1900-
1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 107. 
9 John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 150-52. 
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The Social Ecology of Gun Violence in Guangdong 
 
The Violent Setting of Guangdong 
If seen from the viewpoint of a satellite at night, the border of Guangdong Province in 
South China today is remarkably visible as the acid artificial light of the region’s prosperous 
cities brightens the land. As China’s economic showcase of reform and modernization today, the 
specialty of Guangdong Province lies not only in its advanced economy, but also in its unique 
cultural traits and historical trajectories. Even in the early twenty-first century, Guangdongese or 
guangdongren 廣東人 saw themselves as ethnically different from other Chinese people in the 
north. Geographically speaking, the Nanling Mountains rising from western Jiangxi province and 
then stretching to Guangxi separated Guangdong from the rest of China. The mountains in the 
north and the Pearl River Delta in the south together helped shape a distinctive culture and social 
morphology. According to G. William Skinner’s geographical system, most of Guangdong falls 
into the Lingnan macroregion.10 Its distinctiveness is directly apparent in the multitude of 
languages spoken in the province. Apart from Mandarin Chinese as an official language, a 
majority of the population speak Cantonese, along with sporadic Hakka and Min speakers.  
Regarding this region’s social structure in history, unlike North China, where owner-
cultivators predominated villages and the influence of lineage was less prevalent, sophisticated 
kinship organizations were predominant in Guangdong and assumed significant social roles in 
                                                          
10 G. William Skinner delineates nineteenth-century China into eight macroregions: North, 
Northwest, Lower Yangzi, Middle Yangzi, Upper Yangzi, Southeast, Lingnan, and Yungui, and 
a separate macriregion, Manchuria. See Skinner, “Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century 
China,” in The City in Late Imperial China, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford 
University 1977), 211-53.  
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local society.11 Due to its geographical location, the region was opened up to the outside world 
much earlier than other inland provinces during the Ming and Qing dynasties. It was through 
Macau and Canton that foreign religions, ideas, and exotic commodities, though remaining in 
small scale before the mid-nineteenth century, were introduced to China.12 After the First Opium 
War (1839-1842), Guangdong’s contacts with the West were even more pronounced as a result 
of geographical proximity to Hong Kong, a British colony since 1841. The bustling Pearl River 
Delta area, in particular, had taken advantage of the geographical environment and frequent 
international contacts, shaping a particular Lingnan culture that embraced diversity, 
entrepreneurship, and compatibility. 
                                                          
11 British anthropologist Maurice Freedman first used the term “lineage” as a description of the 
communal organization form in Southeastern China. Freedman was echoed by James Watson 
who define the lineage is “a corporation in the sense that members derive benefits from joint-
owned properties and shared resources; they also join in corporate activities on a regular basis. 
Furthermore, members of a lineage are highly conscious of themselves as a group in relation to 
others, whom they define as outsiders.” See Maurice Freedman, Lineage Organization in 
Southeastern China (London: Athlone Press, 1958); and Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien 
and Kwangtung (London: Athlone Press, 1966); James L. Watson, “Chinese Kinship 
Reconsidered: Anthropological Perspectives on Historical Research,” China Quarterly, No. 92 
(1982), p. 594; Jack M. Potter, “Land and Lineage in Traditional China,” in Family and Kinship 
in Chinese Society, eds. Ai-li S. Chin and Maurice Freedman (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1970), 121-39. 
12 For the impacts of Hong Kong and Macau on the South China, see Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, The 
Bible and the Gun: Christianity in South China, 1860-1900 (New York: Routledge, 2003); 
Huang Qichen黃啟臣, Aomen Lishi 澳門歷史 (A History of Macau) (Macau: Aomen lishi 
xuehui, 1999).  
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Figure 7: Guangdong Province in China 
The special features of the cultural cycle offered excellent soil for the formation of a 
rebellious and revolutionary spirit. From the late nineteenth century onwards, political 
movements that transformed modern China, ranging from the major anti-Manchu activities 
before 1911 to the Nationalist Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen in the 1910s and 1920s, mostly 
began in Guangdong. It was also in Guangdong that Hong Xiuquan and his followers made their 
preparations for the Taiping Rebellion, which, as China’s most destructive nineteenth century 
war, almost toppled the Qing Empire. Local officials of the Qing government often lamented that 
Guangdong’s proximity to Macau and Hong Kong, both of which were centers for ammunition 
smuggling, became contributing factors in the rise of rebellious movements and secret 
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societies.13 As the imperial central power weakened in the mid-nineteenth century, the pace of 
local militarization also accelerated, bringing about widespread local armed forces such as 
militia (tuanlian) organized by local gentry, organized armed banditry, and other individuals 
armed themselves for either defensive or aggressive purpose. This situation did not cease with 
the fall of the Qing dynasty, as the new Republican period was marked by political instability 
and chaos.14  
 Starting from the nineteenth century, a number of sociopolitical factors facilitated the 
proliferation of various types of guns in Guangdong society, which included the erosion of 
imperial power, the subculture of violence, the proximity to the source of weapons, and the 
increasing demand for weapons by non-military individuals and groups. The difficulties of 
estimating the number of guns scattered in local society are unavoidable, because, unlike regular 
soldiers whose guns were registered, armed outlaws were always on the move and striving to 
avoid detection. Anonymous individuals or groups who had guns for self-defense, in the absence 
of an effectively enforced gun registration policy, were always invisible to the government. 
However, some witness reports and social surveys provide a glimpse of the pervasiveness of 
privately-owned guns in society. In 1912, when the Qing dynasty was on its deathbed, Zhang 
Mingqi (张鸣歧 1875-1945), the last governor-general of Liangguang, argued that “bandits and 
secret societies spread like prairie fire…. Their sophisticated weapons, procured from Hong 
                                                          
13 David Faure, Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 314.  
14 For the complex social and political conditions of Guangdong in the late Qing and early 
Republican period, see Fitzgerald, Awakening China. 
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Kong and Macau or provided by revolutionaries, were even better than military weapons.”15 
Another observation comes from an editorial that appeared in the Hong Kong-based Chinese-
language newspaper Huazi ribao (華子日報 Chinese Daily), which in 1924 noted that “[A]mong 
all Chinese provinces, guns may be the most commonly found in Guangdong. Besides soldiers 
on service, Merchants’ Volunteer Corps (商團 shaungtuan), village militias (鄉團 xiangtuan), 
bandits, and many ordinary individuals all owned various types of firearms. The number of guns 
now in Guangdong may be as many as four million.”16 One year later, Japanese businessman 
Chōdo Shibuya conducted an investigation on Guangdong’s local armed forces, estimating that 
the number of modern rifles carried by militiamen might reach to 128,000.17 It should be noted 
that this number did not include other inferior traditional firearms and handguns. Another 
contemporary source showed that at least 200,000 guns were carried by peasants in Nanhai 
County, while in Fanyu and Shunde County, the number might be over 180,000.18 So-called self- 
defense guns, these weapons were registered and visible to the local government. Though the 
statistical reports could be taken as no more than a rough summary, they at least attested to the 
popularity of guns in Guangdong society. 
                                                          
15 “Duyuan Zhang juzou yuesheng feifeng shenzhi qingxiang chuli yuanbian rengqing fenbie 
Yichang xunchang geijiang yuanyouzhe督院張具奏粵省匪風甚熾清鄉出力員弁仍請尋常給
獎緣由折” (On the awarding to the officials who managed to pacify the bandits in Guangdong 
province), Liangguang guanbao 兩廣官報, 12 (1912): 15.  
16 He Minhun 何民魂, “Zisha di Sunwen自殺底孫文” (To kill Sun Yat-sen), Huazi ribao, 
October 24, 1924. 
17 Chōdo Shibuya, “Nanzhina aidao yu tufei diaocha 南支那海盜與土匪調查” (Investigation on 
pirates and bandits in South China), Dongya jingji yanjiu 1(1928): 132. 
18 “Baoquan minming yu tongjiao hanfei保全民命與痛剿悍匪” (Protecting people’s lives and 
stamping out ruthless bandits), Guangzhou minguo ribao 廣州民國日報, April 23, 1926. 
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 Even before the coming of Western-style weapons to Guangdong, the province was 
known for its residents’ use of weapons. Civilian weapons in Guangdong, which originally 
constituted a mixture of cold steels and traditional muskets were becoming more complex and 
diverse after the mid-nineteenth century. As noted in chapter two, many coastal residents of the 
province were well acquainted with firearms from the early Qing period. The famous Cantonese 
scholar Qu Dajun (屈大均 1630-1696), writing in the seventeenth century, noted that “[G]uns 
were commonly found in Guangdong. In the hill areas, men learned to use them from the age of 
ten, and Xinhui County was known for making them.”19 Bird guns were widely used in hunting, 
lineage feuding, and temple sacrifice during the Ming-Qing period. As small arms technology in 
the West was advancing rapidly by the mid-nineteenth century, producing more efficient breech-
loading rifle and repeating small arms, individuals or groups who demanded guns in Guangdong 
gradually switched from traditional bird guns to these modern weapons of various brands and 
types. For example, several newspaper reports described in the late 1890s that some factory 
workers even armed themselves with foreign guns in fighting their colleagues when conflicts 
arose or when chasing robbers.20 As civilian gun possession became widespread in the early 
twentieth century, the selections of guns became more diverse and powerful. Another statement 
issued by the Guangdong government in 1926 suggested the broad diversity of firearms owned 
by non-military individuals, while the traditional bird guns only constituted a minor portion of 
civilian weapons. It was shown in this official statistic that the small arms scattered in local 
                                                          
19 Qu Dajun, Guangdong Xinyu廣東新, 441. 
20 “Lun hui yuanjigong xiedoushi論穗垣機廠械鬥事” (On the armed fighting in the machine 
factory of Guangdong), Shenbao, December 19, 1888; “Xuedong Tanxie粵東談屑” (On the 
trifles in the eastern Guangdong), Shenbao, June 9, 1899.   
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society included not only traditional bird guns, and, more predominantly, foreign guns or rifles 
manufactured by Mauser, Colt, Browning, Mannlicher, and Lee, and also their Chinese copies.21  
The Social Impact of the Proliferation of Guns 
 
 The widespread use of firearms, either foreign guns or traditional bird guns, reflected 
and reinforced a social milieu within which an atmosphere of violence and insecurity flourished. 
Myriad violent acts, as we shall see, including armed banditry and lineage feuding prevailed in 
Guangdong society in the absence of effective state control. An official report in the 1920s was 
not exaggerating when it claimed “the proliferation of privately-owned guns appeared as a big 
social problem in Guangdong.”22  
Lineage Feuding 
 During the Qing Dynasty, Guangdong had long been a region of turmoil and instability, 
as ethnic disputes and inter-lineage feuds became ever more routine, engendering a subculture of 
violence and conflict. The central government was less forcefully felt there. In his finely wrought 
study of collective violence in a Chinese county, William Rowe, writing about Hubei Province, 
ascertains that “China has been as violent as most other human societies, and perhaps more 
violent than many.”23 Such assertion is very apt to describe the social ecology of Guangdong. 
Literati in Guangdong’s history had never hesitated to speak of the violent character of the 
people and the role of violence in social life. The influential Confucian Philosopher Ding Jie (丁
                                                          
21 “Chayan renmin ziwei qiangpao changcheng查驗人民自衛槍炮章程” (Regulations on the 
self-defense guns), Guangzhou minguo ribao, Decomber 7, 1926.  
22 Hu Zhongtao 胡仲弢, “Guangdong Difang Jingweidui Gexian Bianlian Jingguo Qingxing 廣
東地方警衛隊各縣編練情形” (Report on the police forces in all the counties of Guangdong), 
N.P., 1922, 15. 
23 William T. Rowe, Crimson Rain, 3.  
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杰 1738-1807) commented that “the ethos of feud originated from Min (闽 Fujian Province), 
progressed in Yue (粤 Guangdong), and boomed in Chao (潮 Eastern Guangdong).”24 As the 
mid-seventeenth century gazetteer of the Xinhui County 新會縣 recorded, “[A]fter Wanli’s reign 
(1572-1620), people grew gradually unscrupulous. Powerful and aggressive local landlords 
tyrannized the local communities… In almost ten years, litigations over the mountain rights 
boomed. Lineage feuding and even mass killings became widespread.”25 The gazetteer account 
and scholar’s reflection on Xinhui’s feud was just the tip of the iceberg when discussing the 
social violence of Guangdong. As many contemporary writings suggested, the foremost 
manifestation of the society’s violent component was the endemic feuding, which took forms of 
organized violence and made many parts of the province a truly turbulent place.  
Due to the lack of complete records, it is hardly possible to measure how many intra-
lineage feuds took place from the beginning of the Qing dynasty. What can be analyzed here is 
the historical causation and motivation of violent practices. The Han people in Guangdong, 
including the Cantonese, the Hakka, and the Chaozhou all migrated originally from the North at 
different times throughout history. Its special historical formation helped harbor some strongly 
developed lineages, under which the agnatic or exogamous groups were held together by both 
cultural and economic bonds. During the prosperous eighteenth century, Guandong was subject 
to pressures from increasing population density and tenancy, which made the competition for 
                                                          
24 Ding Jie, Zhi doulun止斗論 (On ceasing strife), in Guangdong wenzheng廣東文徵 (Essays 
collected from Guangdong province), vol. 5, ed. Wu Daorong (Hong Kong: Guangdong 
wenzheng bianyin weiyuanhui, 1973), 27. 
25 Xinhui xianzhi新會縣誌 (Gazetteer of Xinhui county, Guangdong), 1686, vol 5: 23b-24a.   
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control of scarce resources intense.26 As Harry Lamley and Thomas Buoye’s studies on lineage 
feuding in Guangdong show, that the impetus for violent conflicts came essentially from the 
contention over property rights such as land, mountain, and water boundaries, which resulted in 
collective and lineage-based action.27 Often, the local officials, who either hesitated to get 
involved between rival lineages or attempted to gain advantages from the strife, provided limited 
restraints. Starting from the eighteenth century, lineage feuding and violent disputes consistently 
unsettled Guangdong society, the people of which seemed inured to the presence of interpersonal 
conflicts. 
The confrontations always took the forms of armed affrays, in which plenty of weapons, 
either cold steels or firearms, were widely used. Long before the nineteenth century, the 
inhabitants living in the coastal areas carried either farm tools or a variety of old-style firearms, 
including swords, spears, and bird guns or jingals.28 When the Qianlong emperor issued the 
aforementioned edict in 1777 that led to the confiscation of bird guns throughout the country, the 
Guangdong provincial government collected 11,251 bird guns.29 Even though the number might 
                                                          
26 William Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009), 90-6. For the demographic change during the Qing dynasty, see Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the 
Population of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).  
27 Harry J. Lamley, “Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern Guangdong under Qing 
Rule,” in Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture, ed. Jonathan N. Lipman and 
Stevan Harrell (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1900), 27-64; Thomas Buoye, 
Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes over Property Rights in 
Eighteeenth-Century China, 153-92.  
28 Chen Shengshao 陳盛韶, Wensu Lu (問俗錄, Record of asking about customs) (Beijing, 
Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 85. 
29 “Tietong gao zhi yi chi yishangang zhe song ju xiaohui, etc.” (鐵統高至一尺以上送局銷毀
等, Destroying all the firearms with height higher than one inch), in volume entitled “haifang” 
(sea defense) chapter, Guangdong Qingdai dang’an lu (廣東清代檔案錄, Archival documents 
of Guangdong during the Qing dynasty), N.P., 
https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/asian/items/1.0214167#p4z-4r0f:  
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not tally with the actual amount, it is indicative of the abundance of private guns in local society. 
When informed that some guns were used for ritual purposes at the temple sacrifices, the local 
authorities quickly returned them.30 Of course, these returned bird guns, still made for handy 
weapons in lineage feuding. Governor-General Nayancheng (那彥成 1764-1833), who quelled 
the secret societies in Guangdong, discovered in 1805 that many lineage groups even sold their 
lands or estates to buy arms from either Macau or underground gunsmiths.31 Although these 
witness accounts could not offer an accurate picture of bird gun circulation in Guangdong, it can 
be assumed that the guns were evidently common before the nineteenth century, and were an 
inevitable component of social life in Qing Guangdong.  
A tremendous transformation took place from the early nineteenth century onwards when 
the introduction of Western-type rifles and other firearms made armed affrays more frequent and 
more brutal. The acquisition of powerful weapons was often a crucial point for maintaining 
power dominance against their rival lineages. Foreign guns’ involvement in the large-scale feuds 
probably started in the well-known Hakka-Punti Clan Wars from 1855-1867, a devastating 
conflict taking place to the west of the Pearl River Delta between the Cantonese-speaking natives 
(Punti), and the Hakka.32 The bloody battle raged in 1857 when the Punti brought large numbers 
of foreign “fast guns” through Hong Kong, where “guns were freely sold” before the outbreak of 
                                                          
30 See Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 329.  
31 Nayancheng, Na Wenyi gong zouyi (那文毅公奏議, The collection of Na Wenyi’s memorials), 
1834, 10/46a-50b.  
32 For a detailed study of the armed conflict, see Liu Ping, Bei yiwang de zhanzheng: Xianfeng 
Tongzhi nianqian Guangdong tuke daxiedou yanjiu, 1854-1867被遺忘的戰爭：咸豐同治廣東
土客大械鬥研究: 1854-1867 (Forgotten war: tu-ke feuding in Guangdong during the Xianfeng 
and Tongzhi decades) (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2003).  
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the Sino-French War.33 The huge gap in weapon power between both sides had a great effect on 
the outcome of the clan war. Zhang Zhidong (張之洞,1837-1909), Governor-General of 
Guangdong-Guangxi, reported in 1885 that “Weapons from abroad can be bought anywhere, and 
so Western guns, banners, and knives  are available in every village.”34 Thereafter, the ready 
accessibility of guns and unrest led to an arms race of sorts, incentivizing other lineage groups to 
purchase even more powerful guns, or replace their traditional Chinese weapons with ever more 
lethal foreign guns. Starting from the late nineteenth century, local newspapers picked up these 
foreign gun-involved strives and gave them prominent display. 35   
The founding of the Republic did not bring social stability to Guangdong. Instead, the 
constant warfare, the frequent banditry, and the collapsed government authority made lineage 
members believe the acquisition of powerful weapons was essential to maintaining dominance. 
One example from Puning County 普寧縣 is the Fang surname lineage. In the early 1910s, the 
Fang family “bought five or six hundred foreign guns, which initiated the lineage’s climb to 
military power in the County.”36 A few years later, lineage feuds happened in Qingyuan County 
                                                          
33 Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾, Guo Songtao riji郭嵩燾日記 (Diaries of Guo Songtao) (Changsha: 
Hunan Renmin chubanshe, 1981), 332. 
34 Cited from Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 315; Zhang Zhidong, Zhang Wenxiang gong wenji 
張文襄公文集 (Collections of Zhang Zhidong) (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1965), 14/9a.  
35 “Shipaixi cun juzhong xiedou石牌洗村聚眾械鬥” (Lineage feuding in Shipaixi village), 
Shenbao, November 22, 1894.  
36 “Puning xian dizhu cuican nongmin shimoji普寧縣地主摧殘農民始末記” (The details of the 
landlords of Puning County tortured peasants), Zhongguo nongmin (Chinese peasantry), 4 
(1926): 12. 
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of Northwestern Guangdong, in which each lineage “carried more than ten thousand foreign 
rifles.”37  
The use of these weapons would have two major consequences for lineage feuds.  First, 
the adoption of modern rifles that possessed greater accuracy and range of fire profoundly altered 
the way of fighting among rival lineages. Previously, the lineages that were equipped with bird 
guns’ always fought on the appointed fields to ensure their enemies came into the gun’s short 
range arc of fire. Starting from the nineteenth century, the introduction of quick-firing armed 
men more frequently positioned themselves at more hidden and protected positions. Some 
villages became heavily fortified by solid walls and watch towers, some of which were equipped 
with cannon batteries.38  
Second, the feud affrays escalated when the lineages hired skilled marksmen to fight 
against their rivals. As Shenbao reported in 1892, the Chen surname lineage had a long-standing 
dispute over water rights with the neighboring Li lineage in a county close to Canton. The fierce 
competition over irrigating water gave rise to armed feuding. Both lineages hired bandits or 
rebels (斗匪 doufei) who were skilled in the use of guns as proxies in the surname affrays.39 The 
participation of professional mercenary bands, as shown in many similar cases, indicated that the 
armed conflicts were not limited between the rival lineages, but escalated into large-scale 
warfare, which “detached from local lineage and surname groups.”40 The mercenaries (銃手
                                                          
37 “Qingyuan pajiang fasheng xiedou清遠琶江發生械鬥” (Lineage feuding in Bajiang village 
of Qingyuan county), Minguo ribao, Feburary 11, 1926. 
38 Niida Noboru, Chugoku no Noson Kazoku (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1952), 386.  
39 “Juzu xiedou聚眾械鬥” (Lineage feuding), Shenbao, April 13, 1892.   
40 Harry J. Lamley, “Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern Guangdong under Qing 
Rule,” in  Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture, 50. 
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chongshou), in most cases were roving bandits or pirates who were desperate for profit and 
trained in the use of modern firearms as well as traditional bird guns. In the aftermath of the 
mercenaries’ violent actions, the numbers of feud-related incidents were undoubtedly increased 
and the extent of their damage, became severe. John Scarth, a British businessman who 
frequently traveled to Guangdong from the 1850s marveled about the increasing numbers of gun-
related feudings in almost every single village of Guangdong.41 In 1915, a feud broke out 
between two rival lineages in suburban Canton, both of which readily recruited hundreds of 
armed bandits. The fighting leading to numerous casualties was out of government control when 
“gunfire licked the heavens.” Stray bullets injured passengers waiting in the adjacent train 
station, and even jeopardized the safety of the running train.42  
Armed Banditry 
For centuries, banditry had been one of the paramount threats that the people in 
Guangdong had to encounter. In eastern Guangdong, in particular, it was said that, “The bandit 
numbers in Guangdong are the largest under heaven” (粵東盜匪甲天下 Yuedong daofei jia tian 
xia).43 During his post as the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, Zhang Zhidong in 
his memorial to the court in 1885 complained that “In Eastern Guangdong, seas and rivers 
intersect the mountain-chains. People there were fierce and violent. Bandits abounded in greater 
                                                          
41 John Scarth, Twelve Years in China: The People, the Rebels, and the Mandarins (Edinburgh: 
Thomas Constable and Co., 1860).  
42 “Shalun Liangxiang Xiedou Zhi Jilie 沙倫兩鄉械鬥之激烈” (The intense armed affray 
between the Sha and Lun counties), Dagong bao, November 12, 1915.  
43 He Wenping, “Bei Yulunhua de Lishi: ‘Yuedong Dao Jiatianxia’ Shuo yu Jindai Guangdong 
Feihuan 被輿論化的歷史 ‘粵東盜甲天下’與近代廣東匪亂” (The publicized history: the 
historical truth about the saying that ‘Yuedong dao jiatianxia), Journal of Sun Yat-sen University 
194 (2005): 40-46. 
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numbers than in any other provinces.”44 From the late 1890s, media never stopped reporting the 
frequent occurrence of robbery, killing, and torture, portraying Guangdong as the cradle of 
banditry. In 1897, Shanghai’s Shenbao commented that “The bandits in Guangdong are the most 
sneaky and unscrupulous among the provinces.”45 The estimate of bandits numbers are varied, 
ranging between 10,000 and 30,000 in the early twentieth century.46 Accurate figures are 
difficult to come by without further information about how the numbers of bandits were 
calculated by different groups. These estimates at least indicated that the banditry and its 
associated violence became enduring facets of social life in modern Guangdong.    
Bordering upon Hong Hong, a major hub for weapon diffusion, bandits in Guangdong 
armed themselves with foreign guns much earlier than in Northern provinces. Shanghai’s 
Shenbao commented in 1894 “Why are the Guangdong bandits unscrupulous like this? One 
reason lies in the fact that they have easy access to military weapons, which even pose with 
advantage against the official army.”47 The number of bandit-held guns soared following the end 
of the 1911 revolution. Before the revolution, the revolutionary organizations led by Sun Yat-sen 
and other anti-Qing groups were lumped together as the Revolutionary Alliance. Before and after 
                                                          
44 Zhang Zhidong張之洞, Zhang Wenxiang Gong Quanji 張文襄公全集 (Collections of Zhang 
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1911, thousands of bandits were recruited by the revolutionaries to overcome the deficiency of 
troops. These bandits were known as people’s armies (民軍 minjun), which proved fatal in 
enhancing Sun’s military power in Guangdong. Recruiting bandits, most of whom knew how to 
master guns, helped “cut short the laborious process of recruiting and training.”48 The 
Revolutionary Alliance always distributed numbers of firearms to these bandit armies. In the 
name of revolution, many of the minjun could thus justify their acquisition of weapons and the 
recruiting of peasants as bandits. However, as an irregular army, these recruiting bandits could 
only be used to fulfill some immediate tasks when necessary. After the military campaign, as 
Phil Billingsley has pointed out, many of these minjun returned to their outlaw world, 
contributing to the severity of banditry in local society.49 In 1912, the newly established 
government which lacked the resources to maintain the health of its troop disbanded the minjun 
immediately after the Revolution. Nevertheless, successive governments of Guangdong were not 
able to collect the weapons once carried by the dismissed army. Canton’s Minsheng Ribao 民生
日報 reported in 1912 that these bandits in minjun “always carried their guns away with them, 
while very few were confiscated by the regular army.”50 Many of these dismissed soldiers either 
continued their banditry or other “heterodox” activities with their guns, or even sold their 
weapons to other bandits.51 The end result is that these minjun members who carried off their 
guns contributed to the diffusion of guns in local society.  
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How many guns were in the hands of bandits? An official document estimated that at 
least 170,000 guns were held by bandits by 1927.52 In the 1920s, Socialist He Xiya 何西亞
discovered that these bandits had organized into larger gangs based on geographical region. 
These well-organized gangs became major consumers of guns and other firearms. In 1926, the 
Canton Municipal Police learned that eight major gangs operating around the Pearl River Delta 
region owned more than seven thousand guns, most of which were modern rifles and pistols. 
Some bandits were even equipped with cannons and machine guns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
ranks. See Guangdong wenshi ziliao bianjibu, Jiuguangdong Feidao Shilu 舊廣東匪盜實錄 
(The records of bandits in the old Guangdong) (Canton: Guangzhou chubanshe, 1997), 42. 
52 Guangdong Difang Wuzhuang Tuanti Xunlianyuan Yangchengsuo 廣東地方武裝團體養成所 
(The Institute of Training Armed Groups of Guangdong), ed. “Suqing Guangdong de Tufei 
Fangfa jiqi Shanhou 肅清廣東的土匪方法及其善後” (The approaches of suppressing bandits 
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Bandit Head Region Number of Bandits Number of Guns 
Wu Sanjing Shunde, Nanhai More than 1,000 More than 1,000 
Waizui Yu Shunde, Fanyu 800 1,000 
Liu Lian Shunde 600 800 
Hu Ba Shunde 500 600 
Chen Jin Dongguan 200 Revolver 60-70; rifle 
200 
Zhujing Hai Shunde 800 1,000 
Liu Fazai Dongguan 300-400 4 machine guns; 45 
revolvers; rifle 300 
Chen Damao Dongguan 300 Rifle 200; revolver 
30-40 
Modawang Zhang Dongguan 1000 1000 rifle; 100 
revolver 
Table 3: Bandits and their Arms in the Pearl River Delta53 
Almost the same time, Japanese businessmen Chōdo Shibuya conducted another 
investigation of the sixty-three bandit groups in Guangdong. His fieldwork report detailed not 
only the geographical diffusion of banditry, but also the type and quantity of weapons they used. 
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According to Shibuya, all the bandits in these gangs were armed with at least one firearm, which 
mostly consisted of rifles and even included machine guns and cannons.54 
Gang Heads Numbers of Bandits Numbers of Weapons 
Yuan Guangzhao 3,800 17 machine guns, 3 cannons, 
and more than 3,000 rifles 
Mai Bao 200 2,000 small arms 
Lin Cai 400 450 rifles, 9 machine guns 
Lin Yunmin 500 500 rifles and pistols 
Lei Gongquan 600 700 rifles and pistols 
Table 4: Bandits and Their Arms in Guangdong in 1925 
 Continuous warfare, unbridled banditry, and widespread lineage feuding were all  
important manifestations of social violence, which were deeply rooted in Guangdong society. 
Historians unanimously ascribe the origins of these violent acts to the complex social 
circumstances, such as natural disasters, unbalanced resource distribution, and population 
increase. All these factors, as historian Joseph Lee asserts, gave rise to “a wide range of 
heterodox practices,” and helped create “a regional subculture of fear, dissidence and insecurity.” 
The absence of effective government control from the late Qing, and, more remarkably, the 
introduction of powerful firearms made the already violent situation even worse.    
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Circulation Mechanism 
 
 Nowhere were guns more easily accessible than in Guangdong. The analysis of these 
guns’ profound social implication requires an investigation of how these weapons were 
introduced and circulated in Guangdong society. Because most weapons flowed through 
clandestine channels, a detailed grasp of the whole trade and diffusion network cannot be 
documented with any precision. However, as the web of gun circulation thickened, the active 
participants of the network left historical traces in newspapers, criminal cases, and witness 
reports, providing a lens through which to glimpse the gun’s circulation mechanisms. In some 
circumstances, these modern firearms got scattered in a way that shared many characteristics as 
other commodities did that is to say, by formal trade or official distribution to the sanctioned 
populace. Authorized militia forces largely obtained firearms through an officially approved and 
orthodox channel. Comparatively, bandits, violent lineages, and other unauthorized individuals 
who had no means to obtain guns from government and thereby objectively encouraged 
smuggling and trafficking across society, joined with weapons manufacturers and dealers to form 
an underground circulation network.  
Orthodox Sources 
As we have seen in chapter two, the late Qing government did not seek to jealously 
defend its monopoly on the production or use of weapons. Ushering in the period of social 
instability, many Guangdong officials saw putting guns in the hands of the law-abiding people as 
an effective method to defend localities, where state presence was always negligible. The 
Guangdong government had allowed the import of massive firearms by the approved militia. 
Existing sources suggest that obtaining the official permission to buy weapons was not difficult. 
For example, in 1903, the Guangdong Logistic Bureau (廣東軍需局 Guangdong Junxuju) 
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approved the request submitted by Xinning County to procure 1550 rifles from Hong Kong to 
support the organization of a militia.55 The early Republican Guangdong governments continued 
to give permission to the officially sanctioned militia units to obtain necessary firearms. The 
Canton Merchant Association whose behavior later appeared rebellious in the eyes of Sun Yat-
sun, had no difficulty to get approval to buy large numbers of firearms from foreign countries. 
Sun’s new regime established in 1924 approved the Corps’ request to purchase 4850 foreign 
guns and more than one hundred millions bullets from overseas sources.56 The Merchant Corps 
declared that “the request to order firearms had been consistently approved by the Guangdong 
government before. When Long Jiguang was the provincial governor before the 1920s, they 
bought guns through local foreign trading companies. During Chen Jiongming’s period, their 
request had never been rejected.”57  
In addition to procuring guns from overseas sources, the government in many cases also 
sold the firearms to the indigenous militia forces directly. The state-owned Guangdong Arsenal 
was established in 1873 as one of the consequences of the Self-strengthening Movement, and 
continued to operate in the Republican period. We have little evidence to indicate how 
extensively the arsenal’s weapons armed the regular soldiers, but there is some evidence that 
successive rulers of Guangdong were largely dependent on non-Chinese sources.58 The less 
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sophisticated weapons manufactured by the Arsenal found their ways to the local militia forces. 
In 1915, the county magistrate of Gaoyao 高要, on the behalf of local elites who were actively 
organizing militia forces, submitted his request to the provincial government to obtain traditional 
five thousand bird guns and two hundred bullets for each gun. In the same year, as a local 
newspaper reported, “almost all the counties send their officials to Canton to purchase guns of by 
the hundreds and thousands.”59 In 1924, the Guangdong Arsenal set a statute, which allowed the 
local militia forces to order guns directly from the arsenal, only if they obtained the approval 
letter from the provincial government.60 The new statute largely simplified the procedure, under 
which local militia forces no longer awaited approval from various levels of government to 
purchase weapons on their behalf. After that, as the Republican Daily News reported, many 
militia leaders poured into the arsenal to select the weapons they preferred.61 However, the 
provincial government always took their request into cautious consideration. As suggested in 
chapter two, though local armed forces were seen as extensions of state power, they also suffered 
from scepticism from the government, which feared their monopoly over deadliest form of 
weaponry would be challenged. For example, in the June of 1924, Datang 大塘 township applied 
to purchase more than one hundred modern rifles. Because the amount of firearms owned by 
militia were all registered  and were visible to the government, the government rejected their 
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request, for it was aware that the town “had plenty of guns already, and additional firearms were 
not applicable.”62   
Heterodox Sources 
Smuggling from Hong Kong and Macau. As addressed in Chapter two, Macau during the 
Qing dynasty was as a major source of firearms for Guangdong. Macau’s position was still there, 
and Hong Kong, due to its status as a British colony, became another important site that 
facilitated firearm transition. In 1904, the governor-general of Liangguang Cen Chunxuan (岑春
煊 1861-1933) sent a memorial to the court, in which he was extremely worried about the illicit 
firearm transaction in Hong Kong. “The eastern region of Guangdong was known as a cradle of 
banditry. When the place was open for foreign trade, commercial ships came and brought in so 
many foreign guns. These bandits and outlaws had no difficulty obtaining these powerful 
weapons.”63 The firearm transaction generated a huge amount of profit. In the late Qing, “an 
ordinary Mauser was worth only 40 taels of silver. The bandits who got the guns in Hong Kong 
or Macau resold them for a hundred taels each.”64 In the early Republic, a foreign Remington 
rifle could be bought in Hong Kong for only ten or more yuan, Once it was resold in the interior, 
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the price could rise to one hundred yuan. Thereafter, many outlaws and even ordinary peasants 
poured into Hong Kong or Canton’s foreign concessions to stockpile guns for huge profits.”65  
The existing sources from Guangdong Customs suggest that the local government was 
not able to stamp out the illicit firearm transactions. In 1913, the Guangdong customs 
commissioner received tons of reports indicating gun smuggling occurred frequently from Hong 
Kong to Guangdong. However, the Customs thought investigating these cases was the authority 
of local police, rather than the Customs, which, as suggested by its working documents, never 
sought to deal with these smuggling cases.66 However, due to the constant civil war and the 
breakdown and government change in early Republican Guangdong, both the local police and 
government never took serious actions in investigating these smugglers. As a local newspaper 
reported in 1925, the guns could be sold and transferred in Guangdong freely without any 
restrictions. Even though the policy of forbidding firearm smuggling was written in the law, as 
the Guangdong Gongbei Customers claimed, “these policies were futile, because it was hard to 
implement.” Jing Rao, a local official, complained that “most of the guns carried by the bandits 
were even better than the military weapons. Almost all of them were bought in Hong Kong and 
Macau.” As shown above, local militia forces had to obtain governmental approval before their 
weapon procurement. However, many criminal cases that some militia forces even sought to 
these illegal weapons once their request was rejected by the government. For example, in 1914, 
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the Customs found large numbers of firearms on a ship. Later, it was investigated that these 
firearms were bought by militia in Nanhai and Sanshui counties.67  
Starting from the mid-nineteenth century, Hong Kong was an especially convenient inlet 
for arms transaction, with countless sources like Winchester, Victors and many others for both 
wealthy individuals, Merchant Corps, rural militias, and outlaws to approach. As one 
correspondant reported in the English newspaper, the China Weekly Review in the early 1920s, 
“[A]rms smuggling facilities in China have been so perfected that business is transacted in arms 
almost in the same convenient way as other commodities.”  “Any general who wants to buy can 
always get in touch with an agent [in Hong Kong], and there are so many foreigners and Chinese 
engaged in smuggling both in the treaty ports and in interior towns that one wonders how China 
can ever get her house in order.”68 
Transfer from Military Weapon to Civilian Weapon. Ready access to weapon was 
facilitated by the frequent civil warfare of early Republican Guangdong. Defeated or deserting 
soldiers in the period’s frequent battles often carried their guns away with them; other soldiers 
simply abandoned their firearms on the battlefield, which were then picked up later by local 
people. The result was a steady diffusion of weapons into local society. In the late Qing period, 
revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing always regarded Guangdong as their site that 
launched anti-Manchu revolutions. Most of their weapons were imported from Japan through 
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Macau.69 After the revolution, most guns found their way into the hands of bandits. The late 
Qing official Zhang Jinfang in Guangdong’s Jiangmen 江門 county recalled “the rebels’major 
inlet of firearms was in Macau. Once the gun came through, they were obtained by bandits.” 70 
When Sun-yat-sen established his Guangdong revolutionary government in 1911, he 
organized the bullies and other armed forces scattered in local counties. These armed forces, 
were encouraged to participate in Sun’s revolutionary army. Sun also sent them much-needed 
weapons. After the battles, these minjun were quickly dissolved. However, as many witness 
accounts suggest, these armed members carried their guns away with them. As the local 
newspaper recorded, “very few guns were turned in after the 1911 revolution.”71 No further 
sources exisited speculating on the future of these armed individuals who once helped strengthen 
Sun’s revolutionary initiatives. Some of them joined the local militia or merchants corps, while 
many of them sold their weapons to other outlaws.  
Even after the 1911 Revolution, the social disorder was not calmed down immediately. 
Many defeated or deserting soldiers did not turn in their weapons. In 1917, the acting 
Guangdong government issued an order requiring local government to collect these guns. “Our 
province in the past few years witnessed ceaseless warfare, the regular troops lost large amounts 
of guns, many of which found their way into the hands of  non-military individuals.”72 Because 
guns and bullets were regarded as invaluable commodities, many civilians, worked to obtain 
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guns for self-defense or profit. In 1919, one of the branches of Long Jiguang’s army, was 
defeated by other local predatory warlords. But the defeated soldiers sold their guns to Li 
Fulong, a bandit leader in Eastern Guangdong, while many soldiers just simply joined the bandits 
with their guns. In 1925, Chen Jiongming’s army was defeated by Sun Yat-sen’s army. Peng pai, 
a communist cadre, was ordered to collect weapons left by Chen Jiongming’s defeated army. As 
Peng later remembered, many of these guns were lost or just collected by local peasants. He only 
received 300 rifles on the battlefield.73 In the meantime, many soldiers also engaged in illicit gun 
transactions. The Guangzhou Minguo ribao reported in 1924 that it was common for ordinary 
soldiers to sell their weapons directly to the peasants or even bandits. Even some military 
commanders also helped transfer the guns manufactured by the Canton arsenal to other non-
military people and earn huge profit because the price difference. 74 
The Manufacture of Small Arms in local villages. While many guns transferred from the 
military or smuggled from Hong Kong or Macau found their way into local society, a large 
number of inferior guns were manufactured in local workshops. Before the 1920s, many guns 
circulated by civilians or bandits were low-quality local guns or bird guns. It is difficult to find 
sources the exact number of these guns made by people themselves. Many newspaper accounts 
proved the existence of such guns. In 1924, the local government of Gaoyao County found that 
there was a workshop manufacturing guns in a village and collected thousands of bird guns as 
well as many inferior foreign guns. In the same year, a military militia leader of Nanhai County 
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operated one such small workshop and produced hundreds of machine guns. Two years later, the 
local official of Shunde County also found out the county had “at least seven such workshops.”75  
Even in Canton, where there was no difficulty obtaining advanced foreign guns through 
foreign trading companies or nearby Hong Kong, privately operated manufacturers were found 
there. According to a local newspaper report, on the south side of Canton, an arsenal hired lots of 
workers, whose duty was to make various types of guns. “Each worker was able to get 2 yuan for 
each gun he made.”76 In the meantime, some small trading agencies connected the gun 
manufacturers with their potential consumers. As for the consumers, the Guangdong police 
found that many consumers were bandits and other outlaws. All of these accounts suggest that 
gun manufacturing and circulation became an active and profitable business in Guangdong 
during the early Republican period. 
The Formation of the Canton Merchants’ Volunteer Corps 
 
Militia Forces in the Formation of Modern Guangdong 
 As suggested above, the particularity of Guangdong’s social ecology gave rise to a 
provincial subculture of violence and insecurity, which led to a proliferation of local militia 
units. These defensive forces, as we already know, were organized by the local gentry but under 
official supervision. The formation of local militia force was nothing new to Guangdong society. 
As Frederic Wakeman aptly puts it, during the First Opium War between the Qing and British 
Empire, the Guangzhou gentry organized militia operating independently of the Qing 
government to rout the British invaders bravely. It was during the Taiping Rebellion in the late 
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158 
 
1850s that the wheel of local militarization accelerated, as local elites and government engaged 
in a joint effort to forge local militia that defended local communities.”77 Unlike what Edward 
McCord argues in his seminal work on modern Hunan province, the militarization of Guangdong 
society of the late nineteenth century remained a constant condition that lasted into the early 
Republican period.78 The erosion of social order and the rise of popular movements made the 
formation of collective -defense necessary. By the early 1920s, the militia units of Guangdong, 
including both rural militias and urban Merchants’ Corps were widespread in various counties. 
According to one official statistic, the total number of militiamen by 1927 reached approximately 
3,000,000 79  
 What were the major contributing factors to the flourishing of militia and militia-like 
units in modern Guangdong? Li Fulin who himself used to be a bandit and later joined Sun Yat-
sen’s entourage, was appointed the Commissioner of the provincial militia bureau in 1924. In his 
inauguration address, Li attributed the proliferation and rapid expansion of militia units to three 
major reasons: political turmoil and social unrest, the existence of a large wealthy population, 
and the easy availability of firearms.80 Of the major militia units, the Canton Merchants’ Corps 
was arguably the most influential and ambitious forces in the province, which was not only 
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embodied in its consequential roles in public life, but also was shown its fierce conflict with Sun 
Yat-sen’s revolutionary government. An exploration of the intriguing role played by this armed 
group offers an invaluable understanding of the complexities of the coexistence and competition 
of social power and government during the early Republic.  
The Founding of the Canton Merchants’ Corps 
 When the tension between Canton merchants and Sun Yat-sen’s Military government 
was at its height in 1924, which erupted into the aforementioned bloody suppression, Xu 
Chongzhi (許崇智 1887-1965), the Commander-in-Chief of the Guangdong troops proclaimed 
that “The Merchants’ Corps in Guangdong steadily became a full-fledged force since its 
inception. The considerable quantities of guns owned by the Corps were less common in other 
provinces, and even rarer in most other countries.”81 After the Merchant’ Corps was brutally 
repressed in 1925, official discourse and nationalist scholars unanimously regarded the Corp’s 
consistent behavior of acquiring firearms as a military conspiracy to impede Sun’s revolutionary 
objectives.82 While the “Canton Merchants’ Corps Incident” itself has been adequately studied, 
comparatively less attention has been paid to the formation of the Corps and the social roles of 
these armed Canton merchants in urban space. If Mary Rankin was correct that these voluntary 
associations became a “political force” in the early Republican period possessing the potential 
for mobilizing local resources, then a detailed study of the merchants and Corps activism and 
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their dynamic relationship with various ruling entities will provide insight into the origins of the 
later bloody conflicts.83  
Starting from the seventeenth century, Canton’s position as an important port and trading 
hub buzzing with frequent commercial activities has been unchanged. The city’s status as a 
major metropolis and provincial capital with official presence was evident in many ways from 
the mid-Qing dynasty. It was the seat of the governor-general of two provinces, Guangdong and 
Guangxi. It also housed the magistrate of Guangzhou prefecture and the governor of Guangdong 
province during the Qing dynasty. Also, the Manchu and Chinese bannermen were stationed in 
the garrisons located in the suburbs of the city. The city experienced its greatest economic 
prosperity under the “Canton System,” which was strictly controlled by the Qing government 
and was operated by sophisticated Hong merchants, who conducted an enormous import and 
export trade before the mid-nineteenth century.84 Though Canton’s position as China’s sole trade 
center gradually gave way to Shanghai after the Opium War, it continued to function as the 
dominant commercial center in the wealthy Pearl Delta Region.85 
 The frequent and matured economic activities in Canton gave rise to a class of merchants 
who organized various voluntary associations, notably guilds to contribute to charitable or 
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philanthropic projects. Before the early twentieth century, Canton merchants took parts in local 
affairs through the Seventy-two Guilds ( 七十二行 Qishier hang) and the Nine Charitable 
Institutions (九善堂 Jiushantang), which supported the operation of charity schools or hospitals, 
and directed other charitable services.86 The local government seldom intervened in the 
merchants’ economic and social activities in Canton, both because they assumed auxiliary 
functions and because they were politically weak. In 1904, two years after the Qing court 
launched the New Policy Reform, the Canton Chamber of Commerce, an officially authorized 
merchant association, was created to promote local economic development and to provide a 
platform for merchants to cooperate. Nevertheless, the Canton Chamber did not play the leading 
role that integrated various merchant organizations as expected. As Edward Rhoads suggested, 
its quasi-official nature and the dominant role of gentry officials in the organization would make 
merchants reluctant to participate in it.87 
From the turn of the century onward, Canton merchants seemed eager to extend their 
independent and autonomous activities beyond the commercial and local charitable affairs. 
William Rowe and Frederic Wakeman’s depiction of Hankou, a major commercial and 
transportation hub of Central China, as “a major entrepot completely under the official thumb of 
the government,” may not be applicable elsewhere.88 Beyond the philanthropic realm, the 
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restless political situation created many new possibilities for Canton merchants to express their 
political sentiments. Organized by the Nine Charitable Institutions, the Seventy-two Guilds, and 
the Chamber of Commerce, local merchants autonomously set up the Canton Boycott Society in 
1905 against the American discriminatory treatment of Chinese immigrants one year before. As 
part of the nationwide Anti-American Boycott, the movement in Canton marked urban 
merchants’ unprecedented participation in politics and indicated an expression of national 
consciousness among the emerging urban bourgeoisie.89 In 1907, an independent organization, 
the Guangdong Merchant Self-Government Society (粤商自治會 yueshang zizhihui) was 
established by a group of politically minded Canton merchants. Unlike the traditional guilds or 
merchant associations, the Society possessed a political agenda manifested in its active role in 
promoting nationalism and later in the Qing court’s constitutional program.90 
As the merchants became highly organized and politicalized in the early twentieth 
century, they started to expand their functions at the expense of the local government. The 
frequent banditry and rebellions in which heavily armed individuals and militant groups loomed 
large disturbed local order and safety. In 1911, merchants presented a petition to local 
government for the establishment of the Canton Merchants’ Volunteer Corps, as Shanghai did a 
few years before.91 However, the Qing government, which had been frustrated by the 
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Huanghuagang Uprising 黃花崗起義 one year earlier, frowned on the appearance of armed 
forces in the urban area and rejected their petition. As the storm of the revolution surged in 
Guangdong in the same year, the Canton merchants who were now resentful of the late Qing 
reform, became enthusiasts for the Revolution and provided heavy financial support.92 
The founding of the Republic brought favorable changes in many areas to the merchants. 
In 1912, the president of the Merchants Association Chan Lim Pak (陳廉伯 1884-1944) applied 
to the Beiyang government in Beijing again for the permission to organize militia with privilege 
to carry guns for the maintenance of social order. The newly-established government seemed far 
more responsive to the needs of the merchants than the Qing government, and approved their 
request but also formulated regulations. Cen Bozhu (岑伯著 ?-1916), a well known Cantonese 
silk merchant and insurance agent, was elected to serve as the first commander in chief of the 
Corps. The formation of the Canton Merchants’ Voluneer Corps was defensive in nature and 
aimed at protecting merchants’ properity and maintaining local order. As stated in the Corps’ 
mission statement in 1912, “The Republic is founded now, which prioritizes the local self-
governance. This is the responsibility of local society, which required cooperation between 
government and civilians. Expanding people’s politial power and strengthening people’s 
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physical power are essential to stamp out bandits internally, and to resist imperialism 
externally.”93  
When the Corps registered in 1912, it quickly recruited more than 1500 members. The 
expense of purchasing weapons and uniforms and other administrative spending would be shared 
by participating merchants.94 Many sources of the time suggested that the training and activites 
of the Corps were strictly regulated. The well-known journalist Hin Wong’s report provided a 
glimpse into how the personnel were recruited and drilled: 
The regimental quarters are scattered through the ten principal police districts of Canton 
and battalion quarters in important places within the district. All regimental quarters have 
their own  homes or barracks and their total real property and common equipments in the 
several quarters are valued at nearly a million dollars. In order to become a member of 
the Corps, a candidate must become a recruit for at least six months of special drill and 
training taking place ususally in the mornings so as to be of convenience to the business 
men who have work during the day. Before one may become a recruit, he must satisfy the 
chief instructor that he is more than 20 and below 45 years old, recommended by two 
firms which will be responsble for his contribution of some $300 for his initiation fees, 
uniform, and arms, and must be able to pass a mental and physical examination intended 
to test his ability to undertake the training successflly. When a recruit is able to pass all 
tests and attend all the lectures and practice provide for in a course of instruction of six 
months, he will be given a certificate entitling him to become a regular member of the 
corps and receive his arms. As a rule the management of a business firm or office usually 
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pays for an keeps the arms, allowing its representative to take them out when required for 
duty. A few firms have as many as thrity men in the Corps.95 
A member of the Corps recalled decades later that the recruitment was open to the public 
and the selection criteria were relatively low. However, the entrance restrictions still existed as a 
high entry fee and two endorsements from local merchants were required to ensure the morality 
of the members. Thus, most Corps members were hired by participating merchants and joined 
the Corps on the behalf of their employers. A uniform, official badge, and two firearms, 
including one rifle and one short pistol were purchased by the Corps. All the members were 
allowed to purchase one additional gun at their own expense.96 After joining the Corps, they 
were required to participate in military training, including shooting twice per week.   
The purchase of the firearms was coordinated by the commanding officer. Neither rifles 
nor pistols were of standard specifications because the supply of weapons came from a mixture 
of sources. Compared with militia forces in other inland provinces, the Corps in Canton 
possessed the advantages of both the ready accessibility of arms supply and affordability of high-
quality weapons. As they did routinely, the Corps had to gain permission from the ruling 
government. As declared by the Corps during the dispute with Sun Yat-sen, most ruling 
governments never denied their request. The purchase of large-scale weapons was mostly 
dependent on non-Chinese sources, while only on rare occasions did the Corps purchase from the 
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warlords or local government. Foreign arms dealers in Hong Kong where firearms were freely 
available ensured the supply of arms.97  
The popularity of the Corps among Canton dwellers and merchants was particularly 
prompted by its active role in maintaining public order and civic life. Amidst the social chaos 
and political turbulence of the early Republican period, the Corps was particularly welcomed by 
the participating Canton merchants who believed their interests and properties would be 
protected when the power shifting governments failed to bring social stability. Politics in early 
Republican Canton were quite complex because various actors fought to claim their political 
legitimacy. After the failure of Sun Yat-sen’s “Second Revolution” in 1913, Yuan Shikai, the 
nominal president of China based in Beijing, obtained control over Guangdong, and appointed 
Long Jiguang as the military governor of Guangdong. His troops in Canton had brought nothing 
but disaster upon the people. To consolidate his control over the city, Long ordered his troops to 
implement a “city-cleansing” campaign to exterminate the defeated Guangdong Army (yuejun 粵
軍). However, as many Canton newspapers reported, people’s complaints surfaced about the 
abusive behaviors of Long’s five thousand soldiers, who not only plundered and looted 
merchants’ properties but also seriously disturbed public order. A local police officer represented 
this chaotic social situation and the impotence of the Canton police in his poem: 
New and fragile the Republic was born, 
Harnessing the lawless became a heavy duty. 
Crime and violence occurred day and night. 
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But few fugitives escaped from justice.98 
 Even the Canton police department, which was established in 1902 and survived the early 
Republic, was not able to contend with the ruthless and violent warlord soldiers.99 Right after 
Long Jiguang and his soldiers took over Canton in 1913, he immediately ordered the execution 
of the chief of police Chen Jinghua (陳景華 ?-1913), a major opponent to his leadership. The 
Canton police thereafter became a puppet force controlled by the warlords.100 The impotence of 
the police objectively amplified the influence of the Corps which, with their more sophisticated 
guns in hands, played an increasingly important role in protecting the merchants and their 
shops.101 As a Canton merchants later recalled, the Corps members had committed to patrolling 
the streets in the major commercial district. As another Corps member wrote, bandits and other 
urban outlaws who were armed with guns, dared not to rob or attack merchants’ factories, with 
the better-armed Corps’ members standing guard outside the stores and factories.102 
In addition to the designated function as the defender of merchants’ properties, the 
Canton merchants, now with military power in hands, strengthened their traditional roles in 
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organizing disaster relief or maintaining social order. In 1915, for example, the city had a flood 
inundating the greater part of the city. Because of its thorough organization and its possession of 
arms, the Corps members were able not only to undertake relief measures, but also to protect the 
citizens from being encroached upon by outsiders who would not hesitate to take advantage of 
their neighbor’s misfortune.103  
Another factor contributing to the Corps’ high recognition among the city’s residents was 
that it also provided patronage to local religious sites. In the early 1920s, when Sun Yat-sen was 
in search of money to finance his revolutionary government and mount the Northern Expedition, 
he decided to expropriate the property of local temples in Canton, which provoked outrage and 
fierce resistance among religious adherents.104 Local elites who set up and managed the temples 
sought help from powerful organizations to defend their temples. For example, in September of 
1923, an intense confrontation happened between the patrons of the Twin Temples of the 
Chicken Market (雞欄孖廟 jilan mamiao) and the government, which planned to sell the temple 
to another owner for commercial use. Annoyed by the government’s expropriation activities, the 
owners of the temple then designated it as the quarters of the second division of the Merchants’ 
Corps, hoping the Corps’ intervention would deter government from selling their temple.105 
When the new owner, bolstered by local government now, prepared to take over the temple, the 
leaders of the Merchants’ Corps immediately intervened, who were determined to defend the 
temple with their manpower and weapons. The Canton merchant community on the next day 
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threatened to launch a strike and to form a military alliance with other city’s Corps if the 
government refused to compromise. The stalemate lasted several days, and was not settled until 
Liao Gongchao (廖公超 1890-?), the general of the Yunnan Army, mediated the conflict by 
purchasing the temples from the government and then donating them to the merchant 
community. In the early 1920s Guangdong, as Shuk-Wah Poon aptly puts it, the use and 
expropriation of temple property to further revolutionary activities were quite common, which 
“inevitably led to clashes of interest between the political regime and these communal 
groups.”106  The Merchants’ Crops which had expanded dramatically to a force that exceeded 
20,000 armed members and was armed with sophisticated imported weapons, became an 
indispensable social power, serving as both protectors of local community and challengers of the 
government authority. 107 An equilibrium between the Corps and political regime was on the 
verge of collapse.  
Breaking the Equilibrium between the Corps and Government 
The Conflicts between the Merchants Corps and Government  
In late 1923, Sun Yat-sen successfully took over most of Guangdong province and made 
Canton the headquarters of his planned Northern Expedition. The Canton people seemed 
accustomed to seeing different militarists move in and out of the city and province: commercial 
activities continued to develop though against the backdrop of political instability, while the 
Merchants’ Corps functioned well in maintaining civic order as designed. In the eyes of Sun and 
his alliance, the Canton merchants and their well-equipped Merchants’ Corps were important 
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social forces to be reckoned with. These wealthy merchants’ dominant roles in most civic 
organizations were visible, and the financial resources in their hands were indispensable in state 
building. On 14 January 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen gave a passionate speech at a joint meeting of 
representative members of the Canton police force and the Merchant Corps, in which he 
underscored the potential for collaboration and partnership between the two forces. While 
recognizing the awkwardness that his government was unable to monopolize police force in the 
city, Sun advocated a concerted effort to maintain order in Canton: 
“You gentlemen of the merchant corps and the police have come together in one place in 
welcome. In the future, the Merchants’ Corps and the police must work together to 
maintain order in Canton. The police are a government organ. The merchant corps is a 
civic organ (renmin di diguan). Today is the first day the merchant corps and the police 
have met formally face to face. That is, it is the first day the government and the people 
are joined. Gentlemen, since this is the territory of the revolutionary government, both 
(parties) ought to enter into an open and honest (relationship). The party of the revolution 
is using Canton as its fountainhead. As a new Chinese republic is constructed, the 
government and the people must work together. The people of Canton municipality must 
cooperate with the government.”108 
 As discussed above, the Canton Merchants and their Corps were able to maintain a 
political neutrality from the 1910s to the early 1920s with the shifting militarists, who rarely 
intervened in the internal affairs of the merchant community. When Sun’s armies returned to 
Canton with the help of the Yunnan and Guangxi troops in 1923, Sun, like many of his rivals, 
recognized well-equipped merchants would be an important force to cooperate. However, a 
couple months later, Sun, in a radical turn, blamed the merchants bitterly and accused them of 
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“colluding with imperialism and confronting government authority.”109 As discussed above, Sun 
came to believe that the merchant community, with its prominent social and economic power, 
was defying the revolutionary government’s authority. In August, Sun Yat-sen’s Canton 
government seized the merchants’ weapons purchased from a British company. The incident 
caused the confrontation to escalate, which finally brought both sides into the aforementioned 
armed attack in October of that year.  
How would the cooperative relationship between the government and the Canton 
merchants anticipated by Sun become undone in 1924? What are the essential reasons for the 
conflicts that led to the above-mentioned strikes and bloody armed confrontations in October? A 
rich literature has dealt with the reasons for the conflict. Historians like C. Martin Wilbur, 
Stephanie Po-yin Chung, and Michael G. Murdock, in their works on Sun Yat-sen’s early career 
and Canton merchants, attributes three reasons for the controversy. 
 First, Canton merchants from the beginning did not have a penchant for Sun Yat-sen’s 
Nationalist Revolution. In 1923, Sun Yat-sen returned to Guangdong, with the help of the extra-
provincial mercenaries, and successfully chased Chen Jiongming, who had previously allied with 
Sun. The extra-provincial mercenaries were composed of soldiers from Yunnan and Guangxi 
provinces. The commanders of the “guest armies,” in the eyes of Canton merchants, did not 
benefit Guangdong, but levied heavy taxes on the merchants to support their troops.110 As 
suggested by the British Consul-General in Canton, the guest armies extorted a large amount of 
tax money from the province. In 1923, “a sum of $100,000,000 was wrung out of the City in the 
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shape of taxes both regular and irregular… the balance of $70,000,000 having been levied by the 
non-Cantonese troops, chiefly the Yunnanese, who remitted the money to their province.”111  
The social and financial burden brought by the coming of the troops from other provinces 
made the Canton merchants recall the chaotic period when Guangdong was under the heel of a 
Yunnanese warlord in late 1910s. Comparatively, Canton merchants preferred Chen Jiongming, 
an enthusiast for anarchism and democratic federalism, whose Guangdongese troops dominated 
Guangdong from 1920 to 1923. Unlike Sun who was chasing the dream of China’s unification 
under a central government, Chen conceived provincial autonomy as the direction of China’s 
future that would facilitate citizen’s political participation.112 In 1920, Chen initiated a “Canton 
for the Cantonese” movement, commanding all the troops and gunboats to prevent invasion of all 
extra-provincial troops. His rejection of Sun’s proposal to use  the wealth of Guangdong to 
subsidize his effort for national unification was particularly welcomed by the merchant 
community.113 Nevertheless, Chen’s defeat by Sun and the “guest armies” in 1923 shattered their 
dream of provincial autonomy. Canton now once again became the headquarters of Sun’s 
Nationalist Revolutionary Army against the Beijing warlord’s government.  
Second, the merchants’ interests were threatened by the economic reforms launched by 
Sun’s new regime. For a long period after the founding of the Republic, the Hong Kong dollars 
issued by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank had been the major popular medium of exchange 
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in Canton. Though the early Republican government issued official paper notes, the currency 
values were unstable due to the deteriorated social and political situation. In early 1924, Sun’s 
new regime launched its program of standardizing currency, forbidding the use of foreign 
currency in Guangdong. Guangdong merchants had expressed concerns that the establishment of 
a new provincial bank, the introduction of a new currency with an uncertain reserve, and the 
prohibition of Hong Kong currency might adversely affect the mercantile communities.114 In the 
meanwhile, heavy taxation was introduced by Liao Zhongkai (廖仲愷 1877-1925) in May 1924. 
He ordered the levying of a fifty percent sales tax on land transfers and also introduced several 
new taxes. The problem of “unifying financial administration” was launched, under which 
excessive consumer taxes were levied on almost every transaction, “from foodstuffs to 
brothels.”115 What happened following the merchants’ resistance to the government’s 
expropriation of local temples occurred again. However, the confrontation appeared more 
intense. In response, Chen Lianbo, now the commander in chief of the Merchants’ Corps, 
contacted other Corps in the nearby cities and formed a federation of Guangdong Provincial 
Merchants’ Corps.116 The merchant community again threatened a general strike, which was now 
reinforced by a Federation of Merchants’ Corps. It seemed Sun Yat-sen and his government at 
this point had not been prepared to trigger a head-on confrontation. To reassure the public and 
the merchant community, the government was forced to make compromise and rescind the tax. 
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Third, Sun’s pro-Communist stance was evident given he received both material and 
military aid from the Soviet Union and formed an alliance with the newly founded Chinese 
Communist Party.117 One major purpose of the Nationalist Party’s re-organization was to 
broaden its social support base as crucial to struggle for national unification and independence. 
In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Nationalist Party, Sun announced the 
necessity to mobilize peasants and workers as the main force in the revolutionary campaign. 
After the meeting, the government established the Department of Workers, Department of 
Peasants, Department of Youth, Department of Women, and Department of Propaganda, all of 
which served as coordinating media for mobilizing the masses. Nevertheless, the role of 
merchants and their activism in the urban area did not receive sufficient attention. Sun’s pro- 
socialism and pro- agriculturist stance “was usually interpreted by some merchants and the 
enemies of the KMT as the means of the KMT to oppress the merchant class.”118 In 1923, the 
Canton Merchants’ Association was established. Sun Yat-sen then conferred a banner on the 
Association, symbolizing the government's recognition. However, the merchants refused to 
accept it.   
It was against this background that the conflicts between the Merchants’ Corps and Sun’s 
government led to the bloody confrontation a few months later. By mid-1924, the Canton 
Merchants’ Corps was increasingly moving beyond their presupposed function of maintaining 
civic order in the city. Rather, the well-equipped militia forces provided the Canton merchants 
the condition under which they would obtain local power and challenge government authority. A 
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number of confrontation activities, such as the disputes over the Twin Temples in 1923 and the 
economic reform in 1924, all verged on military conflicts, which later appeared to be the 
prologue to the bloody “Merchants’ Corps Incident” in October 1924.  For several decades, 
historians have analyzed the irreconcilability between merchants’ activism in Canton and Sun 
Yat-sen’s revolutionary blueprints. They have focused on the economic and social reasons 
behind the conflicts, but offered little attention to explain how these Canton merchants 
challenged the government authority. When the government was not the sole holder of the 
monopoly of violence, the merchants, who were backed by military power, sometimes forced the 
government to compromise.  
The Merchants’ Corps Incident 
In May of 1924, Chen Lianbo and other leading merchants in Canton managed to build 
an alliance with militia forces of other commercial cities, forming the Federation of Guangdong 
Merchants’ Corps. Chen then moved in a significant manner to strengthen the Corps’ military 
presence by procuring a large consignment of arms. To secure the procurement, the Merchants’ 
Corps succeeded in obtaining a permit in advance by paying the government a license fee of 100 
yuan per gun (50,000 yuan in total). For decades, successive Guangdong governments regarded 
the issuance of gun licenses as a significant mean to raise revenue, if militia refused to procure 
weapons from the government directly.119 A few days later after their request was approved, a 
Norwegian Freighter SS Hav shipped more than 9,000 small arms and some cannons from 
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Europe to Canton. These imported small arms included 4850 rifles, 4331 Mauser pistols, 660 
revolvers with a huge quantity of ammunition.120  
 Nevertheless, it turned out that the procurement was not progressing smoothly. It was 
financed by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; Chen Lianbo was comprador of 
the bank’s Canton branch. The arms were purchased through a German trading company in 
Hong Kong, and were secured in Belgium. Thereafter, they were shipped by a Norwegian 
freighter from Amsterdam to Canton, where they were consigned by the German firm of Saunder 
and Wielder.121 However, the procurement was in light of the Arms Embargo Agreement of 
1919, which was imposed by major Western powers aiming to reduce the internal fighting and to 
restrict foreign intervention. In this case, there would be no legal restrictions for the purchase, 
because governments of Norway and Germany did not sanction the 1919 Agreement.122 The 
cargo was initially to be shipped to Hong Kong, a colony of Britain, which sanctioned the 
Agreement. However, the embargo seemed to be widely violated.123 The Hong Kong official 
possessed little passion to adhere to the embargo. When the cargo was on the way to Hong Kong, 
Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs, the governor of Hong Kong, refused the order from the British 
government to stop the freighter in Hong Kong waters.124 It was shown later the freighter 
deviated from the predetermined voyage route, and arrived in Canton on August 8.   
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 Upon its arrival in Canton, Sun Yat-sen immediately ordered Chiang Kai-shek to 
intercept the freighter and confiscate all the arms. Such a huge numbers of firearms offered Sun 
Yat-sen and his adherents adequate reason to suspect that Chen Lianbo was preparing a military 
conspiracy to expel his “revolutionary government.” The merchants’ community was furious 
about the seizure and once again, threatened a general strike until they received their weapons.125 
In a meeting between Sun Yat-sen and the Canton merchants, Sun explained to them that the 
total number of arms far exceeded the amount stated on the permit.126    
On October 10, 1924, celebrations were being held in most Chinese cities to 
commemorate the thirteenth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. Known as 
“Double Tenth Festival (雙十節 Shuangshijie),” the national holiday was established in 1912 to 
celebrate the victory of the Wuchang Uprising (武昌起義 Wuchang qiyi) which overthrew both 
the Manchu monarchy and Qing dynasty in 1911. This year’s celebration in Canton, however, 
was shrouded in bloody conflict, rather than joy. Crowds of locals already jammed the fair-like 
festivities in the early morning. When thousands of people, mainly composed of young students, 
workers, and military cadets paraded in the city streets with their banners and flags, what awaited 
them were not bursts of applause from the audience, but lethal bullets shot by armed individuals 
of the Canton Merchant Corps. As the parade demanded the right to march through the spot 
where the Corps was unloading their weapons, the exasperated Corps members refused their 
request, which was likely to intensify their conflict. Someone among the Corps started shooting 
at those bare-handed paraders, who at this moment were exposed to heavy gunfire on the street. 
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According to one official statistic, the deadly attack had left eight people dead, including one 
who was disemboweled, and hundreds wounded.127 
History is always filled with contingency and surprise. The first shooter in the Corps 
would never predict that his shots triggered a large-scale armed conflict between the Canton 
merchant community and Guangdong government led by Sun Yat-sen. Right after the street 
conflict, the Canton Merchants Association issued a general strike announcement, claiming that 
Sun and his voracious government had been trampling Guangdong people’s interests, and calling 
for further military action against Sun’s tyrannical rule in Guangdong.128 The armed conflict and 
the threat from the Canton merchant community seemed to have enraged Sun, who then decided 
to reassert his and his Nationalist Party’s political authority in Canton through a high-handed 
policy to suppress and pacify the merchants’ armed force. Sun immediately organized a 
revolutionary committee and also ordered his vice Generalissimo Hu Hanmin (胡漢民 1879-
1936) to place Canton under martial law.  
On the other side, the merchant community never ceded its anti-Sun activities. Not only 
did the Association refuse the intermediation initiated by some civic organizations and the city’s 
General Chamber of Commerce, but it went so far as to patrol in the market to punish any non-
compliant merchants. The merchants’ confidence in confronting the government was by no 
means unrealistic. In 1912, merchants in Canton established the Corps as a private militia force 
equipped with imported weapons. By early 1924, the Corps had recruited more than 20,000 
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members in and around Canton, each of whom had undergone at least six months of drills and 
were armed with at least two guns.129 During the conflict, the leading merchants warned that 
their armed Corps members had the prowess to expel any “outside power” and to maintain social 
order in Canton. The belief that his government authority was being challenged, as well as the 
fear of merchants’ potential conspiracy with his rival Chen Jiongming whose forces had fled to 
eastern Guangdong after their military struggle in 1922, made Sun determined to suppress their 
anti-government activities through coercive military means. The tension escalated on October 15 
when Chiang Kaishek (蔣介石 1887-1975) moved the cadets of the newly established Whampoa 
Military Academy (黃埔軍校 Huangpu junxiao) to Canton, which put the Merchants’ Corps in 
jeopardy. Merchants’ rebellion was forcibly suppressed on the same day, leading to the death of 
thousands of people, including Corps members and merchants, together with huge property 
losses. As the China Weekly Review reported:  
Canton has been horribly red… a Red Army of 40,000 terrorists red-washed 35 wards 
and streets in the Western Suburb with the blood of aged and young who were too weak 
to endure the rage of a Red Sun which pierced through them in the form of daggers and 
bayonets and kerosene oil, the power of which has left a monument of hundreds of 
blackened walls standing over debris, once the glory of 1600 homes and shops worth 
more than $25,000,000 but now a grave of 6000 innocent men, women, and children who 
perished.130 
The Corps were quickly disarmed after the conflict, and their leaders declared 
unconditional surrender. The commander of the Corps fled to Hong Kong and never came 
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back.131 After the Incident, Sun’s reputation fell to a low ebb in Canton, and criticism of his 
revolutionary government increased among Canton residents. The commercial situation in 
Guangdong deteriorated over the next few years. Merchants were reluctant to expand their 
business in Canton, where they believed the government provided no guarantee of their safety 
and property.132 Though the suppression of the Merchants’ Corps made many Cantonese hate 
Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary government, Sun recognized the importance of military power 
and the danger of the unregulated popular forces. Soon after the suppression, Sun left Canton for 
his national unification campaign. What he left to Canton was a disarmed merchants community, 
a strengthened military, and a group of bureaucrats committed to achieving his national dream.  
Conclusion 
 
The case study of Guangdong allows us to examine the complexity of how the early 
Republican government coexisted with armed populace in local society. As suggested in this 
chapter, Sun Yat-sen, in the beginning, confronted the fact that a well-regulated force would be 
reckoned with. His latter action of military suppression indicated that he consciously maintained 
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a balance between the armed people and the government, which determined the government 
policy towards private gun ownership could not be static and consistent.  
This inconsistency could be drawn in some speeches of Sun Yat-sen in Guangdong.  On 
July 28, 1924, amid a swarm of Canton peasants who newly joined the Nationalist Party (GMD), 
Sun Yat-sen, gave a passionate speech about the mobilization of peasants, in which he 
particularly encouraged them to empower themselves with guns in a situation in which they 
suffered from oppression and exploitation. Sun cited both the Hong Kong Seamen’s successful 
strike a few days earlier that forced the Western capitalists to make a concession, and the Canton 
merchants, who founded the well-equipped Volunteer Corps right after the 1911 Revolution and 
made themselves the most prominent force in Guangdong society.133 He said, “you peasants 
traditionally lack solidarity and have no recognition of the importance of organizing self-defense 
units. To throw off the oppression, you (peasants) must unify and form cooperatives. Able-
bodied young men (壯丁 zhuangding) should be selected for conscription into the self-defense 
units. If so, the government could provide support and assistance by selling you guns at a 
reasonable price. Once you are armed and render an effective force, you will be the country’s 
first-class masters (主人翁 zhurenweng).”134 
Sun Yat-sen’s speech championing the militarization of the Guangdong ordinary peasants 
ran counter to his attitudes towards the Canton merchants a few days later. In September 1924, 
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Sun openly denounced the merchants of Canton as defectors and bandits, who defied government 
authority and sometimes forced the government to compromise with their military power.135 At 
the time, Sun was about to stamp out the armed merchants and to exert government authority 
over offenders. However, in the early month of that year, Sun indeed highly appreciated the role 
of the Merchants’ Corps in the city when his newly established government had not monopolized 
armed forces. In a speech to a joint meeting of the local police agency and the Corps, he used a 
different rhetoric by applauding the Corps which would be reckoned with in his state-building 
efforts.136  
Sun Yat-sen, as historian David Strand puts it, was heavily committed to public speaking, 
and “was often obliged to use words” to “achieve his political goals.”137 It appeared from Sun 
Yat-sen’s three consecutive speeches that he expressed three utterly different and mercurial 
attitudes towards the armed civilians. Even his attitudes to one specific group (the Canton 
merchants in this case) was inconsistent. He encouraged and facilitated the peasants to arm 
themselves; appreciated the Merchants’ Corps in maintaining order in Canton; blamed the Corps 
later and then fiercely suppressed them. This chapter is a study of the inconsistency and 
fluctuation towards the armed forces in the early Republican decades. In order to show how 
governments’ different and changing ways of dealing with armed civilians affected the dynamic 
of state-society relations, this chapter investigates both conflicts and collaborations behind the 
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Canton Merchants’ Corps Incident, a unique aspect of Sun Yat-sen’s coercive rulership that 
clearly illustrates the dynamic gun control politics.  
Sun Yat-sen’s suppression of the armed merchants left a political legacy to the later 
Republican decades. With the end of the Northern Expedition in 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, the 
successor of Sun, endeavored to reintegrate Chinese society. Of all the policies in the way of 
claiming the state monopoly on violence, Chiang’s Nanjing government immediately enacted a 
law forbidding the formation of Merchants’ Corps in major commercial cities. He also made 
regulation policies towards private gun ownership. However, the important element of local 
militarization continued to exist, which appeared as the obstacles to his gun control agenda, 
which will be addressed in the next chapter.  
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~ CHAPTER FOUR~ 
Regulating Guns and State-building in Republican China 
 
Introduction 
 
After the suppression of the armed Canton Merchants in October 1924, the KMT and the 
National Revolutionary Army (NRA) left Guangdong province to fulfill the Nationalist 
unification agenda. In the summer of 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, now the Generalissimo of the NRA 
took his troops into Beiping, indicating the Northern Expedition had been officially concluded. 
China seemed to be entering a new era. The newly founded Nationalist government, now based 
in Nanjing was unequivocally committed to penetrating the penetration of state power into local 
society. Drawing lessons from the Canton Merchants’ Incident and recognizing the potential 
threat from armed urban Corps, the Nanjing government enacted a law, seeking to restrict the 
development of merchants’ Corps in major commercial cities.1 Several other attempts were made 
to maintain social order and increase government power and authority over local society. Private 
gun ownership and its regulation were an integral part of the state-building project undertaken 
during the Nationalist era (1927-1949). Chinese officials followed gun policies adopted in the 
late Qing and early Republic in claiming that regulation rather than total prohibition was the best 
way to deal with private gun ownership.  
That is to say, like their predecessors, the Nationalist era officials believed that the most 
effective gun policy would be placing guns in the hands of “good people (良民 liangmin),” who 
would use them in self-defense, while keeping them out of the hands of those who could threaten 
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social order or the government’s agenda. When the founding of the Nanjing government in 1927 
made the extensive state-building efforts possible, the central government set out its policy 
regarding private gun ownership. As will be addressed below, gun registration, licensing, 
stamping out gun trafficking gradually became standard practice in both urban and rural areas. 
The purpose of this chapter is not only to review these regulation policies, though their 
importance was evident to assess Republican China’s state-building efforts.  
One goal of this chapter is to review these policies, which is essential to an assessment of 
Republican China’s state-building efforts. Another goal is to explore how gun regulation was 
implemented in local society. In many cases, things did not happen as envisioned. One such case 
was that of Bie Tingfang (别廷芳 1883-1940), the ad hoc “local king” in Henan province’s 
Ningxiang County, where he organized a militia force and operated primitive arsenals to 
manufacture guns and ammunition. In July 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arranged a meeting with Bie 
in Wuhan, the temporary capital of China at the time. In the meeting, Chiang praised him for 
organizing collective-defense forces in which ordinary civilians armed themselves and offered 
him a medal of honor. To even Bie’s surprise, his status as “local king” was then officially 
recognized. After the meeting, Bie’s initiative of arming local peasants, who used their guns to 
defend the communities was officially recognized. 2 
Another case happened in 1939 when China was undergoing the trauma of the second 
Sino-Japanese War. Chiang telegraphed Yan Xishan (阎锡山 1883-1960), a former warlord who 
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still maintained de facto control in Shanxi province. Chiang issued a stern warning to Yan not to 
confiscate any guns from peasants to “endure harmony between government and the masses.”3 
If we examine these two cases from the lens of privately-owned guns, it becomes clear 
that the government in certain circumstances made concessions when regulating the armed 
populace. From the late 1910s, Bie Tingfang organized unsanctioned militia forces in Neixiang 
Country, which provided essential backing for his ambition of controlling local society. To 
bolster his military strength, Bie and his followers not only seized weapons from other militia 
forces, and also operated a number of community based arsenals to manufacture rifles and 
pistols.4 Bie’s private manufacturing of guns was obviously not officially sanctioned, according 
to the gun regulation law. Yet, this did not prevent him from receiving government recognition. 
Bie’s domination in local power structure and active role in protecting local communities forced 
the government to forge a compromised relationship with him. The firearm regulation was not 
consistently implemented in wartime China. If the law prevented the rebels, bandits, and other 
outlaws from owning any firearms, Chang’s order to Yan Xishan in 1938 suggested that the state 
made compromise by adopting a lax attitude towards armed civilians, no matter their status as 
law-abiding civilian gun owners or not.  
These cases are two ordinary examples among many that illustrate the government’s 
policy could be negotiated and compromised with respect to certain circumstances. Then, how 
do we understand the inconsistency of the government’s policy towards private gun owners? As 
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Edward McCord puts it, the local strongmen “might stand as obstacles to state penetration of 
their communities, in return for political support they could also perform as state agents for this 
penetration.”5 The focus of this chapter is not to repeat what previous studies have fully 
demonstrated that state’s endeavors to penetrate local society. Using previous scholarship as 
baseline, this chapter seeks to examine how the proliferation of guns in local society generated 
political responses, as a new angle to scrutinize the dynamics between state and society. My 
findings indicate that although the National government were deeply committed to state-building 
between 1927 and 1949, it did not claim absolute monopoly of violence, but adopting a 
regulatory approach to cope with the private gun ownership. Nevertheless, as I will argue below, 
its policy was inconsistent when the strong local society, partially as a result of the proliferation 
of guns, precluded effective regulation, which forced the government to make concessions.  
A focus on the nexus of state and armed populace in gun regulation can yield new 
perspectives of the Chinese society during the Nationalist era. The Nationalist government’s 
regulatory approach towards private gun ownership allows us to examine how a weak state 
viewed its relations with the strong society. As discussed in the chapter two, Chinese 
government, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, adopted a “reliance/control” model to 
resolve its relationship with local power. When China was confronting both external threat and 
unfavorable domestic conditions, its regulation became contingent and lax. The exploration of 
the history of regulating guns allows us to see that modern China was concerned with 
establishing a balanced relation with local society. This chapter starts with an introduction about 
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how the private gun ownership was regulated during the Republican period, and then discusses 
the difficulties in carrying out the regulations.  
Regulating Private Gun Ownership in Republican China 
 
From the mid-eighteenth century until the early twentieth century, the Chinese 
government had no interest in enacting specific legal provision empowering people to own guns 
in defense of themselves and their communities. As the second chapter suggested, prior to the 
late nineteenth century, the Qing authorities believed that there was an explicit link between 
firearm ownership and the increasing risk of uncontrollable violence and insurgency. Only after 
China experienced a successive series of foreign defeats and domestic rebellions from the late 
nineteenth century, did the governments see putting guns in the hands of ordinary people as 
being the extension of state power. The prerequisite was that armed civilians were properly 
trained and regulated. At the same time, the state also sought to control the supply of guns and to 
stamp out their use by the ones who were regarded as threats to public order and central 
authority. The policy of gun licensing or registration proposed by Shen Jiamen in 1908, for 
instance, was meant to decrease the danger of violence and to prevent any rebellious or 
revolutionary actions. Despite the fact that the Qing dynasty collapsed shortly after these 
regulatory approaches were proposed, they laid the basis for the successive governments to deal 
with the issue of private gun ownership.  
The approach of what I term “control/reliance” continued to be adopted during the 
Republican period. The persistence ascribed to the common political and social circumstances 
that both the late Qing and Republican governments faced. The decline of the central grip forced 
the successive governments to cede central power to local individuals and groups, so that they 
could help the central authorities to maintain local order and to defeat the uprisings. At the same 
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time, the state also made efforts to guarantee that the empowerment should not challenge the 
state authority and legitimacy. The major aspects of the regulatory efforts, which aimed to place 
gun in the hands of the right people, were as follows. 
The Surveillance over Militia’s Guns and Ammunition 
 
Not only the organization and operation of both rural and urban militia forces, but their 
use of weapons were also subjected to government supervision. Two years after the founding of 
the Republic, the Beiyang government in Beijing issued the Self-Defense Militia Decree (地方保
衛團條例 Difang baoweituan tiaoli), the purpose of which are two-fold. First, the newly founded 
government offered legitimacy to self-defense forces and acknowledged their policing function. 
Second, it aimed to consolidate all local defense forces into one controllable policing body. The 
Beiyang government also expressed special concern over the militia use of firearms. As required 
by the decree, “all of the militiamen’s guns should be registered to provincial government.” It 
also added that “if new firearms were indispensable under special circumstances, the request 
must be approved by provincial governors.”6 The decree did not mark any significant departure 
from the late Qing in terms of firearm regulations. However, in a few months, the Beijing 
government issued another order to provincial governors, prohibiting any people or groups from 
acquiring guns from local governments. This marked a radical shift in gun policy, as the state 
was worried about an armed populace had potential to bring threat to local society. The state also 
concerned with the high possibility that militiamen transferred their guns to bandits resulted in a 
                                                          
6 “Sheng Yihui wei geshu yujing dinggou junhuo 省議會為各屬預警訂購軍火” (The provincial 
council ordered firearms for paramilitary forces), Shengjing shibao, January 14, 1913. 
 
  
190 
 
grip on firearm supply. Late in the year 1914, the Beijing government ordered explicitly to ban 
any people from acquiring guns from local governments.7  
Nevertheless, the Beijing government’s effort at centralization of militia forces was 
doomed by the unwillingness to cooperate of the provincial authorities, who were seeking 
provincial autonomy as opposed to Yuan Shikai’s central control. Yuan’s order banning local 
government from providing firearms to militia forces was often ignored. One example of local 
government working to support the formation of the armed militia can be seen in the Fengtian 
province of Manchuria, which was under the control of warlord Zhang Zuolin. The Fengtian 
government initially passed the order to local counties, but soon after, the ban was lifted. The 
new order strongly encouraged militia forces to acquire enough weapons against malicious 
bandits: 
It is reported that the new militia groups are being formed, but the guns and ammunitions 
are not adequate in defense of the local communities. The government now requires that 
any respective militia should acquire weapons from government to prevent banditry, if 
not already prepared.8 
The local government sponsorship of the armed militia occurred in many other places as 
well. In the Quzhou County of Zhili Province, “owing much to the support of local gentry, who 
provided fund to procure modern guns, county magistrate immediately recruited militia units and 
worked out the structure of the new force.”9 As discussed in chapter three, successive 
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Guangdong governments barely rejected the request from local magistrates who organized local 
militia forces with the assistance of elite. 
The effectiveness of such regulation and control efforts, however, lay in the coercive 
power of the state. The practice originated in the late Qing became institutionalized in the early 
Republican period. The establishment of the Republic in 1912 failed to bring unity and stability 
to an already fragile society, which had suffered from a successive series of foreign defeats and 
domestic turmoil. But instead, warlordism emerged as the fall of the Qing dynasty made the 
major check on regional autonomy vanished. Scholarly research on the emergence of warlordism 
has concluded that military prowess was crucial in establishing and maintaining warlords’ 
dominant status in their respective sphere of interests.10 Thus, the extent of their acquisition of 
weapons became the basis of their military dominance. Once they secured the positions of 
power, respective warlords made efforts to create firearm laws.  
During the early Republican period, the consistent civil conflicts among warlords and the 
decentralization of political power made it difficult to regulate military weapons. Warlord in 
their respective ruling areas created a series of laws or regulations of the weapons carried by 
their soldiers. However, due to their ruling power never ceasing to change, these regulations 
were also subject to change. Nevertheless, most warlords acknowledged the potential threat 
posed by the runoff of their weapons. The provide a consistent view about the regulations upon 
military weapons, this section uses the regulation in the Manchuria as a case study, because the 
region remained politically stable from the 1910s to the early 1930s, when the Japan came to 
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establish the Manchuguo. During this period, the whole region was controlled by the Zhang 
family and their gun control policies remained stable as well. 
In late 1916, the Fengtian provincial government noticed that “the frequent banditry 
forced local attached armies to apply guns, rifles, and bullets to defend the threats. However, 
they failed to report the procession of any broken or surplus guns. The military weapon should 
be carefully monitored. Otherwise, the danger will follow.”11 The government ordered all the 
counties to report meticulously about their broken and unused weapons to avoid these weapons 
to be used by outlaws.12 The government also recognized that some soldiers pawned their 
weapons secretly for profits, which led the government to make laws against such phenomena. A 
case like this was reported in the Shengyang based Shengjing shibao in 1919.  “Zhang Zuoxiang, 
the garrison commander, admonished that most military weapons were owned by the country, 
the private transfer of which was illegal. However, some ignorant soldiers pawned them for 
profit. This is unreasonable. From now on, on the behalf of military government, all the pawn 
shop should not accept weapon.” In the 1923, the commander in chief enacted another harsh 
laws prohibiting the military individuals from transferring their weapons by all means.13 
In other provinces as well, the military leaders feared the diffusion of firearms from 
military camps to the local society. Once caught, these military weapons were confiscated 
immediately, and any concerned individuals should suffer from strict punishments. In 1917, the 
                                                          
11 “Zhang Dujun Shengzhong Junhuo 張督軍慎重軍火” (General Zhang was cautious of 
military weapon), Shengjing shibao, December 24, 1916. 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 “Yanjin Dangshang Shouzhi Qiangxie 嚴謹當商受質槍械” (To ban the pawn merchants from 
accepting guns), Shengjing shibao, October 1, 1922. 
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army garrisoned in Baoding 保定, the provincial capital of Zhili, found that an ordinary soldier 
stole two rifles and wanted to sell them to local merchants. His behaviors were found by 
detectives, who arrested both transaction sides.14 The soldier later was sentenced to death. Even 
though local governments made their respective laws in regulating military weapons, the case of 
illegal transfers occurred endlessly. As we addressed before, these regulations were always 
futile.  
During the late Qing period, as we discussed in the second chapter, local militia had to 
submit application to local government before purchasing weapons. Local magistrate always 
reviewed their applications carefully before making any decisions. In 1910, one militia of the 
Xiangshan County of the Guangdong Province made request to local magistrate for rifles and 
other firearms.15 The magistrate approved first but suspended their order, due to their application 
letter did not indicate the numbers of militia members. In 1911, the Guangdong Bureau of 
Ordnance formulated a detailed order, which requires that in a formal application, it should 
include the reason of organizing armed militia, the members of the force, and the source of 
financial support. According to the order, “thereafter, all the militia forces in the counties had to 
prepare sufficient fund and recruit militia members before submitting application to the 
government. The gentry who are usually responsible of organizing militias should assure that the 
weapons would not be borrowed or transferred. The request must be sent to the county 
                                                          
14 “Fanmai Qiangdan Chusi 販賣槍彈處死” (Executing the soldier who trafficked guns), 
Dagong bao, December 16, 1915. 
15 “Chaban Xiangtuan 查辦鄉團” (Inspecting militia force), Xiangshan xunbao 香山旬報, 63 
(1910): 2. 
 
  
194 
 
government, which will review its militia members and other requirements. All of these details 
will be reviewed carefully before issuing any licenses.”16 
 After the 1911 revolution, the governor-general of Manchuria issued an order to all the 
prefectures and counties, saying that “the central government in Beijing now ordered that the 
militia forces organized by gentry must be carefully inspected. The purposes of militia forces are 
to defend localities. However, there are some flaws in the systems. In the future, the militia 
forces could not purchase any types of weapons without government approval. In doing so, the 
rebels and bandits would not have any chance to get guns.” 17 
When the central government sent this order, the Qing court was not collapse yet. 
However, the Qing court recognized the dangers of the existence of armed people in society. 
Besides the unregulated militia forces, the Qing government was worried about the social turmoil 
will be again destroyed its ruling foundation. The gun control was tight again to reclaim its 
monopoly over the violence. The tight control over arms, however, did not stop the revolutionary 
enterprise. In the early 1912, the Qing dynasty collapsed. In 1913, the Fengtian government was 
required to regulate the guns owned by the militia forces. 
“As for the weapons for the militias, it has been prohibited already. However, it is heard 
that local government did not take it seriously. The establishment of militia and merchants’ corps 
were sanctioned by the government. Even from the late Qing, there was no law prohibiting the 
organization of militias. However, these militia forces were not good in quality at all. Some 
                                                          
16 Liangguang Guanbao, 18 (1911): 3. 
17 “Shenzhong Junhuo 慎重軍火” (Be cautious about military weapons), Shengjing shibao, 
January 9, 1913.  
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disorganized militias might post threat to local order. The distribution of guns to militia had no 
standard regulations. Thereafter, all the provinces should set up definite law the regulating the 
procurement of firearms. All the procurement must be submitted to the central government for 
careful review.”18 
It seems that the new policy that tightened the procurement of firearms indeed made the 
acquisition of firearms difficult. According to an editorial that appeared in the Shengjing Shibao 
in 1913, “In Jilin province, the local paramilitary forces now needed foreign guns to defend the 
localities. In the previous days, they could get the weapon from the government through local 
council, but now they had to apply a special permit from local and above government. After 
approval, they would be eligible to get them.”19 In the meantime, the Fengtian government also 
issued an order that requiring all the local council to carefully review the request from militias. 
After receiving the request, local council was asked to submit the request to local government 
and military sections. The Fengtian governor Zhang Xiluan also ordered his subordinates to 
consider the militias’ qualities before issuing any firearm permits. As addressed in these 
accounts, the government in the Manchuria recognized that militia forces had a penchant to have 
advanced guns from the government. However, these laws and regulations suggest the local 
officials were resolute to maintain their monopoly over the violence.  
 The early Republican government did not destroy any law established by the late Qing 
government, especially about the firearm control laws. The Beiyang government in 1914 enacted 
a law entitled “Regulations on Local Self-Defense Forces,” in which it clearly stated that “all the 
                                                          
18 “Junxieju Shenzhong Junxie 軍械局慎重軍械” (The Bureau of Ordance is cautious about 
military weapn), Shengjing shibao, January 21, 1913.  
19 “Guanyu Feiqiang關於匪槍” (On the Bandits’ Guns), Shibao, May 9, 1916.  
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militia members who had guns or other firearms had to obtain the license from local government 
and to have their guns seared. In a situation that additional weapons are required, application 
must be submitted to local government in advance.”20 Such law had nothing difference with the 
order made by the late Qing government, as suggested in the second chapter. The state saw the 
militia as an extension of the state power, which was difficult to penetrate into local society.  
However, the firearm control took an opposite turn a couple months later. In November 
1914, the Beiyang government issued an order again to prohibit the distribution of firearms to 
local militia forces. According to the order, “in recent days, some reports suggest that militia 
members become bandits with their guns, or lend their guns to bandits. We have to stamp out 
this phenomenon, otherwise, the consequence would be disaster.” 21The central government then 
issued a letter to all the provinces, requiring that ordinary people would no longer get guns or 
bullets from the government.” In 1917, the Beiyang government set up a guideline of organizing 
the merchants corps, named “The Organization Guideline of Merchants Corps,” in which 
regulated that “the guns or other firearms owned by the merchants corps had to be distributed in 
terms of the number of corps members. The local government must send relevant document to 
the provincial government, which then signed and send it to the military bureau. The Department 
of Peasants and Merchants would calculate the price of the arms. The Corps had to state in 
details about why they required guns.”22 
                                                          
20 Cai Hongyuan, ed., Minguo Fagui Jicheng, vol. 15, 34. 
 
21 “Dianchi Jinzhi Renmin Lingqiang 電飭禁止人民領槍” (To ban civilians from obtaining 
guns), Shengjing shibao, November 15, 1914. 
 
22 Cai Hongyuan, 35. 
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Generally speaking, the government wanted to maintain its monopoly on violence and 
guaranteed its authority would not be challenged by an armed populace. Thus, gun control policy 
was bound to be strict to maintain its monopoly. However, starting from the late Qing period, 
China suffered from a “state involution” process, in which the state’s authority was hardly 
appreciated by local society.23 In short, the state was not able to control the provinces. The 
provincial governors were charged with local affairs. After the fall of the Qing dynasty, political 
decentralization was accelerated along with the weakness of the central Beiyang government. 
Therefore, the orders issued by the Beiyang government could not be carried out effectively in 
provinces. In the meantime, local provincial governors also relied on local gentry, who were the 
most zealous of developing local militia forces. Therefore, the government’s firearm control 
policy was not appreciated by provinces. The existing sources suggest that the government was 
more likely to encourage the gentry to develop militia forces. What they did was simply warning 
local gentry that the firearms should be carefully contained.  
Under such situation, both local government and gentry or merchants did not take the 
prohibitory order seriously. For example, in November 1914, when the Fengtian government 
received the order, the governor issued it to local governments, ordering that “all the people and 
governments had to comply with the law.”24 On the other hand, however, the governor also 
called for the organization of militia forces, and claiming that “now the self-defense bureau is set 
up, thereafter, local militia forces required firearms and weapons in large amount. Otherwise, it 
                                                          
23 For the “State Involution” process, see Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural 
North China, 1900-1942.  
24 “Tongchi Baoweituan Juling Qiangdan 通飭保衛團具領槍彈” (The order to obtain firearms 
and ammunitions fro the militia forces), Shengjing shibao, December 2, 1914. 
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is hard to defend localities. If militia requires bullets, such a request should be sent to 
government immediately to avoid banditry.”25 
In Guangdong province, the situation was rather similar. In the early 1912, the 
Guangdong Chamber of Commerce suggested establishing a Merchants’ Corps to the provincial 
government. In the application, it is indicated that the Chamber of Commerce could also serve as 
bondsman for the procurement of weapons. Such a request was immediately approved by the 
Guangdong government, which was now controlled by the revolutionaries, rather than the 
Beiyang government in Beijing. In 1913, when Long Jiguang took over the Guangdong province, 
the governor also encouraged local gentry to organize militia forces. If guns were necessary, “the 
county magistrate must make sure the necessity and then acquired guaranty from local influential 
people. The request would be sent to provincial government before firearms distribution.” 
According to these accounts, the governments in the early Republican period established 
relatively lax firearm control policies in comparision with the Qing. In 1924, the county 
magistrate of Gaoyao wrote to Sun Yat-sen, asking for five hundred rifles. Sun did not reject its 
request. A lot of requests like this suggest that any levels of government or individuals had no 
difficulties to obtain guns, once they had someone assure their guns would not be used by 
bandits. In the June of the same year, the Da Tangbao of Taishan County also applied to buy one 
hundred rifles. The local government reviewed their request carefully, and noticed that their 
application document did not show the quantities of existing guns. When the document was 
supplemented, their request was approved without any difficulty.  
                                                          
25 “Qingling Tuanqiang Zhishi Xuyi Shenbao 請領團槍知事須以身保” (Endowment is required 
for the militia forces to obtain guns), Huaguo bao, December 30, 1913. 
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In 1924, the Guangdong arsenal set up a regulation on the distribution of guns to local 
militia. In this regulation, it clearly stated that:  
First, for the militia forces with a desire to arm with guns, they should submit their 
request to county government. The arsenal would not issue their order before receiving approval 
from the grand marshal. 
Second, as for the rifle, the price would be 160 yuan. The maximum amount of bullets for 
each militia is 200. Each bullet worth 20 yuan. 
Third, if militia has special requirement on the design of the weapon, a letter of 
endorsement is required from the government. In the first month, twenty percent of weapons 
would be distributed. The rest would be distributed within three months. 
Forth, all of the rifles would be sealed with using guidelines. These guns would be 
registered by provincial government. They are awaiting future inspection.  
Fifth, the local government had the responsibility to inspect the weapons owned by local 
militias. When receiving weapons, militia leaders should report their weapons with detailed 
information to local government without any delay.26 
According to the regulation established in 1924, it is evident that it aimed to regulate the 
weapon use by the militia forces, and in the meantime, it also encouraged the organization of 
armed militias. In October of 1924, the military commander of Guangdong, Xu Chongzhi, also 
wanted to simplified the procedure of obtaining guns by militia forces. He ordered that “at this 
moment, the militia leader could apply their request to the military government directly, and do 
not have to submit their request to arsenals.”27 
Though both the late Qing and early Republican governments allowed the common 
people to own guns for self-defense. Most guns were held, however, by the militia forces. 
                                                          
26 “Binggongchang Xinding Mintuan Lingqiang Zhangcheng 兵工廠新定民團領槍章程,” Qishi 
er shanghangbao 七十二商行報, April 11, 1924. 
27 “Mintuan yu Siren Lingqiang Shouxu 民團與私人領槍手續” (The procure to obtain guns for 
militia forces and civilians), Guagnzhou minguo ribao, October 4, 1934. 
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Therefore, the government noticed that to regulate civilian weapons, the regulation of militia 
weapons was inevitable.  
For example, Sichuan province in 1908 issued a statute regulating the militia weapons. In 
it, it stated that “as for the militia forces scattered in localities, the foreign guns should be 
inspected by local government. These guns must be sealed and registered with local 
government… The provincial government should inspect these guns at least once per quarter. If 
the gun was lost or lent out to others, the militia leaders must be punished heavily.” In the 
meantime, Sichuan government also regulated that “other than weapons owned by militias, those 
guns owned by ordinary people without government sanction should be confiscated. These gun 
owners could be compensated. Those who refused to turn their guns in would be published.”28 
The regulation upon the militia weapons was in place during the late Qing period. In 
1901, the Guangdong Bureau of Military Logistics established a more detailed regulation over 
the militias and their weapons. 
“After the militia purchased weapons, its leader had to report to the local government. 
The militia also needs to report if they had used the guns against bandits. If any guns were lost, 
they had to report immediately to the government.  
Local government is required to inspect the militia weapons regularly. If they fail to 
fulfill their duties, they would be punished. If the guns or bullets got lost, the militia leaders 
would be punished. If some militia members transfer the weapon to bandits, they would be 
arrested immediately. 
The distribution of guns is based on how many militia members. If some members leave 
the militia, their guns must be turned in immediately. If the militia forces dismissed, all of their 
weapons must be collected by local government without delay. 
The information on the quantities of guns and their maintaining records, along with the 
registration records would be open to the public.”29 
                                                          
28 “Jin Mintuan Sishou Qiangdan 禁民團私售槍彈” (To ban militia forces from selling firearms 
and ammunitions), Shenbao, July 12, 1908. 
29 Liangguang Guanbao, 18 (1911): 3. 
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In 1909, the Bureau once again revised the statute, and emphasized that “thereafter, local 
gentry should report the use of weapons by militia forces to the provincial government every 
year. If the guns were used to stamp out bandits, a letter is required. Different levels of 
governments should inspect the guns owned by militia forces.”30 
According to the statute, the Guangdong government of the late Qing granted the power 
to regulate militia forces to the local government. The organization of militia forces had to be 
approved in advance by local government. Then, the local government had absolute power to 
regulate and control the militia weapons. The officials in local government were also required to 
inspect the militia force on a routine basis. There are many similar regulation across the country. 
These regulations require the officials to oversee the ownership of weapons by militia. As we 
know, the routine inspection is a duty for the local officials, who in reality, on rare occasion 
inspected the militia guns.  
After the Republic of China was established, almost all the provincial governments set up 
policies toward the weapons owned by militia forces. In 1921, Jiangsu Province promulgated the 
law on regulating militia and civilian weapons. It clearly stated that “all of the weapons owned 
by militias, no matter whether they were used or not, had to be registered with the local 
government. The registration included the types of guns, quantities, seal numbers, and other 
information. The inspection of firearms had three steps. First, the gun should be sealed with 
unique number. Second, the information must be registered. Third, a license will be issued.”31 
                                                          
30 Ibid.  
31 Xu Xunru 許恂儒, Xianzheng Quanshu 縣政全書 N.P., 1925, 61. 
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These regulations and laws were collected in the Xianzheng Quanshu in 1925, which was 
used during the Republican period as a guideline to manage local affair for local magistrate. The 
Xianzheng Quanshu also served as guideline about how the regulate or control civilian gun 
ownership. According to the Xianzheng Quanshu, “all of private armies with defense purposes 
should be purchased through county magistrate. The guns must be sealed and then distributed to 
local people. The guns must be registered with local government and disclose their usage 
monthly.”32 
The similar regulation also appeared in Guangdong. In 1913, the Guangdong government 
enacted “Regulations on the Militia Forces,” in which it clearly stated that all counties if bought 
guns from other channels, rather than the government, militia leaders have to report to county 
government immediately. The county government had the duties to collect these guns and seal 
them before they could be used by militia members.”33 
A glance at the gun regulations established during the early Republican period reveals 
that the policies were embodied in two aspects. First, all the government emphasized the 
importance of engraving of guns to assure these guns were used legally. Second, inspection is 
also required by law to assure that the guns were kept by local militia forces, rather than other 
outlaws.  
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33 “Guangdong Chouban Baojia Tuanlian Zanxing Zhangcheng 廣東籌辦保甲團練暫行章程” 
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Gun Licensing and Registration 
 
 The late Qing’s attempts to mobilize armed people to regain control over society 
backfired when popular armed forces undermined the state’s monopoly on violence. But a 
variety of gun regulation measures targeting at armed individuals including registration, 
periodical inspection, and licensing originated during the late Qing formed an important legacy 
to the Republican period. Though the rise of provincialism after the founding of the Republic 
troubling the implementation of a uniform gun control law, most provinces, acting in concert 
with the central government, all adopted independent policies regarding private gun ownership. 
These gun regulation policies, despite the local variations, appeared to follow a similar logic and 
purpose. The major goal of regulating gun owners was to put guns in the hands of those people 
who would not use their weapons to commit illegal acts.  
 To purchase a gun, the law-abiding civilians had to meet specific requirement designed 
by either central or local governments. The common procedure is to get a purchasing permit 
from local government in advance, providing proof of their status as “good civilians.” What was 
the status to be a “good civilian?” In the spring of 1922, the Ministry of War of the Beiyang 
government telegraphed to the Fengtian Province, specifying the qualification of the purchaser. 
According to this decree, any people living in the rural regions had to meet the minimum 
property requirement. In Fengtian for instance, a good civilian was obliged to provide 
information about the arable land (at least 750 acres) and housing (at least 20 rooms). If the 
family did not meet the requirement, he might not occupy certain official rankings.34  
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In the December of 1926, the Nationalist Revolutionary Army enacted the first 
nationwide gun control law “The Statute on the People’s Self-Defense Guns” in which Chiang 
Kai-shek’s military government ordered all the weapons owned by either ordinary individuals or 
militia forces had to be reported to his government. The purpose of establishing the policy was to 
have the compliance of the gun owners. However, if we look at the policy closely, the policy 
placed too many requirements on the local gentry and militia leaders. It was difficult to make all 
these strongmen follow the government order as expected. In a period that the state had no direct 
control over the local society, the firearm control was hardly effective. In 1925, the Canton 
Municipal Police admitted that “the government only issues gun licenses and engraves their 
guns. It never addressed the issue of illegal ownership of guns, which caused more serious 
problems.”35 
The governments in Manchuria had similar regulations as Guangdong. In 1912, the 
governor-general of Guangdong Zhao Erxun ordered all the counties to report the guns owned by 
local militia forces. He also ordered the foreign firearm merchants to stop selling any types of 
weapons to people without government licenses.36 Based on the newspaper accounts, Zhao’s 
order was quickly carried out by local counties. County magistrates sent working reports to 
Zhao, reporting the policy has been implemented. The Liaoyang County reported that “the 
magistrate dispatched police to investigate the use of firearms among militias and then seals their 
                                                          
35 Xu Xunru, Xianzheng Quanshu, 61.  
36 “Huanqu Ziwei Qiangzhi zhi Bugao 換取自衛槍支之佈告” (The announcement to obtain gun 
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weapons.” In 1922, Jilin province enacted similar regulations, which required all the weapons 
owned by police forces, militias, and ordinary individuals to be registered. 37 
The regulation of guns owned by ordinary individuals had three aspects. First, the 
government set up the qualification of individuals who could buy guns. In 1915, for example, 
Fengtian government carried out a policy that designed the qualification of armed people. “The 
Manchuria was famous for its frequent banditry. Many ordinary peasants purchased guns for 
self-defense. This has been sanctioned by government. In recent days, local government reported 
many cases of robbery and banditry. These robbers and bandits all were equipped with guns. It is 
possible that the peasants who had guns in home are likely to assist bandits and outlaws. If one 
gun was lost among ordinary people, then a bandit would get one gun. If so, the consequence 
would be disastrous. The self-defense power was not strong among the people, police force and 
militias, and collective defense forces are necessary. In the meantime, the guns owned by 
ordinary people should be closely monitored.”38 
If we read this letter closely, it is evident that the Fengtian government took the private 
gun ownership for granted. The government noticed that it was legal to own guns by ordinary 
people, but was also worried about the regulation of these scattered guns. In this statement, the 
government merely ordered local government officials to deal with the issues, but failed to point 
out the content at all. 
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In 1917, Fengtian government went further to regulate the qualifications of individuals 
who were eligible to purchase guns. “In recent days, the bandits disturbed localities with guns. It 
seemed that they had powerful foreign guns and countless bullets. It could be speculated that 
these bandits got these weapons from ordinary armed civilians, because it was hardly possible 
for these bandits to buy guns without government approval. In order to stamp out bandits, it is 
necessary to regulate the civilian weapons. Thereafter, only rich families whose properties worth 
more than three thousand dollars were eligible to purchase guns. Even if the families were rich, 
they did not hair brave men, these families were not eligible to purchase guns.”39 
 In 1921, Jilin province enacted a new law about the private gun ownership, because the 
1917 regulation was “hardly implemented.” The new gun control law changed the requirement of 
property. “All the merchants and people have to meet the following requirement to get the 
license to purchase a gun. The merchants should own more than two thousand yuan, or owned 
more than 10 mu land and 5 rooms, or rent land for more than 20 mu. The merchants also require 
some others who could write warranty for them. The guns must also obtain license from local 
government and got registered. If any guns or weapons lost, the owners have to report to local 
government immediately. After the privately-owned guns get registered, the owners should have 
their weapons inspected twice per year by local government.”40 
 The regulation in reality set a precondition for the gun purchase. According to the law, 
only wealthy families, including merchants, landlords, and other businessmen could get guns 
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lawfully. However, the policy was difficult to implement. First, even if the eligible merchants, 
they had to purchase their guns from government, which was much expensive than other 
channels. Second, to get the license, they had to find some other people to serve as their 
guarantors, which was hard. In the meantime, some poor families for the sake of self-defense 
also obtained their weapons from smugglers or in black market, which was invisible to the 
government. In practice, the law enacted by the Jilin and Fengtian provinces were fruitless.  
 There are also other provinces establishing similar requirements for the purchase of guns. 
In 1920, Jiangsu provinces enacted similar regulations. “One civilians who satisfy the following 
requirements are eligible to own guns. First, any corporations or organizations registered with 
local government. Second, civilians with formal occupation. Third, wealthy merchants.”41 The 
law also regulated the quantities of guns ought to be owned by each household. Each household 
only could get five guns maximum. All the weapons had to be reported to government.  
 Some counties in particular encouraged eligible merchants or gentry to purchase guns. 
For example, the Yi County of Fengtian province encouraged the wealthy gentry to purchase 
guns for the purpose of collective defense. Though these guns would be prepared by these 
individuals, as suggested by the council meeting, they could be organized by local county to 
organize militia forces. To deal with the loss of privately-owned guns, some counties also helped 
maintain these guns. In one county of Fengtian, “the police department noticed the frequent loss 
of civilian guns, which channeled the banditry. The government encouraged these armed 
civilians sold their guns to the Police Department, or turned their guns in with compensation. In 
the season when banditry was frequent, these guns would be mobilized to form collective 
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defense forces.”42 Existing sources do not disclose the implementation of this policy. It is likely 
that setting up the qualification of armed civilians did not prevent illegal civilian ownership.  
 Another policy that was used to regulate civilian weapons was gun registration. From the 
Qing dynasty to the Republican period, sealing on the guns and then registering with local 
government became the common way to keep civilian weapons under control. In 1914, Canton 
Municipal Government carried out a policy requiring “all the officials who conducted survey in 
local counties had to investigate the circulation of civilian weapons, and have these weapons 
sealed.” “After the guns were sealed, local government should inspect their registration 
immediately.”43 Each gun was assigned a specific number for tracking its usage. During the 
whole Republican period, the government used three steps to have civilian guns under 
surveillience: sealing, numbering, and registration. The well-known Shengjing Shibao 盛京时报 
reported largely about the registration of civilian weapons.  
The gun licence was issued to the civilian gun owners who were sanctioned by local 
government to bear their weapons. The policy was not carried out until the early 1900s, and then 
continued to be implemented during the Republican period. In 1913, after the failure of the 
Second Revolution, politics in Guagndong once again became quite complex because Chen 
Jiongming and Sun Yat-sen were pushed out of power by the Guangxi Clique army, which was 
allied with President Yuan Shikai, who was engaged in a political and military battle with Sun 
over the nature of the Republican regime in Beijing. In 1913, Long Jiguang, who was warlord of 
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the Guangxi Clique ruled most of Guangdong on behalf of Yuan Shikai until late 1917. When 
Long arrived in Guangdong, he carried out a massive campaign to stamp out Sun Yat-sen’s 
remnants. Fearing the armed civilians posting threat against his military government, Long 
reclaimed that “if anyone concealed the gun without obtaining licenses from government, they 
should be punished.”44 It is hard to measure how the policy was implemented. The control of gun 
in the chaotic period was extremely important to maintain the warlords’ prominent status.  
Some counties in Guangdong also enacted specific regulations towards private gun 
ownership. In 1922, the Taishan County of Guangdong established a law, requiring “(1) All the 
armed individuals or groups, if not those police or soldiers, must obtain gun license; (2) To apply 
the license, one should submit their application in person in local police department. (3) The 
application should clearly identify the name, occupation, detailed description of guns, the 
quantities of bullets, and other necessary information. (4) The armed individuals are required to 
obtain a letter of endorsement from local gentry, who assure their guns are used for self-defense 
purpose only.”45 The new law also listed the price for licenses. It should be noted that the 
government made differences among the types of guns. For the advanced Mauser, Colt, and 
other foreign guns, the price is five yuan, while the outmoded guns deserved much less price for 
the license. Certainly, the government also required local police to keep close eyes to these 
licensed guns to avoid any lost.  
Long Jiguang’s Guangxi Clique did not rule long in Guangdong. In late 1917, his troops 
were again defeated by Sun yat-sen and his ally Chen Jiongming, who then established a 
                                                          
44 “Shenzhong Qiangxie 慎重槍械” (Be cautious about guns), Shengjing shibao, March 4, 1917.  
45 “Bugao Qiangzhi Lingzhao Zhangcheng 佈告槍支領照章程” (Anouncement on the gun 
licensing), Huaguo bao 華國報, January 15, 1922. 
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claiming to be the legitimate Republican government. The alliance between Sun and Chen 
Jiongming ended in 1922. After a military conflict between Sun and Chen, Chen was chased 
from Guagndong and fled to the eastern part of the province and was finally defeated in 1925. 
Thereafter, Sun used Guangdong as his headquarter of his North Expedition. In 1923, Sun Yat-
sen enacted a statute entitled ‘The Regulation on Civilian Weapons,” in which it identified the 
qualification of armed civilians and the procedure of license application. “The gun license is 
required for civilian gun holders in urban area. One must submit their name, home address, 
occupation, and other information on the guns to the government. A letter of endorsement by 
wealthy merchant is still required. As for the rural area, government recognizes the letter of 
endorsement from merchant is difficult to obtain. The letter could be sent from local gentry or 
other prominent individual in village.”46 All the licenses would be issued by Sun Yat-sen’s 
Republican government only.  
The mechanism of gun licensing changed from the late Qing to Republican period. The 
early Republican government required every single gun should be licensed, rather than one 
license for all, as late Qing government did. So called “one gun, one license,” the new policy 
aimed to make a difference between “legal” and “illegal” guns. When the police inspected guns, 
the license became the sole standard. The law also required that the license is required to transfer 
the ownership of guns. The mechanism indicated that the government acknowledged the 
popularity of guns in society, and also made the ownership of guns legal. When Chiang Kai-shek 
                                                          
46 “Dabenying Junzhengbu Hefa Renmin Qiangzhi Zhizhao Jianzhang 大本營軍政部核發人民
槍支執照簡章” (Regulations on gun registration to armed civilians), in Minguo Fagui Jicheng 
民國法規集成, ed. Cai Hongyuan, vol 3 (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1999), 240-41. “Guangzhi 
Qiangxie,” Shenbao, December 12, 1923.  
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unified China in 1928, the issuance of gun licenses turned out to be the typical way to manage 
civilian weapons.  
It should be noted that the early Republican government only required armed individuals 
to apply for gun licenses. Militia forces and merchants Corps, as discussed in the previous 
chapters, would not need licenses for every single weapon. As mentioned in the second chapter, 
one channel of the circulation of guns during the Republican period was the transference from 
the sanctioned militias to outlaws or other demanded individuals. Therefore, the policy which 
aimed exclusively at the individual guns also generated some social programs. It failed to resolve 
the problem that some militia member might sell their weapons to bandits or other outlaws. The 
government was not unaware of this social problem. In 1925, Guangdong government issued the 
amendment to the “Statute of Civilians Weapons.”  
 First, the statute aims at stamping out illegal civilian weapons to maintain social order.” 
Second, the Ministry of Military of the Guangdong Government is responsible for 
regulating civilian weapons. 
Third, the Bureau of Police was the sole government organ to issue gun license in 
Guangdong. Local bureau of police should collect the materials from armed individuals and 
submitted them to the Ministry of Military, which will review their qualifications.  
Fourth, each single gun should have one license. For the cannon, the same policy applies. 
Fifth, applicants should also pay the license fee.  
Sixth, all the guns and other firearms, no matter they owned by individuals or by 
collective forces, should have licenses with them. Otherwise, the owner would be punished. The 
gun licensing policy also applies to the one who worked in government or military, but owned 
guns for individual use.47 
 The new policy clearly states that all the guns and cannons should be entitled to obtain 
licenses. Cannons were not typical weapons for individuals with defensive purposes. Only 
                                                          
47 “Huangqu Renmin Ziwei Qiangzhi Zhizhao zhi Bugao 換取人民自衛槍支執照之佈告” 
(Announcement on the gun licensing), Guangzhou minguo ribao, August 15, 1925. 
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militias, some villages, and commercial ship owned cannons for collective defense, while the 
guns were owned mostly by ordinary individuals. The new law also required that individuals 
who worked in government and military registered their personal weapons with local 
government. Letters of endorsement were required to get the gun licenses. The new policy 
indicated that the previous gun sealing practice gradually gave way to the gun licenses. The gun 
sealing proved ineffective to keep gun owners lawful. The guns with seals would be transferred 
or stolen. Local police could not make sure the holders of sealed guns were its lawful owners.  
 Nevertheless, the gun licensing policy also encountered many challenges when it was 
carried out in local society. The Sanshui County of Guangdong province, for example, wrote to 
Guangdong government in 1926, complaining that “after the new law was enacted, no one 
applied gun license in local government.”48 The County magistrate explained that “the new 
statute states that letter of endorsement from wealthy merchants or wealthy gentry are necessary 
to get a license. However, in some remote areas, there are few business exiting and armed 
civilians could not find one to write the letter. In the meantime, guns as tools for defense, had 
potential to kill others. Even if there were merchants and gentry in local village, few of them ran 
risk to write the letter.”49 
 After Guangdong government received the complaint, the Military Council made slight 
change on the law, and claimed that “As for the people living in remote region, if there is no 
wealthy merchant, every five armed individuals could organize as an entity to write the letter of 
endorsement on a mutual basis. The county magistrate should also sign on the letter to prove it is 
                                                          
48 Guangdong Provincial Archives, JL500-234-5487. 
49 Ibid. 
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appropriate.”50 It is clear that even if the law aiming at regulate civilian weapons and maintaining 
local order was enacted, the effectiveness of its implementation was highly doubtful. Given that 
many guns circulated in local society are those without gun licenses, people would not like to 
apply the licenses. In 1924, a newspaper editorial stated that people had a couple reasons that 
made them reluctant to apply the licenses. “First, it is difficult to get the letter of endorsement 
from either wealthy gentry, merchants, or their fellow gun owners. Second, to apply a license, 
they had to pay certain amount of money, which brings financial burden to peasants.”51 
 Besides the Guangdong province, the provinces in Manchuria also adopted a gun license 
policy. In the years of the early Republican period, the Fengtian government ordered that all the 
merchants and ordinary civilians apply for gun licenses and have their weapons registered with 
local government. Heilongjiang province also made more explicit regulation which were then 
distributed to local county governments in 1912. However, the provincial government discovered 
one year later that local county governments did not report how the policy was implemented. In 
1914, the provincial government in Harbin made another announcement, requiring them to 
“make sure all the civilian weapons, no matter newly purchased ones or outmoded. are carefully 
inspected by local county governments, which maintained the records and submit to provincial 
government.” In 1916, the Department of Police of Jilin Province sent an order to all the 
policemen in province. “Thereafter, all the policemen should inform the armed residents in their 
jurisdiction that all the weapons could not be lent out or transferred without government 
approval. Once an unlicensed gun is discovered, its owner had to have their guns sealed 
                                                          
50 “Diaocha Qiangzhi 調查槍支” (Investigaing Civilians’ guns), Guangzhou minguo ribao, 
August 15, 1925. 
51 “Yanjin Sijie Qiangpiao 嚴禁私借槍票” (To ban the transfer of gun liences), Shengjing 
shibao, November 8, 1914.   
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immediately. Otherwise the owner would be punished, and his weapon will be confiscated.” 
Based on these order issued from provincial government, it is safe to make a judgment that the 
gun control policy was not carried out effectively. Unlike Guangdong, where the policy of gun 
licensing was implemented as early as 1910s, many regions like Manchuria did not adopt such 
policy.  
 The policy of gun licenses was adopted nationwide starting from 1920s. The legal 
documents of the provinces in Manchuria in the early 1920s clearly exhibited the policy 
transition. In the early 1923, Jilin Province issued an order to local county governments again, 
stating that “the issue of gun was extremely important to the national security and social stability. 
For those merchants and ordinary civilians who plan to purchase guns for self-defense should 
apply gun licenses to local government.” 52From this statement, it can be speculated that in the 
early 1920s, the policy of gun sealing was replaced by gun licensing. After receiving the order, 
the Chamber of Commerce in Jilin Province forwarded this order to the Jilin merchants. The 
Chamber also provided convenient channel for merchants, who could send their application to 
the Chamber. The Chamber then collected all the documents, which would be reviewed by the 
provincial government. In the April of 1923, the Fengtian Police Department also issued a 
similar order like Jilin. Like Guangdong province, the provinces in Manchuria also realized that 
it was hard for ordinary peasants to get a letter of endorsement from local wealthy merchants and 
prominent gentry. Therefore, both Jilin and Fengtian provinces made an amendment, claiming 
that the gun owners could write the letter mutually.  
                                                          
52 “Ziweiqiang Yixu Lingzhao 自衛槍亦須領照” (License is required for self-defense guns), 
Shengjing shibao, January 16, 1924. 
  
215 
 
 Even though government of different levels issued gun control policies, namely the 
mechanism of gun licensing, the effectiveness of its implementation was highly doubtful. As 
suggested in many newspaper accounts, many peasants did not register their guns as required by 
local government. For example, in 1924, a military commander in Jilin admitted that “many 
merchants and other civilians prepared guns for self-defense, most of whom did not have their 
gun registered and did not obtain gun licenses. The local police set up some checkpoint in 
important regions to inspect if passing people have unregistered guns with them. Some gun 
owners counterfeited the gun licenses. Some bandits even shot policemen when encountering 
inspection.”53 The military commander once again reiterated that gun licensing was mandatory. 
For those armed people without licenses, the punishment was severe. Many accounts like this 
indicate that the prevalence of unlicensed guns also became a social problem, even if the policy 
was promulgated for years in Manchuria.  
Conclusion 
 
In March 1938, Chen Cheng, a senior general in the Nationalist Chinese military wrote to 
Chiang Kai-shek, expressing his deep concern over the popular movements in southwestern 
Shandong province. The confiscation of civilian-owned guns in Shandong, Chen argued, did 
more to provoke peasants’ anti-government outrage than any socio-economic cause. Chen 
attributed the peasant unrest to the policy of confiscating guns adopted by Han Fuju, the military 
governor of Shandong, who had been executed two months previously for disobeying central 
government orders. Starting in the early1930s, Han took the advice of Liang Shuming (梁漱溟 
                                                          
53 “Hufei Qiangsha Xunjing 胡匪槍殺巡警” (Bandits killed police with his gun), Shengtian 
Shibao, May 15, 1925. 
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1893-1988), a leading figure of the rural reconstruction movement, to collect private guns, which 
were then distributed to militia for collective defense.54 However, local residents were skeptical 
about the policy, fearing that they would lose their means of self-defense. To avoid escalating 
tension, Chiang quickly ordered Shandong authorities to return the guns and required them not to 
register any private weapons.55    
In was shown in the 1938 case that the gun policy that local government adopted was not 
consistent as expected. This chapter focuses more on the regulation policies from both national 
and provincial governments, which was not effectively implicated. The Nationalist government 
realized that civilian possession of guns subverted their authority over local areas, and enacted 
various mechanisms to regulate the private gun ownership and its circulation. The purpose was 
to put the gun in the hands of “good people” who were expected to protect themselves and 
defend their localities. Nevertheless, these central gun regulation efforts failed when regional 
power blocs undercut the central government’s power. Though both provincial and central 
governments adopted similar strategies to regulate armed people, a standard and unified policy 
was absent. As discussed in the beginning, in wartime, the government changed its policy for 
fear that restrictive control might provoke illegal gun owners to insurrection. This lax and 
inconsistent gun regulation policy, however, gave the Chinese Communist Party the opportunity 
to take advantage of these armed masses, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
                                                          
54 For Liang Shuming’s rural reconstruction movement, see Guy Alitto, The Last Confucian: 
Liang Shuming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986).  
55 Chen Cheng, Chen Cheng Xiansheng Shuxinji: yu Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng Wanglai 
Handian 陳誠先生書信集:與蔣中正先生往來函電 (Letters of Chen Cheng to Chiang Kai-
shek), vol. 1 (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007), 302.  
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~ CHAPTER  FIVE ~ 
“Political Power Grows out of the Barrel of a Gun”: 
The Mobilization of Armed Masses in the Communist Revolution 
 
Introduction 
 
In summer 1939 most Western countries were still at peace, while the flames of war had 
already raged in China for years. Two years before, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident sparked the 
eight-year long Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which inflamed Chinese nationalism against 
foreign aggression. After the Xi’an Incident of 1936 the Nationalists and Communist parties had 
put aside their domestic hostilities in a joint effort to stave off Japan. Known as the Second 
United Front, the alliance did not last long because both parties still competed for strategic 
advantage in “free China.”1 The alliance was in name only. Although the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) agreed to place its armies under Nationalist command, it never ceased to expand its 
independent military power in the provinces of North China. 
The CCP’s acts of noncompliance and other unsanctioned activities were frequently 
reported to Chiang Kai-shek, the generalissimo of the Nationalist Army. In 1939 Liao Lei (廖磊
1891-1939), the provincial governor of Anhui Province, wrote to Chiang, bitterly criticizing 
Communist general Peng Xuesong (彭雪楓 1907-1944) who, along with his army, confiscated 
people’s guns in the Jiangsu-Anhui border region.2 Peng’s cruel and surreptitious action, as 
                                                          
1 During the Second Sino-Japanese War the term “free China” referred to the regions of China 
not under the control of the Imperial Japanese Army or any of its puppet states. For a general 
introduction of the term, see Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 175.  
2 Academia Historica, 002-090300-00018-082, (May 25, 1939).  
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reported in Liao’s letter, was apparently in violation of Chiang’s command, who had repeatedly 
ordered local armies to not seize people’s armsregistered or not--during the war. Chiang was 
well aware of the CCP’s steady efforts to strengthen its military capabilities in the rural areas. 
His attempts to centralize military and political authority seemed futile. He merely ordered 
Peng’s commanding officer Ye Ting (葉挺 1896-1946), the army commander of the New Fourth 
Army, to admonish Peng.3 However, Chiang himself was clearly aware that his Nationalist 
government, now based in the southwest city of Chongqing, barely held direct control over the 
north, especially the rural areas where the CCP had been building its political legitimacy for 
years. Neither Nationalist nor Communist sources tell us whether Peng Xuefeng and his army 
were subject to any disciplinary punishment. Liao Lei also referred this issue to Zhang Yunyi (張
雲逸 1892-1974), the chief of staff of the New Fourth Army, expecting the Communists to 
respect the central command and not confiscate civilian weapons. However, Zhang deliberately 
ignored the request and ordered his subordinates to focus their attention on strengthening the 
army’s independent military presence.4  
The dispute between Liao and the Communists in Anhui Province was not an isolated 
episode. Military reports that condemned the CCP’s confiscation of people’s guns or mobilizing 
armed peasants to expand its own military power were consistently reported to the central 
government in Chongqing.5 However, Chongqing’s efforts to command the Communist-led 
                                                          
3 Academia Historica, 002-090300-00205-210, (June 20, 1939). 
4 Luo Yingping 羅永平 and Ceng Fuxian 曾傅先, Zhang Yunyi Dajiang 張雲逸大將 (General 
Zhang Yunyi) (Zhengzhou: Haiyan chubanshe, 1995), 143-44. 
5 Reports from provincial governors and military commanders about the CCP’s gun confiscation 
activities were sent to the central government in Chongqing. These documents are preserved at 
the Academia Historia under the category “Zhongzhong bufa zuixing種種不法罪行” (Several 
sorts of misdeeds). 
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armies seemed futile. Moreover, Chiang failed to predict the Communists’ effective efforts in 
utilizing the armed populace in their revolutionary agenda. Scattered as they were, these military 
reports to Chiang Kai-shek indicated some new elements of the CCP’s activities in wartime 
China. In these reports the CCP was accused of confiscating people’s guns for its own military 
use. Nevertheless, what Chiang had been told about the CCP’s activities was incomplete.  Gun  
confiscation was one of many policies that the Communists had adopted to cope with the armed 
populace in local society. Even Peng Xuefeng, who was blamed in these military reports for 
taking away the peasants’ guns, actively mobilized armed peasants and organized them into local 
militia forces, which was a distinctly different way of dealing with civilians’ guns.6 The strategic 
importance of an armed populace, and how the Communists utilized them in many instances but 
confiscated their weapons in other instances thus deserves further scholarly attention. 
In the late 1930s the Communists, who had just survived the epical Long March, were 
dedicated to building and consolidating the base areas. When the CCP enlarged its military and 
political influence in North China and established its grip in the provinces, including Shanxi, 
Gansu, Ningxia, Henan, Hebei, and Shandong, they encountered an already-militarized local 
                                                          
6 Peng Xuefeng, who organized guerrilla warfare in Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu revolutionary 
bases, believed that conducting guerrilla warfare was impossible without broad mass support. 
According to Peng, the Communists should mobilize people to join local militias that would 
coordinate the fight with Japan. See Peng Xuefeng, “Yuoji Zhanshu de Jige Jiban Zuozhan 
Yanze 遊擊戰術的幾個基本原則” (Some basic fighting principles in guerrilla tactics), in 
Kangzhan shiqi de Zhugou 抗戰時期的竹溝 (Zhugou during the Second Sino-Japanese War), 
ed. Zhonggong Zhumadian diwei dangshi ziliao zhengbian weiyuanhui 中共駐馬店地委黨史資
料整編委員會 (Compilation Committee for Historical Materials of the Zhumadian CCP) 
(Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1985), 33-53. 
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society that led to the proliferation of guns among the masses.7 Some wealthy landlords not only 
armed themselves with rifles but also organized community armed forces to protect their family 
and property. Ordinary peasants also sought to protect themselves against bandits with guns. The 
existence of an armed populace in North China offered the Communists the opportunity to bring 
armed civilians into and advance the Communist cause. For instance, in 1940 Mao Zedong was 
concerned with developing armed forces in Shandong Province. In his telegraph to the 115th 
Divisions of the Eighth Route Army, whose troops were already stationed in the province, Mao 
stated that he was pleased that the “civilians’ guns” were sufficient to support the development 
of the Communist force.8 For the CCP leaders, effective control of an armed peasantry was a 
prerequisite to strengthening the Communist military force and to consolidate its power in local 
society.  
The party endeavored to launch massive programs to mobilize the masses for their 
Communist revolution, an effort that has been the subject of numerous studies. Many research 
works have centered on questions such as what factors made Chinese peasants revolutionary and 
how the CCP won mass support. For instance, Mark Seldon’s seminal studies of Communist 
activities in Shaanxi and Steven Levine’s analysis of revolution in Manchuria demonstrate, 
                                                          
7 During the period from 1937 to 1945 the CCP established five major base areas: the Shaanxi-
Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, the Shanxi-Hebei-
Shandong-Henan Border Region, the Shanxi-Suiyuan Border Region, and the Shandong Base 
Area. For a general introduction of each border region see Feng Chongyi and David S. G. 
Goodman, “Introduction: Explaining Revolution,” in North China at War: The Social Ecology of 
Revolution, 1937-1945, eds. Feng Chongyi and David S. G. Goodman (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 1-24. 
8 Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi Kexueyuan 中國人民解放軍軍事科學院, ed. Mao 
Zedong Junshi Wenxuan 毛澤東軍事文選 (Selected military papers of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi chubanshe, 1981), 225.  
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though in different ways, that the CCP deployed its strength in organizational and mobilization 
skills through either social revolution or political action.9 The CCP’s efforts to form tactical 
coalitions with armed groups or secret societies, such as the Red Spears, have also been deeply 
analyzed.10 However, previous studies of the CCP’s mobilization efforts have rarely taken the 
party’s gun policies seriously because historians assume that armed people automatically 
belonged to either militia forces, bandit groups, or other armed local groups. These studies place 
the complicated nexus bewteen the Communists and armed groups at the center of their inquiry, 
but overlook those armed individuals who had no affiliations to any groups. Thus the study of 
how the CCP co-opted militia forces, local militarists, or bandit groups is not sufficient to draw a 
complete picture of the party’s policies for coping with an armed populace. Many ordinary 
Chinese men and women of different class backgrounds owned guns, and the party sought ways 
to accept that reality and turned it to its advantage. 
The important role of privately owned weapons in the party’s revolutionary cause has not 
been taken into account. Building on the existing scholarship on the CCP’s revolutionary 
enterprise in the 1930s and 1940s, my research goes further, exploring how the CCP dealt with 
armed individuals in a fragmented and militarized society. This chapter makes three arguments. 
First, the CCP made the mobilization of an armed populace part of its mass line policy to fulfill 
its revolutionary agenda. Second, the implementation of the CCP’s gun policies at the local level 
                                                          
9 See Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China; Steven Levine, Anvil of Victory: 
The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1987). 
10 Elizabeth Perry argues that the CCP’s policies toward local armed groups were contingent. 
The CCP first formed alliances with local groups. Once the Communists gained the upper hand, 
they moved from a policy of rapprochement to confrontation. See Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and 
Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 208-47. 
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was tied to its overall mobilization tactics, adopting varied stances toward gun owners in term of 
their class division and social status. The CCP’s clear distinction between what historian Odoric 
Y.K. Wou defines as core and peripheral groups in mobilizing the masses loomed large in its gun 
policies.11 Finally, the CCP’s gun policies were designed only in part to arm the masses, as they 
did routinely by recruiting peasants into the army or Communist-affiliated militia forces. Rather, 
they were about dealing with a preexisting pattern of personal gun ownership. Their practice 
aimed to bring these previously armed civilians into the revolutionary cause. Based mostly on 
party archive documents and local historical materials, this chapter first attempts to answer the 
question of why the mobilization of armed civilians was inevitable in the CCP’s revolutionary 
cause. It then follows the strategies and tectics that the CCP adopted in mobilizing an armed 
populace in North China.   
Overview of the Communist Mobilization in North China 
 
Our central task at present is to mobilize the broad masses to take part in the 
revolutionary war, overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang by means of such 
war, spread the revolution throughout the country, and drive imperialism out of 
China. Anyone who does not attach enough importance to this central task is not a 
good revolutionary cadre. If our comrades really comprehend this task and 
understand that the revolution must at all costs be spread throughout the country, 
then they should in no way neglect or underestimate the question of the 
immediate interests, the well-being, of the broad masses. For the revolutionary 
war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and 
relying on them. (Mao Zedong, “Be Concerned with the Well-being of the 
Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work,” 1934) 12 
 
                                                          
11 Odoric Y.K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan, 18. 
12 Mao Zedong, “Be Concerned with the Well-being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of 
Work,” Selected Work of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. 1 (Elmsford: Pergamon Press, 1965), 147. 
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When Mao Zedong gave this famous address in January 1934 in which he called for the 
mobilization of the masses against imperialism and its domestic rival, the Chinese Communist 
Party was about to be wiped out in the Jiangxi Soviet Base by Chiang Kai-shek’s Fifth 
Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign. A few months later the Communists were compelled 
to abandon Jiangxi Soviet, and then embarked on the legendary Long March to Northwest China, 
where the Communist Revolution ensured its survival.13 The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War 
and the Xi’an Incident of 1936 saved the Communists from being eradicated and offered them a 
breathing spell to expand. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the party, now headquartered in 
Yenan 延安, stretched its political influence across North China and some base areas in the 
southern provinces. When the Japanese surrendered in 1945 the CCP became a considerable 
military and political power that could not be underestimated by the Nationalist government. It 
was already in a position to fight Chiang Kai-shek’s armies in the civil war that ensued.14  
One of the contributing explanations for the CCP’s stunning victory lies in its effective 
mobilization of the masses during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Mao Zedong’s address in 
1934 calling for the mobilization of the broad masses proved vital in the expansion of 
Communist power during the Second Sino-Japanese War. When the Communists steadily 
expanded their revolutionary bases in the north, they encountered a highly militarized and 
fragmented society. The decentralization of political power and widespread local militarization 
had led to a proliferation of firearms in the rural areas. In addition to bandit groups and 
                                                          
13 For the origins and influence of the Long March see Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to 
Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March (Boulder: Westview Press, 1900).  
14 For a general introduction on the activities of the CCP in wartime China see Lyman P. Van 
Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945,” in The 
Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949, ed. Lloyd E. Eastman (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991),177-290. 
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community-based forces, landlords and peasants armed with modern firearms also became the 
CCP’s major target for mobilization. This section argues that the mobilization of the armed 
populace was an integral part of the CCP’s revolutionary project in North China. In order to 
understand how the CCP survived in the militarized society and enlisted armed civilians in its 
revolutionary cause, it is necessary to first look at the new political situations in which 
Communist cadres exercised their mobilization skills. An overview of the CCP’s mobilization 
tactics and strategies then follows, which is necessary because these strategies were thoroughly 
adopted when the Communist cadres actively mobilized individuals and groups equipped with 
guns.  
The Political Turmoil and Prevalence of Guns in Northern China 
In order to understand how the CCP seized the opportunity to form an alliance with the 
armed populace in North China, it is necessary to first look at the social and political situation. 
Generally speaking, the regions in which the Communists were extraordinary active were mainly 
rural societies over which the Nationalist government and the Japanese had limited control. For 
example, Henan Province, which had suffered from constant warfare and banditry since the 
1920s, witnessed the increasing militarization of the local society.15 During wartime the 
                                                          
15 According to Phil Billingsley’s investigation, Henan Province had the highest number of 
bandits in Republican-period China. The province was transformed into a “cradle of banditry.” 
See Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China, 40-70. Sociologist He Xiya also estimates 
that the total number of bandits in Henan may have reached 51,100 by 1924. See He Xiya, 
Zhongguo daofei wenti zhi. Henan Province suffered from constant military conflicts during the 
warlord period. As discussed in the introduction chapter, Henan in the 1920s became a hotly 
contested area among warlords who competed to exercise their control of the province. Local 
elite or predatory warlords organized militia forces, which also transformed the power structure 
in the local society and accelerated local militarization. For social transformation in Henan see 
Xin Zhang, Social Transformation in Modern China. 
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Nationalist government loosened its hold on the province, which gave the Japanese and the CCP 
opportunities to strengthen their presence.16 While the Japanese mainly controlled the urban 
centers and major transportation lines, the CCP’s expansion occurred primarily behind the 
Japanese.  
A similar situation happened in other northern provinces as well, where previous 
warlords still preserved their power. This prevented the penetration of the central government’s 
authority. With the completion of the North Expedition in 1928, Chiang Kai-shek and his 
Nanjing government aimed to claim central authority over the northern provinces as one crucial 
part of his state-building program. However, Chiang’s national unification campaign was 
completed through a collaboration with warlords in the north, who retained their political power 
in Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan.17 Even within these provinces the peirod of warlordism 
had left a legacy in which the local society was controlled by regional military commanders, 
whose power was secured by their ability to organize military forces.18 
The Japanese invasion and the escape of the Nationalist government and some local elites 
altered the political landscape in the rural areas of North China, leaving a significant power 
                                                          
16 After the outbreak of the Macro Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 the Nationalist army failed to 
stem the advance the Japanese invasion, which resulted in a Nationalist strategic retreat to the 
south. See Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-
1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1991). 
17 Most of the military commanders joined the Nationalist Party and were appointed as chairmen 
of respective provinces. Han Fuqu served as the chairman of Shandong before 1938. Yan Xishan 
controlled all of Shanxi Province until 1949. For Han Fuqu’s activity in Shandong see Sherman 
Xiaogang Lai, A Springboard to Victory: Shandong Province and Chinese Communist Military 
and Financial Strength, 1937-1945 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 1-23.  
18 James Sheridan asserts that the military commanders survived after the Northern Expedition 
and held sway over large parts of each province. See James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The 
Career of Feng Yu-hsiang (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), 14-6.   
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vacuum. The weakness of the central government became worse after the outbreak of the Marco 
Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. In Hebei Province the defeat of the Nationalist 29th Army in 1937 
made Song Zheyuan (宋哲元 1885-1940), a former warlord who controlled the province, lose 
his political prominence in the region. The Japanese Imperial Army then quickly occupied Hebei 
and Chahar. Han Fuqu, the chairman of the Shandong provincial government, was arrested and 
executed in early 1938, leaving a governmental vacuum in the province. The situation in Henan 
was much more complex. The central government never practiced direct control over the entire 
province. Government and regional military commanders shared their political interests to 
manage local affairs. After the outbreak of the war with Japan the Nationalist armies, which 
failed to stem the Japanese advance, retreated southward. From late 1938 the Japanese controlled 
all of eastern Henan Province.19  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 For the political situation in North China in the 1930s see Marjorie Dryburgh, North China 
and Japanese Expansion, 1933-1937: Regional Power and the National Interest (London: 
Routledge, 2004).  
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Figure 10. The Political Situation in Wartime China. “Sino-US Relations during World War II,” 
accessed July 12, 2017, http://sino-american-relations.weebly.com/home/sino-us-relations-
during-world-war-ii. 
After China’s failure in 1937 major Nationalist armies in the north were ordered to retreat 
to the south, which also weakened the government presence in the northern provinces. As 
Communist general Zhu De (朱德 1886-1959) commented in 1937, “the remaining Nationalist 
troops lacked the capability to coordinate the fight with the Japanese. The fighting plan created 
by the central government was not carried out effectively.”20 In the meantime, the Japanese did 
not stop their military advance in the north, sweeping through major cities in Hebei, Shandong, 
and Henan provinces and controlling the main lines of transportation. In many instances officials 
of local governments retreated to interior sites to escape the Japanese invasion. Many landlords 
and local elites also fled from the Japanese-occupied areas. Behind these areas the Communists 
were dedicated to expanding their sphere of influence in the rural areas. They gradually 
organized local governments and put their political authority into practice. 
                                                          
20 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文獻研究室, Wenxian he Yanjiu 文獻與
研究 (Documents and Research) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988), 236. 
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In additional to the weak central power and Japanese invasion, northern provinces 
witnessed rural militarization in the early twentieth century. Most northern provinces had a long 
tradition of forming collective armed forces, such as the famous Red Spear.21 The collapse of 
Nationalist regime and the Japanese occupation accelerated the process of local militarization. In 
the late 1930s this culture of collective violence continued to play a role in most rural 
communities. Local gentry, bandits, and militarists all organized armed forces based on their 
community. Some defeated Nationalist military commanders carved out territorial bases for 
themselves in these localities. A number of landlords purchased weapons and organized their 
independent force to protect their families and communities. These forces existed in a variety of 
forms. Some armed forces had a collective-defense nature. For example, in Henan Province 
wealthy local gentry organized “house-watching aquads” (护院团), “village pacts” (联庄会), 
and “joint defense squads” (联防队).22 These local gentry had channels to acquire better 
weapons. In many regions the gentry brought these armed forces together and formed joint 
defense battalions.  
As mentioned in the introduction, influenced by these local elites the ordinary peasants 
also obtained weapons for self-defense purposes. The prevalence of private gun ownership in 
Henan had been grasped by local Communist cadres, who conductd social surveys to determine 
the possible ways in which these guns could be mobilized (the CCP’s social survey is discussed 
later in this chapter). The northern provinces had similar reasons for the prevalence of guns. 
                                                          
21 The Red Spear Society was organized by peasants in the early 1920s for defense against 
bandits. The society quickly spread throughout the northern provinces. Elizabeth Perry argues 
that the Red Spear reflected local peasants’ protective strategy for survival. See Perry, Rebels 
and Revolutionaries, 81-88.  
22
 See Odoric Y.K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses, 177-80. 
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First, Shandong, Henan, Hebei, and other northern provinces were traditional areas known for 
their frequent banditry.23 In the shadow of bandit activities, peasants and landlords took up guns 
for self-defense. Second, these provinces also suffered from chronic warfare in the 1920s. 
Military weapons fell into the hands of either bandits or ordinary peasants.  
 To sum up, when the Communists entered the northern provinces, the party encountered 
a completely different social and political situation in which various political entities, including 
Nationalist rampant soldiers, bandits, local armed forces, and Japanese invaders, coexisted in 
these provinces. The local society was increasingly militarized. The weak governmental presence 
in the northern provinces meant that large numbers of guns owned by peasants or landlords had 
not been regulated or detected by the Nationalist government. This new situation provided the 
Communists with an opportunity to expand their influence, in which the organization of armed 
civilians served as one integral part of its overall revolutioanry agenda. 
Mobilization Tactics 
The idea of a mass line (群眾路線 qunzhong luxian) strategy proved crucial to the CCP’s 
dramatic development. Behind enemy lines, the Communists were making every effort to launch 
a social revolution at the grassroots level through which the masses of the rural sectors would be 
mobilized. In so doing, the CCP was able to claim political legitimacy and succeeded in gaining 
people’s support in anti-Japanese activities and the Communist expansion. Historical research on 
the CCP’s mobilization strategies has been abundant. Historians have provided a set of 
                                                          
23 See Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China, 28-39. 
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interpretive frameworks, asserting variously that the commitment to nationalism, socioeconomic 
policies, organizational control, and democratic management have played vital roles.24  
 Much of the scholarship directed at the CCP’s grassroots effort inevitably touches on 
two issues: how to gain popular support, and how to get masses involved. In the first place, the 
CCP modified its radical policies during the Jiangxi Soviet period, when all landlords and gentry 
were shorn of most political and economic rights, by making a number of moderate moves. 
Under what Mark Selden has termed the “Yenan way,” attempts were steadily made to secure 
peasants’ economic status.25 In the base areas the party halted the radical policy of land 
confiscation as they did in Jiangxi, and rapidly promoted a program of rents, taxes, and interest 
reduction. Popular support also stemmed from peasants’ awareness of political consciousness. 
Mao Zedong ordered the establishment of representative assemblies in base areas and devised 
the “three-thirds systems,” which not only aimed to win the adherence of nonparty elites but also 
to facilitate the political participation of poor peasants in local communities.26 In many regions 
peasants who had previously exercised no rights were elected to serve as village heads or 
representatives to the CCP National Congress.27 In so doing, the role of the gentry was shattered 
                                                          
24 The CCP’s mobilization efforts have been interpreted either as a hegemonizing process or as 
people’s voluntary participation. For a historiographical review see Pauline Keating, “Getting 
Peasants Organized: Village Organizations and the Party-State in the Shaan Gan Ning Border 
Region, 1934-1945,” in North China at War: The Social Ecology of Revolution, 1937-1945, 26. 
25 Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. 
26 Mao Zedong devised a three-thirds system in a united government in the Communist 
Revolutionary bases. In accordance with the united front principle, the allocation of seats in the 
local government organ was to be one-third communist cadres, one-third non-CCP left 
progressive elements, and one-third intermediate sections who were neither left nor right. See 
Xiaowei Zang, Elite Dualism and Leadership Section in China (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
39. 
27 See Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China, 384.  
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in the traditional power structure. In wartime China the “mass line” strategy became one 
cornerstone of Communist ideology in building a reciprocal relationship between the CCP and 
the general public. 
Despite the fact that the party agreed to form a united front with traditional elites and 
advocated a series of moderate social policies for the sake of the anti-Japanese war, it did not 
abandon the class struggle to fulfill its revolutionary goals. In practice, priority was given to 
mobilizing the poor peasantry against local despots and landlords. Communist cadres made the 
peasants organize numerous peasants association, a crucial step in taking part in local affairs and 
challenging village elites. Communist work teams provided educational sessions to ensure that 
the peasants would be protected if they took action against the elites, and to indoctrinate the 
masses about Communist ideology. As Elizabeth Perry has demonstrated, the CCP proved adept 
at using emotion to excite peasants’ hatred of their class enemies.28 The public forums for 
“speaking bitterness” (诉苦 suku) or “criticism and self-criticism” (批評與自我批評 piping yu 
two piping), for example, were frequently organized by local Communist cadres. To resolve the 
problem of peasants’ unresponsiveness to the program against their previous masters, as Chen 
Yung-fa vividly puts it, struggle-meetings involving landlords and their “neighbors, relatives, 
and bystanders in quarrels” were held to provoke peasants into openly expressing their anger 
against the traditional elite, through which the preexisting solidarity in the local communities had 
been disrupted.29 
                                                          
28 Elizabeth Perry, “Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution,” 
Mobilization: An International Quarterly 7 (2002): 111-28. 
29 Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution:  The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 
1937-1945, 220. 
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Paralleling the effort to polarize the masses and traditional rural elite, the party devoted 
considerable attention to ensuring the political compliance of the popular armed forces. During 
the first half of the twentieth century, privately organized forces had sprung up in North China 
due to social and political turbulence. The growth of banditry and the Japanese invasion made it 
necessary for the local communities to create these defense forces, which generally took the form 
of self-defense corps (自衛隊 ziwei dui) and militia (民兵 minbing), though they varied in their 
names and organizational structure.30 The party envisioned these spontaneous armed forces not 
only as auxiliary forces to assist the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, but also as 
one major vehicle for mobilizing the masses into the Communist movement. Immediately after 
the Second United Front was established in 1937 the CCP Central Committee issued the 
Instruction of Organizing Local Work in Wartime, in which local Communist cadres were 
ordered to utilize and organize “any forms of traditional armed forces, including militia, peace 
preservation forces (保安隊 baoandui), able-bodied forces (壯丁隊 zhuangdingdui), and 
volunteer army (義勇軍 yiyongjun),” and to try “by all means to play a guiding role in these 
forces.”31 A few months later another order was made to “train and assist popular forces in all 
aspects to improve their political awareness and military skills.”32  
                                                          
30 According to Chinese historian Wei Hongyun, local anti-Japanese forces can be categorized 
into two forces: the Self-defense Corps and the militia. The major difference is that the former 
recruited any individual between sixteen and fifty-five years old, while the militiamen were 
selected among the Song. See Wei Hongyun, “Social Reform and Value Change in the Jin Cha Ji 
Anti-Japanese Border Region,” in North China at War: The Social Ecology of Revolution, 99.  
31 Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中央檔案館, ed. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji 中共中央
文件選編 (Selection of documents of the central committee of the CCP), Vol. 11 (Beijing: 
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2004), 319. 
32 Ibid., 483. 
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The importance of various militia forces was always highlighted in both the battles with 
the Japanese and in the revolutionary enterprise. In 1937 Liu Bocheng (劉伯承 1892-1986) used 
a metaphor to describe the importance of militia forces, stating that “a regular troop is the bone, a 
guerrilla is a tendon, and the militia is muscle.” An effective military campaign was produced by 
coordination among these three groups.33 Under orders from the Central Committee, local 
Communist cadres always highlighted the role of militia forces in their fight against enemies.34 
As Odoric Y.K. Wou’s research suggests, the important roles of militia forces lay first in their 
familiarity with the local conditions, and second, in their lower level of vulnerability to enemy 
attack because they “formed small targets.”35 To encourage people’s participation in militia 
forces, local Communist cadres held educational meetings that led the people to believe they 
were fighting for themselves。  
It is clear from the above discussion that the Communist revolution was composed of 
both a social revolution and military campaign. The strategies that the CCP adopted to involve 
the masses also applied to the armed population. When the Communists arrived in North China, 
what awaited them was a highly-militarized society. The frequent military conflicts led to a 
proliferation of weapons among civilians. Banditry and increasing social chaos made many 
people arm themselves with guns to defend their communities. The CCP’s activities in 
mobilizing an armed populace was one integral party of their mobilization activities. It turns out 
                                                          
33 Liu Bocheng, Liu Bocheng Junshi Wenxuan劉伯承軍事文選 (Selections of the Military 
Documents of Liu Bocheng) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1992), 62.   
34 One example was Peng Xuefeng, who always emphasized the role of militia forces in the war 
against the Japanese. See Lü Jingzhi 呂敬之, “Henansheng Zhan Shi Sunshi Diaocha Baogao 河
南省戰時損失調查報告” (Investigation on the war damage in Henan Province). Minguo 
Dangan 民國檔案 (Republican Archives), no.4 (1990): 24-45.  
35 Odoric Y.K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan, 230. 
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that the strategies and tactics that the CCP adopted to embrace the masses were applicable to its 
activities towards the armed masses. For the CCP, an armed populace was crucial in the war, 
because in many cases these people’s arms provided the party with weapons, particularly the 
Communist forces that encountered a shortage of arms. Another strategic importance of the 
armed masses lay in the prospect that these masses could function in the revolution because they 
were empowered by gun ownership. The next two sections consider how these two reasons 
integrated together led to the mobilization of the armed masses. 
The Problem of Weapons 
 
The lack of weapons was a consistently major concern of the CCP before the end of 
1945, when the Soviets turned over the weapons of defeated Japanese armies in Manchuria to the 
Communists.36 As the Red Army waged a guerrilla war in the Jiangxi Soviet region in the early 
1930s the soldiers armed them with primitive equipment, including traditional bird guns, spears, 
and swords, while modern rifles or pistols were scarce.37 Despite the fact that the Red Army, led 
by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, survived in Jiangxi and maintained some small arsenals, it was 
                                                          
36 Michael Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United State (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 110-11. 
37 Jiangxisheng Dang’anguan 江西省檔案館, ed. “Difang Wuzhuang de Zuzhi Bianzhi he Junshi 
Xunlian Jueyian 地方武裝的組織編制和軍事訓練決議案” (The resolution on the organization 
and military training of the local armed forces), in Zhongyang geming genjudi shiliao xuanbian 
中央革命根據地史料選編 (Selections of documents of the Central Revolutionary Base), Vol 2 
(Nanchang: Jiangxi renminchubanshe, 1982), 563-65. 
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unable to supply sufficient weapons to all of its soldiers.38 Shao Shiping (邵式平 1900-1965), 
the commander of the independent regiment of the Red Army, offers a firsthand account of how 
invaluable the guns were. In the early 1930s Shao was optimistic about the army’s active 
recruitment of soldiers but was worried about the shortage of firearms. This was reflected in a 
popular saying in the army, “There were far more people than guns, and the bullets fared far 
worse.”39 Shao’s regiment made every effort to secure their logistics supply. He finally managed 
to purchase two foreign guns, one Browning and one Colt, from a nearby city at an exorbitant 
price, though only the Browning pistol came with bullets. A few days later both pistols had 
broken, but for several months Shao’s regiment was unable to find anyone to fix them. Even so, 
these nonworking guns functioned well in deterring local tyrants.40  
 Other memoirs by Red Army veterans provide moving accounts about the lack of 
weapons. In his memoir Liu Desheng (劉德勝), who had joined the army in 1930, recalled that 
no rifles or pistols were available to recruits until they succeeded in seizing enough enemy 
weapons.41 The heavy financial burden of the Red Army and the GMD military blockade 
                                                          
38 “Di Shiba Jituanjun Zongbu Jungongbu Yijiusiling Nian Gongzuo Zongjie 第十八集團軍總
部軍工部一九四零年工作總結” (Working summary of the Logistics Department of the 
Eighteenth Army in 1940), in Zhongguo Jindai Bingqi Gongye dangan Shiliao 中國近代兵器工
業檔案史料 (Historical documents on Chinese military industry), vol. 4 (Beijing: Bingqi gongye 
chubanshe, 1993), 21-23. 
39 Shao Shiping, Qiang de Gushi 槍的故事 (The Story of the Gun) (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 
1959), 1.  
40 Ibid., 2.  
41 Ibid., 6.  
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restrained the Communists from obtaining sufficient weapons.42 Before the Red Army settled in 
Yan’an in 1936 it depended strongly on confiscated guns from local bullies or defeated enemies. 
Edgar Snow, the author of Red Star Over China, observed in 1938 that: 
The Reds had a very limited output of armaments: their enemy was really their 
main source of supply. For years the Red had called the Kuomintang troops their 
“ammunition carriers,” and they claimed to capture more than 80 per cent of their 
guns and more than 70 per cent of their ammunition from enemy troops. The 
regular troops (as dstinct from local partisans) I saw were equipped mainly with 
British, Czechoslovakian, German, and American machine guns, rifles, automatic 
rifles, Mausers, and mountain cannon, such as had been sold in large quantities to 
the Nanking Government.43 
There did not appear to have been any significant improvement of the supply of weapons 
even after 1936, when the Nationalist government agreed to lift the arms embargo to the 
Communist troops. After the Xi’an incident both parties reached a military agreement under 
which the GMD promised to appropriate guns and ammunition. Zhu De (朱德 1886-1976), the 
commander in chief of the Red Army once noted that by 1940 the Nationalist government was 
providing a monthly aid of 680,000 yuan in fabi, along with eight million bullets.44 In the 
meantime, all divisions of the Eighth Route Army had constructed factories of varying scale that 
produced a wide range of weaponry, ranging from rifles and pistols to grenades and land 
mines.45 According to a CCP report dated February 10, 1941, the party’s largest military facility 
in Shanxi at that time had a production capacity of 3,360 rifles per year. Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
42 As for the military supply from the Nationalist government to the CCP, see Maochun Yu, The 
Dragon’s War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China, 1937-1947 (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 2006).  
43 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China: The Classic Account of the Birth of Chinese Communism 
(New York: Grove Press, 1968), 260. 
44 Jiageng Chen, The Memoirs of Tan Kah-kee (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1994), 
239. 
45 Zhongguo Jindai Bingqi Gongye Dangan Shiliao, vol 4, 17.  
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Nationalist appropriation and self-production could hardly support an army of over 500,000. The 
CCP’s dependence on outside military aid became unstable in late 1938, and ultimately came to 
an end as the GMD-CCP United Front suffered an irreversible split in the New Fourth Army 
incident of 1941. The military facilities operating in the base areas were unable to provide 
sufficient arms for all soldiers. Other statistics show that the military factory of the 115th 
Division only produced 292 rifles in 1941.  
How did the Communist forces overcome the lack of weapons? With the increase in its 
military power after 1937, the military commanders explicitly encouraged their soldiers to do all 
they could to collect weapons abandoned or surrendered by the enemy from battlefields, just as 
they did in Jiangxi and on the way to Yan’an.46 According to a military report, the Eighth Route 
Army seized 207,000 pistols and rifles, 1,106 machine guns, 16,800 pieces of ammunition, and 
many other weapons as it swept aside the Puppet Army in Shandong Province during the eight 
years of war.47 The source does not reveal how the Communists obtained these weapons from 
defeated soldiers. Given the frequent battles between the Eighth Route Army and the Puppet 
Army in Shandong, it was possible to capture a large amount of guns and ammunition. However, 
weapons from the defeated soldiers could not support all Communist troops. As mentioned 
above, the primitive arsenals were operated by local Communist branches. It was imperative for 
                                                          
46 “Di Shiba Jituanjun Zongbu Jungongbu Yijiusiling Nian Gongzuo Zongjie 第十八集團軍總
部軍工部一九四零年工作總結.” 
47 “Shandong Balujun Banian Kangzhan Zhanji Tongjibiao 山東八路軍八年抗戰戰績統計表,” 
in Shandong Kangri Genjudi 山東抗日根據地 (Anti-Japanese base in Shandong), ed. 
Zhonggong Shandong Shengwei Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Weiyuanhui 中共山東省委黨史資料
徵集研究委員會 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshiziliao chubanshe, 1989), 621.  
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the Communist forces, which had limited access to any outside sources, to secure other channels 
for procuring weapons.   
Arming and Disarming the Masses 
 
The current scholarly literature gives much attention to the CCP’s effort to gain the 
alliance of heterodox forces such as the armed bandits. As Phil Billingsley observes, the 
Communists adopted a pragmatic approach that allowed a coalition to be formed with bandits. In 
a community where bandits brought social chaos and had little public support, the CCP sought to 
suppress these groups to win respect from the peasants. In many other cases in which the bandits 
had close ties with their community, the party utilized both military and political means to gain 
adherence from the bandits. The establishment of military dominance over the bandit groups laid 
the foundation for the CCP to form an alliance with them.48  
What the current scholarship has overlooked is how the CCP dealt with a large number of 
armed individuals who had obtained guns in this era of consistent warfare and social unrest. 
Many strategies that were adopted to mobilize the masses also gained importance. Considerable 
efforts were made to make use of civilian weapons in the revolutionary campaign. As mentioned 
above, the CCP, now headquartered in Yen’an, was good at using class struggle to mobilize the 
ordiarmy peasants againt local elites or power holders. The makeup of the ordinary armed people 
in local society was highly varied in terms of their social class. The CCP adopted different 
strategies towards different armed people. To utilize the armed masses in its revolutionary cause, 
the party placed its gun policies in its overall rural mobilizatio pragrams. 
 
                                                          
48 Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China, 226-70. 
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Identifying Gun Owners in the Local Society 
The party devoted much attention to investigating the scale of private gun ownership in 
the local society. When the Communists arrived at a location, determining the degree of civilian 
gun ownership became one of their priorities. The investigation included the number of guns in 
the village, the political affiliation of local elites, and the places where people stored their 
weapons. The survey reports sent to Yan’an played an instrumental part in establishing 
mobilization strategies.  
In early 1940 Wei Gongzhi (危拱之 1908-1973), a female Communist cadre, conducted a 
detailed investigation in Western Henan Province. Her report provides some perspective on how 
local cadres viewed the importance of the armed populace in their activities. When Wei Gongzhi 
arrived in Henan she was shocked by the prevalence of guns in the local society. She was not 
able to determine how many guns were owned by ordinary individuals, but did estimate that the 
majority of guns were controlled by community-based armed forces, the number of which was 
impossible to estimate. Because some collective-defense forces were registered with the local 
government, she used these officially sanctioned forces to attest to the popularity of arms. For 
example, the visible militia forces in the thirteen counties of Nanyang city controlled at least 
130,000 rifles or guns. “More than 10,000 guns were owned in the counties like Xinyang 信陽, 
Runan 汝南, and Xiangcheng 襄城. Even the less militarized counties had 3,000 to 5,000 guns.” 
Wei listed the numbers of militia forces in these counties, as shown below.49 
 
                                                          
49 Wei Gongzhi, “Guanyu Yunan Wuzhuang Gongzuo Buchong Baogao 關於豫南武裝工作補
充報告,” 89. 
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County Number of Guns County Number of Guns 
Nanzhao 5,000 Tanghe 1,2000 
Neixiang 4,0000 Wuyang 8,000 
Yexian 9000 Zhenping 5,000 
Xichuan 5,000 Fangcheng 8,000 
Tongbai 5,000 Miyang 8,000 
Xinye 7,000 Dengxian 8,000 
Table 5. The Numbers of Milita Forces in Western Henan 
Wei Gongzhi believed that the actual number of guns owned by either militia forces or 
ordinary peasants went far beyond the numbers listed above since the majority of guns were not 
reported to the government. She concluded that the proliferation of modern firearms had already 
become part of Henan’s social ecology.  
 According to Wei, there were at least four sources for the masses to obtain guns. First, 
almost all the counties in Henan had locally- based arsenals that were operated by either the 
government or by landlords. Private manufacturers concealed their arsenals in rural villages. The 
landlords then sold their guns to individuals and groups. Second, the frequent military conflicts 
from the 1920s scattered a large number of guns throughout the local society. Third, bandit 
groups or secret societies controlled a large numbers of guns. “It was reported that some 
ambitious peasants seized the weapons from warlords’ armies.” 50  Fourth, most wealthy families 
                                                          
50 Ibid.  
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purchased advanced weapons from urban cities, where more-sophisticated guns could be 
obtained.  
 The types of guns owned by peasants or landlords varied. Wei Gongzhi was delighted 
that the quality of these privately owned guns was better than in other provinces. Roughly 40 
percent of these guns were forged locally in the primitive arsenals. She also acknowledged the 
fact that class differences were obvious among gun owners, since most peasants owned primitive 
arms while wealthy landlords carried better ones.  
Wei Gongzhi’s social survey was one example of many carried out by local cadres. 
According to Wei, these reports allowed the Communists to designate specific policies targeting 
armed individuals of different classes. Additionally, in many cases local Communist cadres 
conducted these social surveys before they initiated their mobilization activities. One newspaper 
report stressed the importance of conducting these social surveys before penetrating rural 
settlements. Communist cadres were aware that the village head who dominated local power was 
always reluctant to have their villagers’ guns confiscate or mobilized. The survey about the 
number of guns in the village was vital because it precluded the village head from concealing 
their weapons.  
The use of class in the control of guns 
As discussed above, one of the major tools that the CCP used in their mobilization efforts 
was the use of class distinction. In this way different policies were adopted that targeted people 
of different classes. The CCP’s ideology of mobilizing the peasants as its priority was applicable 
to its gun policies as well. As discussed above, peasants were always willing to collaborate with 
the party; the difficulty came with the local elites or landlords. In practice, the Communist cadres 
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took advantage of the collaborated poor peasants, who were ordered to persuade the landlords to 
surrender their arms. In her report to Yan’an, Wei Gongzhi reported one effective way of 
obtaining guns from landlords in which poor peasants played a major role. Wei noticed that 
many poor peasants owned no guns while the landlords possessed large numbers. Landlords 
normally hired local peasants to carry guns to protect their properties.51 It should be noted that 
these landlords were not powerful enough to organize community-based forces; they simply 
hired peasants to patrol their property at night. Local Communist cadres saw this as an 
opportunity, and encouraged poor peasants to work for landlords. Wei Gongzhi believed that 
once these peasants received the guns these weapons could be used by the party.  
Mass associations were widely organized and became an effective tool to penetrate into 
the local society. In South Hebei Province, for example, the CCP first instructed the mass 
associations about the importance of surrendering their guns and ordered these mass associations 
to force landlords to surrender their guns. Under these methods, the pressure was intense. In 
Xushui County of Hebei Province if rifle owners refused to surrender their guns to the party, the 
mass association would ask them to volunteer themselves. If the owners refused again, the 
association used another persuasive effort, such as by surrounding the landlord’s house and 
applying collective persuasion.  
Educational Meetings 
When the Communists arrived in Hebei, Shandong, and Henan provinces, they were well 
aware of the proliferation of arms among the ordinary rural population. To win the support of 
these armed civilian was not an easy task, given the complexity of the social categories of these 
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armed people. As mentioned above, the CCP adopted specific policies toward heterodox armed 
groups, who were either surrendered to the Communist army or suffered from bloody 
suppression if their resistance was resolute. However, like many other orthodox armed people, 
their stance could not be overly simplified. The Communists had two methods of dealing with 
these armed peasants. First, the party members encouraged these armed people to surrender their 
arms as a way of directly supporting the Communist military campaign. Second, if armed 
peasants were reluctant to surrender their weapons, the Communists aimed to organize them into 
militia forces. To fulfill these two targets local Communist cadres designed a series of 
educational programs to convey an ideology to the local peasants in which the Communists’ gun 
policy was justified.  
A propaganda program was always introduced. In many villages in Hebei and Henan, for 
example, Communist cadres organized the educational meeting. In the meeting the CCP 
demonstrated their strong military presence and justified their efforts to stamp out Japanese 
invasions or local bandits. In Ruxian County of Hebei Province, for example, local CCP troops 
cooperated with community forces to eliminate the bandits, thus promoting a different image of 
themselves as the protector of the citizens. In this way, local peasants welcomed the CCP and 
wanted to attend the educational meetings. In one meeting one leader of the CCP branch told the 
peasants that “it was the CCP troops who defended the country actively and protected the local 
community from bandits. Thus all the armies should be utilized in a proper force that fights for 
the people.” 52 
                                                          
52 “Gongfei Zenyang Shoujiao Minqiang 共匪怎樣收繳民槍” (How did the Communists collect 
civilians’ guns?), Wanbao 皖報, June 24, 1942. 
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To resolve the peasants’ worry that their rights of self-defense would be taken away, the 
cadre stated, “The people’s guns are owned by people. The purpose of owning a gun is 
absolutely to protect the people. Therefore the CCP respects and guarantees the people’s rights to 
arm themselves. However, to defend the people and their community effectively, we think they 
will exert the largest effect only if the CCP manages these weapons. The party will not 
confiscate their guns, but use considerable ways to utilize these weapons to make sure they play 
their role as expected.”  In Henan Province, for example, the CCP cadres actively conveyed to 
the people that their right to own a gun would be protected and that their weapons would be used 
to defend themselves.53 In these educational meetings the party rarely told the peasants that the 
party would confiscate their guns; rather, they told the peasants that weapons would be 
mobilized and organized in their community.  
Gun Registration 
To strengthen their control of guns, the Communists quickly enacted decrees that made 
the armed masses register their weapons. Gun registration was carried out as a common way to 
make sure the armed masses used their guns in the proper way. In his seminal work on the 
Communist movement in eastern and central China, Yung-fa Chen finds that the local 
Communist government “required all rifle owners, including communities as public owners, to 
register their weapons with the Hsiang government.”54 Local governments issued permits to gun 
owners, who had to prove that their use of the gun would be for self-defense. Such policies were 
                                                          
53 Qiao Jinou 喬金鷗, “Kangzhan Shiqi Zhonggong zai Lunxianqu de Kuochong Shouduan 抗戰
時期中共在淪陷區的擴充手段” (The CCP’s efforts to strengthen its power during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War), Gongdang Wenti Yanjiu 共黨問題研究 no.11 (1965): 69-76. 
54 Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 
1937-1945, 282. 
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effectively enforced only when the CCP consolidated their power in the region. However, the 
implementation of gun registration was determined by the power base of the party. When the 
party’s power was relatively weak in regions where either the Nationalist government or local 
elites dominated the local power structure, the party always tended to conceal unregistered guns. 
In Henan Province, for example, party cadres deliberately kept unregistered guns hidden from 
the Nationalist government. These guns would later be mobilized without being noticed by the 
government.55 
Confiscating Guns from the Armed Masses 
When the CCP cadres became aware of the degree of private gun ownership, the next 
step was to take advantage of these weapons. One of their purposes was to acquire the weapons 
when the CCP troops lacked military weapons. Their policies varied from place to place, and 
time to time. Besides educational meetings, in Western Henan Province, where the ownership of 
firearms was a community effort, the CCP first established a model in the village who agreed to 
surrender their weapons. The collective meeting was then held to encourage other villagers to 
surrender their weapons. However, not every peasant or landlord was willing to turn in their 
weapons. In such cases the CCP would use coercive means to force armed landlords to surrender 
their weapons. Local peasants were informed if the local gentry refused to surrender their 
weapons and received punishment; they were then more willing to cooperate with the party to 
avoid such coercive action.56 
                                                          
55 Wei Gongzhi, “Guanyu Yunan Wuzhuang Gongzuo Buchong Baogao 關於豫南武裝工作補
充報告,”100. 
56 “Shouqiang 收槍” (Collecting guns), Xinhua Zhoukan 新華週刊, 3, no.4 (1949): 19-20. 
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The local province also used “gun borrowing” to acquire guns from local peasants. If a 
local cadre discovered that some landlords had recently obtained new guns, they sometimes 
asked them to “borrow” their guns. However, the practice of borrowing was coercive. In Heze 
County of Shandong Province, one local Communist cadre wrote out a certificate regarding 
borrowing a gun from a landlord. It stated, “It has been heard that the landlord owns a pistol with 
five [pieces of] ammunition. To support the war against Japanese invasion, the Communist Party 
requests that you loan the gun to the local  Communist troops. We know you are open-minded 
and supportive; please be sure to surrender your weapons. Otherwise you will be arrested.”57 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter connects private gun ownership with the Communist movement in 1930s 
and 1940s China. It again proves the overall thesis of this dissertation, that any government 
entity’s policy toward armed civilians was contigent and dynamic. When the CCP arrived at 
northern China they encountered a highly militarized and fragmented society. This provided the 
CCP with both challenges and opportunities. While previous studies have focused exclusively on 
how armed groups, such as bandits, militia forces, or secret societies, were either suppressed or 
mobilized by the Communists, my research in this chapter places the ordinary armed civilian at 
the center of inquiry. As this chapter argues, the CCP deliberately adopted different approaches 
that targeted people of different classes in their mobilization work. Armed peasants were the first 
group that Communist cadres approached, who were then encouraged to assist the party in 
making landlords or the elite turn in their guns. The CCP’s policy towards armed civilians were 
thus a dynamic process, adopting different stances towards different social class.  
                                                          
57 “Gongfei Zenyang Shoujiao Minqiang 共匪怎樣收繳民槍” (How did the Communists collect 
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 Local Communist cadres either organized the armed civilians into guerrilla units or confiscated 
private guns for their military use. The mobilization of armed civilians in rural society played an 
important role in strengthening the CCP’s military power from 1937 to 1945.
  
248 
 
~ EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION ~ 
 
Disarming the People in the Early Years of the People’s Republic of China 
 
1949, the fourth year of the war between the KMT and the CCP, opened with brilliant 
victories for the CCP. Having liberated the entire northeast, most of the north, and central China 
through three major campaigns, in October, the Communist forces, which now numbered over 
five million, quickly drove Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces out of Mainland China. 
With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the new Communist regime launched 
a series of political campaigns and programs to consolidate political control and to buttress its 
legitimacy. Of the many forms of political culture created by the Communist government, the 
Monument to the People’s Heroes (人民英雄紀念碑, Renmin yingxiong jinianbei), on which 
eight reliefs were sculpted, was one of the most prominent. As historian Chang-tai Hung puts it, 
the reliefs which displayed most important historical events in modern China reflected the 
Chinese Communists’ attempts to use history to promote their prescribed political agenda, and to 
“monopolize collective memory.”1 The War of Resistance against Japan was carved on the 
western side of the monument, which depicted the contribution of the CCP-led ordinary people 
led by the CCP to victory. In the relief, the designer told a narrative scene of the Chinese 
peasants’ energetic participation in guerrilla warfare: peasants with their weapons in hand were 
ready to fight; an old woman gave her son a gun and persuaded him to kill enemies. The relief on 
the War of Resistance against Japan did not explicitly portray major battles that the CCP fought, 
                                                          
1 Chang-tai Hung, Mao’s New World, Political Culture in the Early People’s Republic (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011), 254. The eight reliefs include the Opium War, the Taiping 
Rebellion, the Revolution of 1911, the May Fourth Movement, the May Thirtieth Movement, the 
Nanchang Uprising, the War of Resistance against Japan, and the Yangzi Crossing by the Red 
Army. As Hung argues, the building of the Monument was a politically highly contested project. 
For the choice of historical events, see Hung, Mao’s New World, 235-256. 
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but placed the masses at center stage. As represented in the portrayal, the new Communist 
government particularly reinforced and glorified the active role of the armed masses, who took 
up their guns to join the revolutionary cause.  
Figure 11. Relief Sculpture, War of Resistance Against Japan on the Monument to the People’s 
Heroes. 
The relief on the monument that highlights the sacrifice of the armed peasants was in line 
with Party policy to mobilize the armed people in the Communist Revolution before 1949. As I 
analyzed in chapter five, the CCP saw the peasants with guns as a power to be reckoned within 
its revolutionary agenda in the rural base areas in North China. When the revolution entered the 
consolidation phase after 1949, the Communist government took the opposite stand, seeking to 
assert its monopoly on the use of guns. In Guangdong, for example, the local government 
collected over 500,000 guns or rifles by September 1953.2  In the early 1950s, mass movements 
and campaigns that were aimed to disarm the local populace could occur in almost any regions 
where gun ownership was prevalent during the turbulent Republican period. As one integral part 
                                                          
2 Dangdai Guangdong Yanjiuhui 當代廣東研究會, Dangdai Guangdong (當代廣東, 
Contemporary Guangdong) (Guangzhou, 1995), 45. 
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of the 1950-1953 campaign to “suppress counterrevolutionaries” (鎮壓反革命 zhenya 
fangeming), the government employed its administrative presence to penetrate into local society, 
and confiscate people’s guns regardless of the owners’ social status or intent to bear arms.3  
The tactics of mass mobilization developed in the revolutionary bases before 1949 had 
remained crucial in the movement of collecting civilians’ guns. Several memoirs of local 
Communist cadres provided rich information on the day-to-day workings of how the movement 
was being conducted in local society. In 1950, the local government of Yichun County 宜春縣 in 
Jiangxi province decided to collect people’s guns and dispatched work teams to towns and 
villages that were heavily affected by the proliferation of arms. The work team was usually 
comprised of a number of recently trained cadres and led by a “sent south cadre” (南下幹部 
nanxia ganbu).4 A newly recruited cadre named Wu Jitao 吳繼濤 was selected to join a team to 
confiscate privately-owned guns in Yichun’s Hengtang 橫塘 township, a turbulent region that 
was known for lineage feuding and violence. He recalled years later that their gun confiscation 
activities would not be possible without the involvement of the masses. When the work team 
                                                          
3 The campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries (1950-1953) was the first political campaign 
after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China to eradicate potential enemies. Those 
who were labeled as “counterrevolutionaries” were publicly denounced, many of whom were 
arrested and executed. According to Michael Dutton, the campaign “signaled the beginnings of a 
new tactic of socialist governance as military style campaigning was mimicked and redeployed 
in the realm of politics.” See Michael Dutton, “Passionately Governmental: Maoism and the 
Structured Intensities of Revolutionary Governmentality,” in China’s Governmentalities: 
Governing Change, Changing Government, ed. Elaine Jeffreys (London: Routledge, 2009), 30. 
4 It was common in the early 1950s that the Communists had to transfer cadres to the newly 
acquired regions. So called the “sent south cadres,” they were drawn from the areas already 
under CCP control to the southern provinces to oversee administration in line with the CCP 
ideology. These cadres were mostly from Shanxi and Shandong provinces. See Diana Lary, 
China’s Civil War: A Social History, 1945-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 192; James Z. Gao, The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou: The Transformation of City 
and Cadre, 1949-1954 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004), 42-68. 
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arrived in the town, their first step was to establish a “friendly relationship” with local poor 
peasants who were expected to provide more detailed information about gun ownership in the 
town. Wu and his colleagues were instructed to get acquainted with local peasants. To become 
highly interactive with the community, Wu helped one peasant with farm work for three 
consecutive days. The peasant ultimately agreed to tell the work team how many guns were 
floating in the town and who owned them. Through the mouth of collaborating peasants, Wu and 
other cadres became aware that the acquisition of guns was largely a community effort. In 
addition to the guns owned by bandits or local bullies, most individual guns were held by local 
elites, who were heads of either lineage or household registration groups (保 bao).  
Upon receiving the first-hand information, their next step was to collect these guns. The 
efforts to collect privately-owned guns were to be carried out with a company of well-equipped 
soldiers to avoid the armed resistance from gun owners, as the cadres in the work team were not 
armed with weapons.5 Certainly, the work team expected people to turn in their guns voluntarily. 
To induce people to give up their guns, the work team launched a series of programs of 
education and mobilization to involve the participation of all the peasants. As recalled by Wu, 
cadres went street to street, singing the song, “No new China without the Chinese Communist 
Party” (沒有共產黨就沒有新中國 meiyou gongchandang jiu meiyou xinzhongguo). Later, 
peasants were ordered to gather to learn the song, as a means to direct public feelings of loving 
the Party and the nation. In the educational meeting, the work team explained the current 
                                                          
5 In many cases, the work team held public events to encourage people to surrender their arms, 
while the PLA soldiers oversaw the process and confiscated guns directly. Some other sources 
suggest that local people did not approve of the gun collection movement, which spurred armed 
resistance. In this case, bloody suppression ensued. See Jeremy Brown, “From Resisting 
Communists to Resisting America: Civil War and Korean War in Southwest China, 1950-1951,” 
in Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China, ed. Jeremy Brown 
and Paul G. Pickowicz (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 105-129. 
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political situation to the peasants, and stressed that self-defense with guns was not necessary in 
the new China, as the Communist government possessed the capability to protect all the 
civilians.  
Another mobilization strategy was to organize the poor peasants to report local elites who 
were reluctant to surrender their guns. This echoed the policy adopted by the CCP in the rural 
bases before 1949 that linked class struggle with mass mobilization. Those landlords or elites 
who refused to turn in guns were publicly accused in the public struggle session (批鬥會 
pidouhui) in which poor peasants were encouraged to denounce their noncooperative landlords. 
Gradually, peasants were willing to cooperate with the work team. For example, a peasant 
reported a local bully to have a pistol concealed in his home. Under pressure, the bully was 
forced to surrender his weapon. A wide range of programs like this facilitated Wu Jitao and his 
colleagues to disarm the local people within one month and collected more than eighty guns in 
the town.6 
This scene, recalled by Wu Jitao, could be seen in many places in early 1950s China, 
when the Communist government attempted to achieve exclusive authority over the localities. In 
the urban areas, gun collection was carried out by local Public Security Bureau (公安局 gongan 
ju), which first ordered armed individuals and groups to register their guns, which provided local 
authorities detailed information about gun ownership. Educational programs and gun 
confiscation would ensue. In Xiamen 厦门, for example, a similar movement was launched in 
                                                          
6 Wu Jitao, “Daxiang shouqiang diyipao打響收槍第一炮” (Firing the first shot of the campaign 
of collecting guns), in Yichunshi wenshi ziliao 宜春市文史資料 (Historical materials on Henan) 
5 (1992): 9-12. 
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late 1949. Within three months, the city’s authorities collected 499 guns and 9804 ammunition.7 
As such, the campaign to disarm civilians to some extent reflected the politicization of social 
life.  
Paradoxically, before 1949, the Communists in rural bases had every intention of 
mobilizing the armed masses into the revolutionary project. As portrayed on the Monument to 
the People’s Heroes, peasants who joined the fighting front with their arms were commemorated 
as heroes. The new Communist government’s determination to disarm civilians, as Wu Jitao’s 
personal experience indicated, ran counter to the practices in the rural revolutionary bases. In this 
sense, the year 1949 marked a turning point of the CCP’s gun policy, shifting from less 
restrictive to resolute control. Like any other revolutionary movements, the Communist 
Revolution in China followed a dialectical process of expansion, consolidation, and 
centralization of power. In the expansive process, the power and energy possessed by the armed 
masses played an inevitable role in strengthening the CCP’s military presence, while in the 
consolidation phase, armed masses’ power became counterproductive and a threat to the new 
regime.8 This is especially evident when the Chinese Communists sought to establish political 
legitimacy in the early years of the P.R.C.  
The discontinuity in the CCP’s gun policies across the 1949 divide to some degree echoes 
the main argument of this dissertation: the state’s regulation and control over the armed civilians 
                                                          
7 Xiamen Zhengfazhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 廈門政法志編纂委員會, Xiamen Zhengfazhi 廈門
政法志 (Xiamen politics and law), vol. 2 (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe), 253-254. 
8 The term “dialectical process” comes from Phil Billingsley’s work on the CCP’s different 
policies towards Chinese bandits before and after the Communist Revolution. According to 
Billingsley, “in the consolidation or bureaucratic phase, especially after a Leninist-style putsch as 
the new revolutionary authorities seek to establish their legitimacy,” bandits’ energies are 
counterproductive. See Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China,265. 
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appeared as a contingent and dynamic process, which was determined by social and political 
situations. In 1949, China entered another phase of history. China not only recovered from one 
century-long period of constant military conflicts and imperialist invasions, but also witnessed 
the political decentralization came to an end. In contrast to the late Qing and Republican periods, 
the new state had the capability to assert its domination over society. An autocratic socialist 
system backed by military force facilitated the government to impose strict social control, in 
which the ban on gun ownership played a major part.9 Though the Communist government in the 
early 1950s shifted its previous position on private gun ownership, it does not mean no 
continuity could be traced across 1949. Cadres like Wu Jitao in Yixing County adopted a similar 
strategies like their predecessors in rural bases. They accorded high priority to the mobilization 
of the ordinary people in the movement, and took class struggles as the key in the programs of 
either mobilizing armed people or confiscating their guns.  
The movement to disarm local residents had not come to an end with the conclusion of 
the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries in 1953. Even ten years later, privately-held 
guns obtained during the chaotic Republican period could still be found in rural areas. Some 
landlords who managed to conceal their weapons in the early years of the P.R.C were later 
reported by other villagers in the early 1960s. Another gun collection movement started in 1962, 
as a component of the Rural Socialist Education Campaign initiated by Mao.10 In the suburbs of 
Beijing, for example, the total number of guns collected by police was 24, along with 4461 
                                                          
9 For the political system and political authority of the Communist government, see Zhengyuan 
Fu, Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
10 After the Great Famine (1958-1962), Mao launched the “Socialist Education Movement” to 
counter bureaucratization and to revitalize the practice of class struggle in society at large. For a 
detailed introduction of the movement, see Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History 
of the People’s Republic, Third Edition (New York: Free Press, 1999), 273-288. 
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bullets. The sources of these guns were listed in an internal document preserved in the Beijing 
Municipal Archives. Three guns were concealed by two former landlords and one former bao 
head; six guns were found in the houses previously owned by landlords, rich peasants, and 
counterrevolutionaries; six guns were surrendered by poor peasants who purchased arms before 
1949 to avenge local bullies; the last four guns were picked up by peasants in the field. Beijing 
Public Security Bureau then decided to display the guns and ammunitions in an exhibition that 
celebrated the success of the Rural Socialist Education Campaign. It should be noted that only 
the guns confiscated from “four bad types” were exhibited to the public, as the main purpose of 
the movement was to “reintroduce class struggle into local communities.”11 The government 
sought to use the guns owned by the class enemies to convince the general public how they 
suffered from oppression from the landlords in the past.12 The case in Beijing was one among 
many. Owing to the centralization of state power and stringent control measures, the state was 
able to retain the privately-owned guns in relatively low numbers after the founding of the 
People’s Republic.  
Private Gun Ownership in Contemporary China 
 
Unlike the Republican period, the majority of ordinary civilians in contemporary China 
are not obsessed with guns, and assault weapons are not omnipresent nationwide, as they are in 
the U.S. A report issued by the Small Arms Survey Research Group in 2007 estimated that the 
                                                          
11 R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History 
(Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2011), 348. 
12 Beijing shi gonganju 北京市公安局, “Guanyu zai nongcun shehuizhuyi jiaoyu yundongzhong 
jiaochu qiangzhi danyao qingkuang de baogao 關於農村社會主義教育運動中交出槍支、彈藥
情況的報告” (Report on the collecting guns and ammunitions in the Rural Socialist Education 
Movement), July 7, 1964, J2-7, Beijing Municipal Archives 北京市檔案館.  
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number of privately-owned firearms (both licit and illicit) might reach close to 40,000.000. Per 
one hundred people, China had only 4.9 firearms reported and ranked at No. 102 among 178 
countries. In the U.S., the number was 88.8 per one hundred people, and ranked at No.1.13 
Private gun ownership is less prevalent in contemporary China, which contributes to the low 
frequency of homicides and lethal violence. Owing to the strict gun control policy, many 
criminals find it difficult to obtain guns. For example, on December 14, 2012, a 36-year-old man 
from China’s Henan province barged into a local elementary school with a kitchen knife, 
stabbing twenty-two children, none of whom, fortunately, was fatally wounded. A similar violent 
incident also happened in America on the same day. Conversely, twenty-six people, including 
twenty children and six adult staff members were shot to death by a twenty-year-old man in the 
Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. As the deadliest mass shooting 
incident on school grounds in U.S. history, the horrific tragedy once again prompted fierce 
debate on private gun ownership and gun control measures among legislators and the general 
public. After the incident, Chinese media likewise drew a comparison between the two school 
attacks, and asserted the strictest firearm control policy of China prevented crimes from 
obtaining either guns or explosives. American Journalist James Fellow claimed that “that is the 
difference between a knife and a gun.”14  
The low rate of private gun ownership in contemporary China is a result of the strict gun 
control policy. In contrast to American gun law, which is designed to acknowledge the Second 
                                                          
13 Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, The Small Arms Survey 2007: 
Guns and the City (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39-72. 
14 James Fallows, “American Exceptionalism: The Shootings Will Go On,” The Atlantic, 
December 14, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/12/american-
exceptionalism-the-shootings-will-go-on/266293/. 
 
  
257 
 
Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear arms,” China begins with the premise of 
forbidding the possession of firearms.15 The Firearms Control Law which took effect in 1996 
prohibited any private possession of firearms with extremely few exceptions, and the maximum 
penalty for violation is death.16 The law defines the firearms as “various guns that are propelled 
by gunpowder or pressurized air, and that use tube-like equipment to shoot metal balls or other 
materials that are powerful enough to injure or kill people or render them unconscious.”17 The 
government deliberately uses a broad definition of guns to minimize any potential security 
threats. Even less aggressive air guns and replica guns are subject to the ban. For example, in 
early 2017, a Chinese woman, an operator of a fun-fair booth, was jailed for three-and-a-half 
years because she provided air guns to shoot balloons, though she was unaware the air guns were 
considered contraband under the law.18  According to the Firearms Control Law, three types of 
firearms, including sport-shooting guns, hunting rifles, and anesthetizing guns are permitted for 
civilian use. To obtain firearms, civilians must obtain licenses from local public security organs. 
However, the permission is on paper only, as the licenses are no longer issued to ordinary 
civilians. 
Gun control in China is both a social issue as well as a political issue. Initiated by the 
fourth-generation leadership headed by Hu Jintao 胡錦濤, China is constructing what it terms a 
                                                          
15 As for the origins of the American gun culture and gun control policies, see Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1994). 
16 Laney Zhang, “Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy: China,” Library of Congress, 
accessed August 15, 2017, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/china.php. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Alice Yan, “China’s Gun Laws Attacked After Woman Jailed for Using Air Rifles at Fun Fair 
Booth,” South China Morning Post, January 5, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/2059380/gun-laws-china-attacked-after-jailing-air-rifle-owner. 
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socialist “harmonious society,” with the purpose of achieving social rewards that would 
reconcile social tensions and satisfy the interests of the majority. The signature narrative of 
present Chinese leader Xi Jinping 習近平, the “China Dream” serves the same end essentially. 
No matter how political leaders inspire Chinese people with compelling and motivating slogans, 
their practices and policies have to usher in an era of social stability and unity. As the People’s 
Daily editorialized in 2005, the building of a harmonious society could not exist without public 
security and order.19 The existence of unregulated guns, in the eyes of the government, had the 
potential to jeopardize the safety of civilians, which requires immediate and resolute action.  
Despite the strict regulations, gun-involved crimes have been increasing in recent years 
and grabbed headlines of state-run newspapers quite often. One prominent case was that a fifty-
five-year-old man of Hebei’s Cangzhou city shot his fellow villagers unpredictably with a 
double-barreled hunting rifle in 2015, which resulted in two deaths and several serious injuries. 
The man then shot and killed two police officers when they tried to chase and arrest him. Hours 
later, Liu was found dead after he was trapped in his house. The perpetrator’s motive was not 
clear, but it was reported that he suffered from schizophrenia. The extraordinary act of violence 
immediately spurred intense public and media interest. The media reportage not only blamed the 
murderer and condoled the victims, but also marveled about how Liu with mental illness got hold 
of the assault weapon in a country where private gun ownership is strictly regulated.20 
                                                          
19 “Weihu Shehui Wending, Goujian Hexie Shehui, 維護社會穩定, 構建和諧社會” (Upholding 
social stability and constructing harmonious society), People’s Daily, May 24, 2005. 
20 “Hebei Cangzhou Suningxian Fsheng Teda Qiangjian 河北滄州肅寧縣發生特大槍擊案” 
(Shooting incident in Suning County of Hebei Province’s Cangzhou City), Lianhe Zaobao 聯合
早報, June 9, 2015, http://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20150609-489774. 
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The shooting incident, tragic and distressing as it was, is only one ordinary case among 
many gun-involved crimes that have been plaguing China’s public security and social order in 
recent years. As the case in Cangzhou shows, even an ordinary villager has easy access to a gun, 
which undoubtedly increases the risk of violence in local society. The death of two police 
officers also indicates that the government’s police, who are given legitimate right on the use of 
force, reluctantly find themselves difficult to maintain such monopoly. It seems that the Chinese 
government is very hesitant to disclose social evils (including gun crimes), which might indicate 
the governmental mismanagement. In contrast to these obscure official information, the social 
media has generated a broad set of reports surrounding the arms trafficking, illicit firearm 
manufacturer, and gun violence. In 2014, the police of Guiyang, the capital city of Guizhou 
province cracked down on a criminal gang and seized more than 10,000 guns, the largest number 
of confiscated weapons to date.21  While law-abiding people are hardly possible to obtain assault 
weapons under the existing control rules, an illicit production and trafficking network has been 
forming underground, which supply Chinese crime organizations and the general gun enthusiasts 
with the guns that could escape government surveillance, posing a new challenge to the state 
authority and social order.  
Though not prevalent in the whole Chinese population, the existence of a large number of 
illicit guns break the state’s zero tolerance stance on popular power and violence, which in turn 
prompted harsher and more brutalizing actions against illegal weapons. In the year of 2016, the 
Ministry of Public Security launched a nationwide program to confiscate guns and eradicate 
                                                          
21 “Guiyang Dixia Binggongchang Jiaoqiang 1.5 Wanzhi 貴陽地下兵工廠繳槍 1.5萬支” (The 
confiscation of 15,000 guns in a underground arsenal in Guiyang), Huanqiu wang 環球網, April 
16, 2014, http://mil.huanqiu.com/photo_china/2014-04/2732922_4.html. 
 
  
260 
 
underground gun market. According to the official statistics, local police departments 
confiscated approximately 178,000 guns, 638,000 replicas, 3,9000 tons of explosives, 7.77 
million detonators, and 4.75 million bullets within four months.22 Many circulation mechanisms 
resemble that of the ones during the Republican period. The ban on gun ownership and 
circulation creates flourished black market where guns were manufactured and trafficked. In the 
cyber age, gun consumers, manufactures, and intermediaries are connected online, which also 
facilitated the underground transaction.23 
The increase in gun crime in recent years seems to confirm the causal relationship 
between owning weaponry and criminal violence. Based on the existing criminal cases revealed 
by the government and press, the private weapons owners are predominantly comprised of gang 
members and individuals acquiring guns to commit crime. Illicit gun ownership can hardly be 
viewed as an isolated crime. Rather, arms trafficking, human trafficking, drug trade, and other 
offensive crimes are intrinsically related and it is impossible to separate them. The acquisition of 
guns is often crucial in committing crimes. A prison officer in Shanghai has conducted a 
scrupulous survey on gun-involved crimes of the city based on the interviews with the police 
officers and criminals. According to this 2013 study, among the inmates who were arrested for 
the gun-involved crimes, 63.2 percent have previously engaged in drug trafficking, illicit 
                                                          
22 James T. Areddy, “Staring Down the Barrel: The Rise of Guns in China,” The Wall Street 
Journal, October 14, 2008, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122394012224530655. 
23 In 2012, a Chinese report investigated that it was risky to ask about gun on the online forum, 
because it might be easily found by the Internet police. Thus, gun enthusiasts invented the “black 
talk,” as a means to complete the transaction. For example, they substituted gun (qiang) for dog 
(gou). See Yang Jiang 楊江, “Heiqiang Diaocha 黑槍調查” (Investigating illicit guns), Xinmin 
Weekly 新民週刊, 44 (November 2012): 54.  
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gambling, and sexual transaction.24 The evidence also makes it clear that the rifle or low-quality 
local gun is the primary firearms in most criminal cases involving guns. What follows are the 
replica guns, military weapons, and air guns. In additional to sporadic criminals who acquired 
guns for individual motives, a majority of gun-bearers and arms trafficking practitioners consists 
of the members of black societies and triad-like organized gangs. The presence of criminal 
organizations and their role in arms trafficking are not novel to China.   
While it is fair to assume that most illicit gun owners today are the ones with purely 
criminal intentions, China in recent years also witnesses a rise of shooting enthusiasts and gun 
amateurs. Though the strict ban on private gun ownership, the government and general public’s 
lauds over marksmanship have never been faltered. Rifle shooting has become an integral part of 
China’s military training programs for college students. Since pistol shooter Xu Haifeng won 
China’s first Olympic gold medal in 1984, he emerged as a superstar and a household name, and, 
for most Chinese people, the shooting sports were tightly bound to China’s Olympic dreams. 
China’s superior position in shooting events have become apparent in the successive Olympic 
games, as Chinese athletes have successively displayed their gold medal potentials. In some first- 
and second-tier cities, the government has sanctioned the private operation of shooting clubs, 
which would satisfy the country’s rising upper-middle class’s demands for stimulating and 
adventurous activities. 25 The North International Shooting Range located in north Beijing and 
the East Shanghai Shooting and Archery Club are the two major ranges for hobby enthusiasts to 
                                                          
24 Pang Yan 龐岩, “Sheqiang Fanzui de Diaocha Yanjiu 涉槍犯罪的調查研究” (An 
investigation on gun-related crime), Guangdong Gongan Keji 廣東公安科技 (Guangdong public 
security technology), 3 (September 2013): 16-17. 
25 Wang Jiangen 王健根 and Xie Lei 謝磊, “Shui zai Fanqiang 誰在販槍” (Who is trafficking 
guns), Renmin Gongan 人民公安 (People’s Police) 23 (December 2012): 12.  
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relax and practice shooting at a high price. These enthusiasts (mostly middle-class men with 
legal occupation) are known for their buying power and the readiness to collect fashionable guns. 
It is now pretty apparent that a significant number of gun collectors frequently express their 
predilections for small arms and connoisseurship on many cyber forums for gun amateurs. One 
of such forums, which has more than 70,000 registered members contains sixteenth sub 
discussions, six of which focus on small arms craftsmanship, personal experience, and hunting. 
Apart from these cyber forums, many other QQ groups, BBSs, and chat rooms have provided 
these enthusiasts platforms to exchange gun information and help spread purchase channels. 
These people, though not in huge numbers as criminals, constitute another important gun 
consumers.26 
The Chinese government is deeply wary about the armed populace, and has been taking 
high-handed tactics to stamp out illicit gun ownership. With China’s rapid economic growth and 
the process of globalization, there has been a trend of the expansion of underground gun trade. 
As discussed above, both the criminal groups and some better-off Chinese people have growing 
demand for guns, adding new challenges to public safety. Certainly, it is unlikely for the ban on 
private possession of guns to be lifted, nor will it become a controversial political issue in 
today’s China. A unified China under one-Party rule today guarantees the maximum 
effectiveness of the gun control policy. Conversely, as this proceeding chapters suggested, the 
political decentralization of the late Qing and Republican China kept the governments from 
constructing a consistent and effective gun policy. 
                                                          
26 Li Min 李民 and Gao Fengli 高鳳立, “Biyao Bangzhu zhi Zhufanhua 必要幫助犯之主犯化” 
(A transition from abettor to prime culprit), Dalian Haishi Daxue Xuebao 大連海事大學學報 
(Journal of Dalian Maritime University) 3 (2015): 81.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Using government documents, criminal cases, popular writings, private memoirs, and 
many other primary sources, this dissertation has presented the multifaceted symbolism of the 
gun in modern China, and has shown how the prevalence of gun ownership influenced social 
life, and the dynamics between state and society. This dissertation has suggested that guns 
became invested with social and symbolic meanings, which were subject to change over time 
and space. In a period characterized by both disintegration of state power and rapid sociocultural 
transition, the word qiang (槍 gun) connoted different things to different non-state actors who 
sought to arm themselves during the late Qing and Republican periods. It was a tool to commit 
violence, a symbol of self-empowerment, and an the indicator of one’s commitment to national 
politics. For successive Chinese governments, the gun in civilian hands meant either a social 
power that would be relied upon or a  representation of a threat against state authority.  
 As this dissertation has argued, the multiple sociocultural and political implications of 
private-owned guns in modern China revealed the difficulty in carrying out a consistent and 
resolute policy towards an armed populace. As we have seen, in the context of the disintegration 
of central power, foreign intrusion, and political fragmentation, state builders from the late Qing 
dynasty viewed putting guns in the hands of ordinary civilians as extensions of state power, 
under the prerequisite that armed civilians were properly regulated. A model of what I termed 
“control/reliance” was shaped in the late Qing, as a means to maintain government coexistence 
with the armed civilians. Nevertheless, the equilibrium between a weak state and society was by 
no means stable, as the state’s resolute determination to assert its legitimate authority was never 
shaken. As suggested in chapter three, the early Republican government’s suppression of the 
Canton Merchants’ Corps indicates that the state frowned on an armed populace lest they 
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threaten government authority, though armed forces like the Corps’ important role in the 
province was acknowledged and even relied upon when Sun Yat-sen’s revolution was in its 
expansive phase. Modern China’s political decentralization determined that the balance between 
state and society swung back and forth. As chapter four showed, a sustainable relationship with 
the armed population led by local elite facilitated state penetration of the rural society, which, 
however, prevented the government from implementing its gun regulations, leading to an 
inconsistent and contingent policy. This gave the Chinese Communist Party the opportunity to 
integrate the armed civilians into its revolutionary agenda. The Communists in North China 
adopted the practice of class struggle in the process of mobilization of armed peasants in the 
1930s and 1940s, which played a critical role in consolidating its political power and expanding 
its military presence. Finally, as discussed in this chapter’s first section, the Communist 
government’s movement of disarming civilians echoes the thesis of this dissertation that the 
state’s stance towards private gun ownership was dynamic and contingent, which was 
determined by central power and political conditions.   
 Scholars based in both China and the West have construed the historical development of 
modern China in many different ways, but some key themes have prevailed. These themes have 
included: the parallels and contradictions between Western culture and Chinese culture; the 
protracted struggle between state-building efforts and intractable energy of local society; the 
constant military conflicts and their impacts on politics and society; the Chinese participation in 
a global or transnational discourse; the process of a grassroots revolutionary movement led by 
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the Chinese Communist Party; socio-political changes and their reflections in popular culture.27 
Most of these studies, fruitful as they are, however, are confined to a single aspect of China’s 
historical trajectory. It should be noted that modern China was shaped by the convergence of 
these social, cultural, and political elements.  
 This dissertation focusing on gun culture and gun regulations provides a prism through 
which we can observe the interconnectedness and combinations of these elements in the making 
of modern China. It supplements our common knowledge of the gun, which, as the proceeding 
chapters argued, meant more than a tool used by soldiers to defend the nation, or held by police 
to maintain social order. As an exotic commodity, the gun links foreign technology with Chinese 
conditions, and reflects the process of how a once powerful empire was drawn into the whirlpool 
of global movements. The gun also enriches our understanding of the Chinese people – elite, 
peasant, woman, outlaw, new middle class, and many others. Their different motives and uses of 
guns, from another perspective, illustrate the impact of social forces on personal lives. A close 
look at gun regulation and control implemented by the late Qing and Republican governments 
helps investigate the bond and divide between government authority and social autonomy. The 
dual process of mobilization and confiscation of the gun by the Communists in the countryside 
sheds new light on how the CCP seized every possibility to further and deepen its revolution. 
Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say the gun is also a prism through which modern China’s 
social change and complexity are refracted.  
 
                                                          
27 For the exploration of writings on modern Chinese history by Chinese historians, see Huaiyin 
Li, Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013). For the American historical writing, see Paul A. 
Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).  
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